

# History issues of Russian 20th century



V. Barabash  
G. Bordyugov  
S. Devyatov  
E. Kotelenets

---

Association of Researchers into the Russian Society (AIRO-XXI)  
Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN),  
Philological Faculty

**Viktor Barabash, Gennady Bordyugov,  
Sergey Devyatov, Elena Kotelenets**

# History issues of Russian 20<sup>th</sup> century

A Study guide for students of the Faculty of Philology  
in the major of «Journalism», «Television Broadcasting»  
and «Advertising and Public Relations»  
at the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia

*Translation editor M. Kupriyanova*



Москва  
2021

---

УДК 328.185  
ББК 66.3(0)3  
Р 76

*Proofreader Alexander Melkov*

*Cover of the book Alexandra Zvyagina*

**P 76 Barabash V., Bordyugov G., Devyatov S., Kotelenets E.**

History issues of Russian 20th century / Translation editor M. Kupriyanova. —  
М.: АИРО-XXI, 2021. — 288 с.

ISBN 978-5-91022-488-3

A Study guide for students of the Faculty of Philology in the major of «Journalism»,  
«Television Broadcasting» and «Advertising and Public Relations» at the Peoples'  
Friendship University of Russia.

ISBN 978-5-91022-488-3

© Авторы, 2021  
© ЦНИ «Актуальная история», 2021  
© Щербина С., макет, 2021  
© АИРО-XXI, 2021

---

## CONTENTS

|               |   |
|---------------|---|
| PREFACE ..... | 7 |
|---------------|---|

## INTRODUCTION

### ***Theme 1***

|   |   |
|---|---|
| The Study of Modern Russian History:<br>Main Characteristics and Trends ..... | 9 |
|---|---|

## MAIN PART

### ***Theme 2***

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Russia at the Beginning of the 20th century:<br>Its Self-Image, Economic and Political Organization,<br>and Contradictions of its Development ..... | 18 |
|---|----|

### ***Theme 3***

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Festival of the Oppressed or Social Disease?<br>The Nature of the Russian Revolutions ..... | 25 |
|---|----|

### ***Theme 4***

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Emergency Measures and the “Extreme Emergency<br>Regime” in the Soviet Republic and Other State<br>Formations on the Territory of Russia, 1918–1920 ..... | 38 |
|---|----|

### ***Theme 5***

|   |    |
|---|----|
| From “War Communism” to the New Economic Policy:<br>Contradictions of the NEP ..... | 55 |
|---|----|

## **Theme 6**

|  |    |
|--|----|
| NEP Downsizing and the Transformation of the Policy<br>of Extraordinary Measures into a Permanent System<br>of Government..... | 61 |
|--|----|

## **Theme 7**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| The 1930s: Crises, Reforms, Repressions ..... | 76 |
|---|----|

## **Theme 8**

|  |    |
|--|----|
| The Hierarchy of the Great Terror..... | 85 |
|--|----|

## **Theme 9**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Illusions and Awakening of the Generation of 1930s..... | 94 |
|---|----|

## **Theme 10**

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| The Great Patriotic War 1941–1945:<br>Main Events and Popular Mood in the Unoccupied<br>Soviet Union ..... | 102 |
|--|-----|

## **Theme 11**

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| The People and Problems of the Post-War Era..... | 123 |
|--|-----|

## **Theme 12**

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| The Khrushchev Thaw and Its Reverse Side ..... | 130 |
|--|-----|

## **Theme 13**

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| The 1960s and the 1970s: From Reforms to Stagnation..... | 138 |
|--|-----|

## **Theme 14**

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| The 1980s: The Space of Power and a Search<br>for New Ways of Historical Progress ..... | 146 |
|---|-----|

## **Theme 15**

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| The August Putsch of 1991 and the Termidor of Yeltsin..... | 155 |
|--|-----|

**FINAL PART**

**CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA WITH WHAT DOES RUSSIA  
ENTER THE NEW MILLENNIUM?**

**Theme 16**

The Realm of Power Under Vladimir Putin ..... 164

**Theme 17**

Reforms and The Hierarchy of National Projects ..... 177

**SPECIAL THEMES**

**Theme 18**

Locating of the Revolutionary Period of 1917  
in Russian Historical Memory ..... 197

**Theme 19**

The Great Victory of 1945 in Historical Memory..... 208

**Theme 20**

Twentieth-century Russian Utopias:  
Archaeology of the Future as Imagined by the State  
and Desired by the Intelligentsia..... 220

**APPENDIX**

I. Maps..... 239

II. Main events, dates and glossary ..... 250

III. Selected biographies ..... 273



---

## PREFACE

In the middle of last century, many held that the 20<sup>th</sup> century marked the beginning of a Russian era. Others discussed a “Russian miracle”, referring to the rise of the Soviet Union thanks to the communist idea. During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Russia found an alternative to capitalism as a result of the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917. Industrial modernization and fantastic social mobility not only dramatically changed the image of the country, but also helped to win the mortal battle against Nazi Germany. After World War II, interest in the Soviet Union rose significantly all around the world. The communist idea was changing from a utopian idea into a palpable reality. Both common people and intellectual elites were awaiting the outcome of the “cold war” between the two systems of world order: the USSR and the USA.

“Free market capitalism” was drawing lessons from the world wars, crises, the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s, and protests by left-minded youth in the 1960s. Meanwhile, “elements of socialism” could clearly be seen in the new course of Franklin Roosevelt and Ludwig Erhard, based on expanding state control over the economy and extensive social programs. However, new challenges, primarily caused by a scientific-technical revolution, did not prevent the West from turning to Reaganomics and Thatcherism – that is, to neo-liberalism – starting in the 1980s.

In Russia, the Bolsheviks resorted to violence as a tool of building a new regime and changing society and individuals. As a result, the country received a state-controlled economy based on the administrative mobilization of people and resources, the GULAG (labor camps), the Great Terror and intellectual isolation. Khrushchev’s “thaw” and Gorbachev’s “perestroika” were attempts to get out of the historical traps the country had fallen into as a result of lingering adherence to Stalin’s and Brezhnev’s views of socialism. In 1991, the



country abruptly changed course, towards the restoration of a neo-liberal form of capitalism.

These lectures provide a new understanding and new vision of the dynamics of the historical process in 20<sup>th</sup> century Russia in all its complexity. They also explain why Russia, in spite of having enormous human potential and natural resources, faced such difficulties in development. Russia is portrayed as an integral part of world history, while at the same time its historical peculiarities as compared to both the East and West.

The articles and reference materials are addressed to our colleagues: university teachers and research staff working with foreign undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students. They will also be of interest to people studying Russian history and to visitors and others who want to get a deeper insight into the Russia's past while also learning about trends in the development and the chosen paths of Russia in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

We are offering our interpretation of a people's way of life and mentality, of a country's power structures and regimes, economic policy models, and vision of the future as well as our view of key events of the last century. The book is based on lectures and reports delivered by the authors in universities and research centers in Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, the USA, France, South Korea and Japan.

---

## INTRODUCTION

### *Theme 1*

#### **The Study of Modern Russian History: Main Characteristics and Trends**

The academic study of history has been significantly reconsidered and retooled during the last two decades. Scholars had to solve a whole number of questions. This process was accompanied by “the struggle for the past” and the filling in of so-called “blank spots”; as well as by changes in the subject matter and value orientations of Russian scholars, the destruction of previously existing historical hierarchies, the beginning of coexistence between history and the Internet, market penetration in science and rivalry for the best “packaging” of historical knowledge.

The main reason for understanding the principle characteristics and trends of these transformations is to find out why historical science still attracts public attention in new conditions, and why it is used not only as science but also as a tool for making sense of current events.

Since the middle of the 1980s scholars have been studying Soviet history on the basis of the interests and priorities of Perestroika, elaborating historical patterns according to current political tendencies. While the official state policy was destroying the past, these patterns met the requirements of historical science itself. Researchers were clearing the historical research field of old dogmas and stereotypes. Nobody realized the possible pitfalls of this intellectual revolution. The review of the past was based not on historical science itself but on external factors. Political essays were filling the ideological vacuum. However, the approaches of popular commentators were more political than analytical. Historiography itself was only prepared to remove

old concepts taken from Stalin's "*Short course*" and to replace them with others elaborated in the conditions of a new political situation.

The first animated discussions were actually aimed not at broadening historical science itself, but at "schematizing" it. Some researchers defended and wanted to conserve the old "patterns," others wanted to destroy them. But neither group went outside the bounds of old stereotypes, stable traditions and claims to have a monopoly on truth. The result of these politicized discussions about the past resulted in a vulgar squabble over whether the country had been moving in the wrong direction for more than seventy years. At the least, this was a positive phenomena because the appearance of many "patterns" and explanatory concepts offered real choices and opened room for debate.

Some historians suggested looking for so called "big algorithms" (that is, large-scale structural imperatives of varying kinds – PTC) of Soviet history in the concepts that "had developed themselves" or penetrated Soviet historical science from western sociology. They could give a fundamental explanation of the historical phenomenon of Russia in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. These "big algorithms" include: "rapid economic development designed to overtake the West" or industrial modernization, "large-scale revolution," "the algorithm of empire" and the "doctrinal" algorithm. Behind each of them, there is a concept that had already been well elaborated in western sociology and historiography.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the "doctrinal" algorithm was the most popular. This approach reflects the recent past as the realization of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks initial political doctrine. It deals with the different ways Marxist concepts were adapted to fit the Stalinist political system. Today these ideas represent a specific Russian modification of the "totalitarian" approach developed by American Sovietologists of the "Cold War" period.

There are many facts and events in the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that could explain the first algorithm, connected with the modernization pattern, and the "big revolution" algorithm. As for the first algorithm, since the end of the 1960s political scientists had been elaborating concepts explaining the developmental particularities of the second-tier capitalist countries, including Russia. The second algorithm was used by the Bolsheviks' opponents, such as the Men-

sheviks, the National-Bolsheviks and the Trotskyists. This algorithm was also supported by those scientists who doubt the revolutionary character of the October Revolution of 1917 and refused to include it among the “great revolutions.” Whatever the attitude toward the Russian revolution, this approach did provide a scientific interpretation of the political extremism, violence and terror that occurred. It also allowed historians to trace the revolution’s ascent, regression and decline – that is, its “Thermidorian” and “Bonapartist” phases. The same can be said of the “algorithm of empire,” which can also be used to explain the birth, development, and collapse of the Russian and Soviet imperial systems.

The “grand algorithms” at best could form a clear historical picture of social development as a whole, but they could not deal with the analysis of concrete historical periods. They cannot explain many seemingly particular questions. This means that we need some “cross-over” from global historiographical schemes to particular historical descriptions. It is necessary to find the turning points, notably the periods of fundamental change in the historical interaction of the “big algorithms,” when some algorithms come to the foreground and become determinative and others disappear or become dormant.

For the description of past crucial and routine turning points we can use Hegel’s concepts of “epic” and “prosaic” world conditions. According to Hegel, in its development, society not only goes through various phases, but through comparatively concentrated periods of high social tension and concentrated contradictions as well. They indicate the “crucial moments” of history. Some “crucial moments” develop into “epic” phases leading to great social progress. Others become moments when tactical choices are made concerning ways and means to advance society. The analysis of critical moments allows us to understand how the very nature of societal movement is changing or might change, how social contradictions interact, and what the relative strength among the “grand algorithms” appears to be.

During a period of crisis or social confrontation we see the destruction of the habitual patterns of mass behavior. We see political extremism spilling out into the historical arena, giving rise to an atmosphere of intolerance and confrontation. Unfortunately, we know far too little about these problems which are so significant for the comprehension of the phenomenon “Russia in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.” It is

important to understand why some crises lead to liberalization of the regime while others lead to its regeneration on even harsher foundations.

Political mechanisms of solving social crises as well as forms of social consolidation and stability differ greatly in conditions of “open” and “closed” political life. Historians have only just begun to study the real causes of the appearance in Russia of the one-party dictatorship, its social functions and concrete historical forms.

The events of 1991 and 1993 intensified discussions about the methodological crisis and new types of historiography. Some scientists even invited their colleagues to follow the “totalitarian” approach for the reason that it had prevailed in the West over so-called “revisionists.” Others were convinced of the advantages of the “civilization”-approach (with its ideological neutrality) over the “stages of development”-approach. While political scientists debating, postmodernism began to dominate the foreground. Postmodernism cast doubt on the necessity of history as science. Earlier, society had been looking for universal historical concepts. Historians freely used such concepts as “people,” “class,” “nation,” “state” etc. However, by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, in light of the crisis of modernism, industrial and urban ways of life, and the collapse of many political and intellectual absolutisms, everything has changed. The present is no more a logical result of the forward march of history.

Some scientists saw the way out of crisis in a paradigm shift – the substitution of modernism, with its universal explanatory theories of social development, with postmodernism. Post-structuralism allows us to outline patterns of multidimensional and irregular change. Michigan University Professor P. Novik said that the “postmodernism era” had dissolved historical time in a diversity of texts and opinions. However, some western researchers (P. Novik, K. Lloyd, J. Applebee, L. Hunt, M. Jacob etc) did not view postmodernism as a new tool of intellectual analysis. On the contrary, they considered it a “tool of control over minds” like Marxism and liberalism. Postmodernism became a mind controlling tool rather than a new tool of intellectual analysis. According to the teachings of postmodernism, historical thinking is destructive, it interferes with the present. Since nothing can be repeated in the world, there is no need to know history. We have to free ourselves from the “burden of history.” Thus the former attractiveness

of postmodernism (how to find the meanings and contradictions in a text) turned to an extreme.

The representatives of the “new historical science” justify the search for a new approach through an innovative interpretation of historical objectivity. Every science is based on the interaction of a qualified researcher with an object of investigation. History that can understand and explain the world may still be written (REWRITE). Unlike poststructuralists, practical realists emphasize the ability of words to articulate different forms of interaction between the researcher and object of historical investigation. We can admit that language is a formality, that historians use rhetorical means and that the past has been constructed. However, we can draw a line between the past and the historical view on the past. It may be useful to ask anti-constructivists how to find the hidden meanings in the text. Points of view may be different. However, documents and sources must be carefully checked by different historians. This will facilitate a more positive approach which allows us to locate valid interpretations among the rival opinions on the past (with the existence of different variants of history).

This approach is valuable because of its ways and forms of dealing with the object of investigation. Each generation of historians deals with it in a different way, using notions that are valuable during a concrete period of history. Each generation rewrites history. Meanwhile the historian – a qualified researcher – is not obliged to be an impersonal truth seeker. She must take her own traits into consideration: her character, nationality, gender, and so on. This self-awareness is already a real revolution in historical thinking. Seeking scientific neutrality and objectivity must not turn into a form of religion.

A discussion of new paradigms was seriously complicated by the emergence from underground of “national histories.” In the early 1990s they began to replace State-centered histories of the USSR, which were common at that time. The concept of “national” histories (as opposed to “Soviet” histories) began to predominate in politics as well as in educational systems.

We will try to find an explanation for these phenomena through the examination of the historical circumstances, of the process of so-called nationalization of the popular historical consciousness, through consideration of historians’ inclination for nationalism and elites’ tendency to instrumentalize the past. However, we should emphasize the

fact that the concept of “national history” in its sociological meaning is nothing else but a system of knowledge, created by the national school of historiography. It shows varying degrees of ethnocentrism.

For example, the history of France is considered to be the history of the whole population, not the history of the nation as an *ethnos*. This means that it focuses on the history of the territory and the state (the principle of the “political nation”) and less on the history of the formation of the population (of the Gauls, the Teutons, etc.). When it comes to “national” German history it means the history of all the Germans. The Japanese history known as “*kokushi*” means both the “native history” and the “national history.”

In Russia, “national history” is perceived as a system of knowledge which refers to the past of an *ethnos* and its cooperation with historical neighbors. The appearance of this concept was caused by the creation of the national idea, which justifies the cultural and political pretensions of the ruling classes. National historians of the Commonwealth of Independent States “change” the history to justify the process of the formation of independent post-Soviet states.

Some kind of rehabilitation of national history began in 1988. Criticism of such notions as “empire” and “imperial thinking” and later of the process of the formation of the Russian Empire as the series of Tsarist Russia’s crimes against peoples, caused in Russian society a peculiar guilt complex about its “imperial” past. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the modification of former complexes and pretensions. “Nationalities” were confronted by the co-existence of old and new identities, including national ones. This provoked an identity crisis and a desire to overcome Russia’s status of being on the historical and cultural periphery, of its role as a nation being driven by outside forces. People started searching for arguments to prove that their achievements were in keeping with the great patterns of world civilization.

Of course not every detail of the national life came to the fore. In the course of reconsidering “their” past, even historians approved of depicting their peoples as heroes and sometimes as victims, they were inclined to make their statehood more ancient, to exaggerate the level of political and social development of ethnic groups, to assert their nation at the neighbors’ expense, and to create a modified pantheon of the outstanding national figures.

Historical circumstances and the “nationalization” of popular historical consciousness automatically consolidated the historians’ inclination toward nationalist ideology and nationalistic movements. Moreover historians often became founders or supporters of nationalist doctrine. German, French, British and Japanese researchers tried to estimate and understand this phenomenon. They created historiography which could substantiate states’ ambitious aspirations. Even the evolution of nationalism became historical, especially when in the 20<sup>th</sup> century after World War I a new type of nationalism (ethnonationalism) appeared.

There are several stages in the evolution of the national idea in the USSR. Official historiography focused on a class-based and internationalist approach to historical problems. The term “nationalism” was used in a pejorative sense, as a political label to compare it negatively to internationalism. Meanwhile during the first decade after the October Revolution histories were being written in the atmosphere of cooperation between the central government and indigenous elites, which stimulated the nation-building process among large ethnic groups.

In the late 1920s, there emerged a contradiction between the Russian scientific community, which represented the official historiography of the USSR, and national historians of the other Soviet republics. National histories became the equivalent of anti-Marxism or deviation from Bolshevism. Stalin’s reign dealt a serious blow to national elites and cultures, which were consistently and systematically repressed and contained in the context of the assertion of Bolshevik ideological priorities. Stalin’s regime was concerned with the tension among intellectuals. Turning historiography into a way of substantiating Russian greatness was accompanied by the collapse of Lenin’s class-based historiography. The idea of “national” histories was a way to secretly preserve cultural orientations during this period. National historiographies came to function as part of an official Soviet historiography.

After Stalin’s death, political leaders of the country gave up trying to turn Russian patriotism into a total ideology and historiography. That period of time was characterized by reconstruction of the nation, the formation of new national elites and the search for national histories. The ideological system and official historiography supported the domination of the idea of Soviet patriotism.



In the late 1980s national histories obtained the status of official historiographies. A great myth about a new historical community “the Soviet Nation” began to disappear. It was replaced with new historical perceptions on the part of Soviet nationality groups. National histories now offered a way for up and coming political elites to assert themselves. The political elites of post-Soviet states had to create nations with great national traditions. This is why they needed myths that combined the old and the new.

Science has been studying myths for more than two centuries. Researchers began to realize that myths were a valid attempt to make sense of the world and they began to study myths as an important part of culture and a way to perceive people’s consciousness. Myths challenged ideology, and ideology in its turn started to use myths.

Schematization, simplification, simulation of complicated religious and social processes provides a basis for ideological systems (doctrines). Myths reflect rituals as well. Scientific theories try to make something clear through research, examination, and experience, while myths reflect canonical explanations. A theory tries to formulate a law, which is always open to challenge and falsification. A myth is not. It is ideal when myths and scientific theories are balanced. The predominance of myth is dangerous: it is much easier to manipulate people’s consciousness and actions when the irrational dominates (myths always use irrational proofs).

In Russia myths have not only been reconstructed, but have become a strange mixture of pre-revolutionary, Soviet and post-Soviet myths. They prevent us from approaching actual history, as ideology did before. These old/new myths operate as a support, identity, orientation, protection and demarcation. These functions are neutral but they can become positive or negative according to the situation. Myths can soften crises; they let us deal with all the contradictions and complications of reforms. However they can be used and they are used to achieve certain goals, to take people under control.

Political myths, myths created by and about the ruling class, are of great contemporary interest. They became a distinctive feature of the twentieth century. Political and ideological myths have a tendency to create imagery of a new reality, to determine people’s behavior. Sometimes history chooses as a leading myth a notion advanced by the authorities, such as “enlightened power” or the “power of an iron

fist”; sometimes state ideology portrayed the country as a “united and indivisible Russia”; or Moscow as the “Third Rome.” The USSR created its own “sacred history” with its own “precursors,” like the “revolutionary events of 1905”; with its own predecessors (“revolutionary democrats” of the nineteenth century), with its prophets, ascetics and martyrs, its rituals and ceremonies. The October Revolution provided an opportunity to create a new world. History then had to describe the fight against domestic and foreign enemies (the “continuation of class struggle”), and the “era of battles” (The Great Patriotic War). According to Soviet ideology, Stalin was not only the successor of Lenin, he was Lenin’s incarnation: “Stalin is Lenin today.”

It is important to stress that these non-traditional myths were made artificially. But it is pointless to debate whether a myth is “true” or not. As Roland Barthes claimed: “the myth doesn’t hide anything, it doesn’t show anything, it’s characterized not by telling lies or the truth, but by diverging.” In other words, the basic principle of myth is to transform history from a record of the actual contingent actions of human beings into the unfolding of a preordained and determined process of nature.

The thesis that only the authorities set the range and define the norms and truths of knowledge was rejected during the last decade. Today history is not officially exploited by the State as a political instrument, although there have been many attempts to revival of Soviet tendencies to “protect” Russian history and of imperial or monarchic tendencies in public thinking.

New conditions of social and academic life, and new communication links, make it impossible to “usurp the past,” although the fight to do so still exists. Understanding the fact that historical science has a public nature strengthens the positions of amateur historians, who defend their right to speak and write about history. Many historians have resorted to “new historicism,” which demands “a more equal exchange between the two halves of a kaleidoscope facing the past” – between history and literature, as Russian sociologist Alexander Etkind has written. Overcoming barriers between the humanities, striving to get out of the “disciplinary ghetto,” and new opportunities for communication has provoked a discussion about the language with which to describe the past and about ascertaining the range of connections between different branches of science which analyze the past.

---

## MAIN PART

### *Theme 2*

#### **Russia at the Beginning of the 20th century: Its Self-Image, Economic and Political Organization, and Contradictions of its Development**

Russia entered the 20<sup>th</sup> century with confidence, based on its history and human, economic and political potential. Russia was second in the list of the largest countries with a territory of more than 22 million square kilometers, second only to the British Empire. The Eastern and Northern parts of the country bordered the Arctic Ocean, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea. Overland Southern and Western borders were interrupted by the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. In the South, Russia bordered on oriental countries: Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and China. One-third of the territory of the country (50 *guberniyas* of Russia, Northern Caucasia and The Kingdom of Poland) was European, two thirds was Asian (Southern Caucasia, Siberia and Central Asia).

The first population census in the Russian Empire was taken at the end of the XIX century (January, 1897). It recorded 125,640,021 persons, the number of women (50.3% of the population) was bigger than that of men (49.7%). Age composition in comparison with other countries differed substantially; there were more children and fewer people of working age and older. About a half of the population was under 20.

To understand the population density (taking into account natural environment and peculiarities of historic development), we have to compare it with that of other European countries. For example, in France population density was about 83.1 people per square kilometer, in Germany it was 118.6, in England 155.7, and in Russia in 1897

it was about 6.7 and in 1910 it was 8.5. This figure compares only with the population density of the USA.

The peoples of Russia spoke 146 different languages and dialects, but the majority of the population, almost 80%, was representatives of five peoples. “Great” Russians (Velikorossy) made up 44.3% of the population (55.7 million people), “Little” Russians or Ukrainians (Malorossy) accounted for 17.8% (22.4 million) and Byelorussians for 4.7% (5.9 million). All in all it was 66.8% of the population of the country. In addition, in the Russian Empire there was a large population of Poles (6.3%, or 7.9 million) and Jews (4.2% or 5.1 million).

Migration and colonization in some regions led to a large mix of races. Fifty percent of the population of the 50 Russian guberniyas and Siberia were Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, in the Caucasus they were only 34%.

Concerning other peoples living in the Russia Empire, the majority (10.8%, 13.6 million) were those who spoke Turkic languages, the Tartars, Bashkirs, Azerbaijani, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Chuvash, Nogai, Yakuts and others.

The multinational population of Russia led to a complicated confessional composition. About 69.4% of the population (Russians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Romanians, Finns and other northern nations) were Orthodox Christians. To the second group belonged Muslims (11.1%) with Turko-Tartars and Caucasian mountaineers practicing this religion. To the third group belonged Catholics (9.1%). They were Poles, Lithuanians and some of the Armenians. 4.2% of the population practiced Judaism. To the group of small confessions belonged Lutherans, in particular Latvians, Germans, Finn, and Gregorian Armenians; Buddhists and Lamaists, Mongolo-Buryats, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese and northern peoples.

The population census in 1897 estimated that there were 2.2 million Old Believers and others who did not accept church reforms of the 17th century. However, some specialists think that in fact they were more than 20 million. As they were pursued by the Police and the Court, they concealed their religion.

The result of a century's cooperation between the state and the various confessions was a decree “On Strengthening the Basis of Religious Tolerance” adopted on April 17, 1905. It guaranteed the right to freely change from one religious community to another, and with

certain conditions from Christianity to non-Christianity. Old Believers and other schismatics were given equal rights with all the other religious confessions. It was also officially forbidden to call Buddhists and Lamaists “idolaters” and “pagans.”

(Actually, when the Provisional Government came to power in February 1917, confessional policy was re-targeted at building a secular society in a religiously neutral state. After October, 1917, an effort was made to eliminate religion not only at the level of the state and public life, but from private life as well).

The population of Russia was divided into 4 “statuses” (with different rights and liberties): nobility, clergy, urban dwellers and country inhabitants. Urban dwellers were subdivided into noble citizens, merchants, bourgeois, and craftsmen. Country inhabitants consisted of peasants, Cossacks, petit bourgeois and artisans. At the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century, two parallel processes were taking place. On the one hand, there was the overall unification of social classes, their coming together and strengthening as classes. On the other hand, the overall class structure was rapidly decaying.

In terms of social structure, we have to take into consideration the fact that at that time about 76.5% of the population earned its living in agriculture, 5.7% in trade and transport, 10% in industry, and 7.8% in non-industrial activity, including education, medicine, science, and state service. One of the particularities of Russian social structure was its polarization. The upper middle class and landlords were numerically insignificant, while the majority of the population was small-scale owners and semi-proletarian layers. They comprised about 60% of the population, and if proletarians are included the number rises to almost 80%. That could not help but aggravate social contradictions in the country.

As is well known, Russia was one of those states trying to catch up in terms of economic development, but it was quite late entering the path of modern industrial development. The basis of this development was the appearance of industrial factories that exploited the labor of serfs who worked under the quit-rent system. In search for the money to pay this tribute, the peasants either had to search for work in the city or were engaged in small-scale craft production in the villages. This is how the textile industry appeared. It was the textile industry that catalyzed organic and autonomous industrial growth of

the country. By the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the expansion rate of the economy was relatively high from the point of view of global standards. Russia belonged to a group of countries with quickly developing economies like the USA, Japan and Sweden. At the turn of the century, Russia was fourth or fifth in iron ore, iron and steel smelting, mechanical production, industrial consumption of cotton and sugar production. Russia was the leading country in oil production due to the development of the Baku oil production complex. The length of the railway system was the second in the world to the USA.

The economic crisis of 1899–1903 temporarily interrupted economic growth. Many factories were closed, but several fruitful years gave a new impulse to industrial development. After the crisis, monopoly concerns began to develop as syndicates and cartels began working in close cooperation with banks.

Thus, Russia at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century can be defined a semi-industrial country – that is, agriculture dominated over industry. Colonial holdings of Western European countries were separated from the metropolis by the sea. Russia was an empire where the metropolis and under-developed colonies were united in one territory and in one state. The European territory of the country accounted for about nine tenths of industrial and agricultural production. Clearly, however, at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Russia was just beginning the transition to a predominately industrial society.

Russia managed to make progress because of foreign business and investment. In this regard, the Empire was not different from other countries that were rather late to enter the path of industrial development and enjoyed the support of their rich neighbors. While not deprecating foreign investments, it was still national capital that was the determining factor in the economic development of the country. One of the most significant features of Russian monopoly capitalism, however, was the leading role of the state. The state determined the amount and distribution of government acquisitions, fixed taxes and privileges and controlled banks.

Russia entered the 20<sup>th</sup> century as an autocratic monarchy. The head of state was Emperor (Tsar) Nicholas II, a member of the Romanov family – a dynasty that had occupied the throne since 1623. His power was not limited by formal norms or public institutions. The Tsar relied on the Council of Ministers (a consultative assembly of



The Emperor Nicholas II and his wife, the Empress Alexandra

policymakers) and on the State Council (supreme legislative committee).

Administratively, Russia was divided into 78 guberniyas, 18 oblasts and the Island of Sakhalin. There were administrative units that consisted of several guberniyas. They were called general guberniyas and were established mainly on the outer periphery of the empire. The Tsar usually authorized the Minister of the Interior to appoint the governor (Head of the guberniya). Guberniyas consisted of counties, oblasts, and districts. Further division was specialized. There were volosts (districts) for autonomous peasants, lots for land captains, lots for judicial investigators and so on. By the 20<sup>th</sup> century local government (*zemstvo*) had already been introduced in 34 guberniyas in the European part of Russia, in all other parts everything was under control of the state. The zemstvos mainly dealt with economic issues. They consisted of guberniya and district representative councils and an executive board. Elections to zemstvos were held every three years.

Bureaucracy was one of the most important elements in a monarchical authoritarian system. Often, due to his power, an official had extensive opportunities for personal enrichment. In spite of popular conceptions

about Russian bureaucracy, the number of officials was not that great. If we compare the number of inhabitants in 1897 (129 million people) to the number of the officials (146,000), we see that for every 800 citizens there was only one official. (To compare, in the 1980s there was one governmental official for every fifteen people).

The political construction of the country outlined above had a corresponding specific ideological doctrine. As far back as in the 1830s, Count Sergei Uvarov (Minister of Education) called this doctrine “official nationality theory.” It was based on a three principles: Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality. The patriarchal basis of Russian conservatism and monarchism reflected Uvarov’s metaphor, and such views faced increasing difficulties fighting against rational liberal and social concepts.

More than 150 political (all-Russian, regional and national) parties supported different ideologies. They fell roughly into three groups: Rightists, Liberals and Socialists. The bitter dispute among them sharpened the key contradictions in Russia; resolving these contradictions was important for the further development of all the events in the country.

The disjuncture between the modern and archaic sectors of the economy (industry versus agriculture) was obvious. Capitalism in rural areas developed much more slowly than in cities and towns. Agriculture was inefficient, and although its productivity was increasing, Russia produced half as much bread per head as the USA and three times less than Argentina. The underdevelopment of agriculture slowed down capital formation, while the artificial attachment of peasants to land prevented the formation of a large and qualified working class.



Sergei Uvarov





Moscow Kremlin (1900)

Changes in the economy and the increasing complexity of the social structure conflicted with the class system, exacerbating national and social conflicts. State control over and interference with industrial production affected the Russian middle class, making it passive and restricting its political freedom and maturity.

Energetic economic growth was accompanied by rapid population growth. British historians A. Milword and S. Soul wrote: “Russia was a country of extremes in climate, luxury, needs, in primitive agriculture and modern steel-casting industry in Europe. Its population was growing so fast that all the efforts that could have been a success in other circumstances did not take proper effect.” Production per capita in Russia was less (2.5–3 times) than in the leading industrial countries, and Russia also lagged behind in labor productivity.

All this affected the level of civilization. It was defined not only by the culture of labor and life, but also by the educational level of the population. Only one fifth of the population at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was literate. Medical care was also poor, and the mortality rate was almost twice as high as in Europe.

The political and religious elite not only tried to draw the attention of the supreme governing power and society at large to these mounting contradictions, but also called on people to take dynamic actions and steps toward reform that could head off social tension and avoid the dangerous consequences of potentially serious clashes.

---

### *Theme 3*

## **Festival of the Oppressed or Social Disease? The Nature of the Russian Revolutions**

The only way to decode a thousand years of Russian history is to first unlock its root “code” of Revolution.

*The First Revolution of 1905–1907* was spawned by the social and political crisis which had arose as a consequence of the disastrous Russian war with Japan. After the massacre in Saint Petersburg on the 9th of January, 1905 (“Bloody Sunday”), peasant unrest grew; workers striked; the army and navy rebelled. Soon liberal and conservative parties appeared on the national stage. While the bourgeoisie insisted on liberal political reforms, trade unions and the Soviet of People’s Deputies demanded more radical action. Revolutionary parties (Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries) sought the destruction of the entire regime. The “All-Russian” (that is national) October political strike and liberal’s slashing attack on absolutism forced Nicholas II to publish the October 17 Manifest which promised to guarantee certain political liberties and to create a “representative” State Duma. These promises gave the government enough legitimacy to marginalize radical political groups and quell the armed rebellions of December 1905 as well as the worker rebellions, taking place in Moscow, Rostov-on-Don, Novorossiysk, and Ekaterinoslav. But the government was not destined to enjoy peace for long. In 1906, along with renewed labor strikes, the peasants, the armed forces, and several ethnic minorities began to rebel. The so-called “Putsch of June 3” caused the dissolution of the Second State Duma; the first Russian Revolution had ended. Absolutism created new institutions which would be more loyal to the monarchy such as the Parliamentary Representative Office. It also began massive agricultural reform – introduced by Prime Minister Arkady Stolypin – by permitting the peasants to leave the



The “Bloody Sunday” of January 9, 1905

commune (*obshchina*) for private farmsteads, thereby; it was hoped, creating a middle class citadel against the revolution. Furthermore, Stolypin encouraged mass migration to Siberia as a means of discouraging revolutionary activity. These reforms encouraged the development of Russian capitalism.

*The February Revolution of 1917* was concerned with overthrowing absolutism and establishing a democratic republic in Russia. The Revolution was sparked by a grave economic and political crisis. The crisis was exacerbated by the military disasters of the First World War, economic dislocation, and food shortages. On the 23 of February, lack of food in St-Petersburg (renamed Petrograd) provoked anti-war rallies, protests and massive strikes. The General Strike started on the 24–25 of February; on the 26 of February the strikes developed into an open struggle with the army in Petrograd. On the 27 of February, the General Strike grew into an armed rebellion. The troops took the side of the rebellions. The Union of Labor and Soldier Deputies was created along with the Interim Committee of the State Duma. This formed the basis for the new “Provisional” government. On the 2 (15) of March, Nicholas II was forced to abdicate.




The February Revolution of 1917

*The October Revolution of 1917* was the result of slow and inconsistent actions of the Provisional Government headed by Alexander Kerensky. Of course, he also faced a complicated context of agricultural labor crises and national conflicts. The fact that Russia continued to participate in the World War exacerbated the nationwide crisis. As a consequence, the influence of the radical Left increased in the centre of the country and the influence of the Nationalists in the periphery. The most active party was the Bolshevik Social Democratic Party. The members of the party espoused the ideals of a Socialist Revolution in Russia which they thought would give an impetus for the Worldwide Revolution. The Bolsheviks proclaimed popular slogans: “Peace, to the people”; “Land, to the peasants”; “Factories, to the labor class”. At the end of August – beginning of September, the Bolsheviks gained the majority in the Soviets of Petrograd and Moscow and proceeded to prepare for an armed rebellion, towards the opening of Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. On the night of 24–25 of October (November, 6–7), armed workers, soldiers of the Petrograd garrison and sailors of the Baltic Fleet stormed the Winter Palace and arrested the Provisional

Government. The Congress (the majority of which was built up by the Bolsheviks and left-side socialists-revolutionary) approved the overthrow of the government, passed Decrees on Peace and Land and organized the government, the Council of People's Commissars headed by Vladimir Lenin.

The oppositional forces loyal to the Provisional Government were soon crushed. Soon the Bolsheviks established predominance in most industrial cities. The main adversary – the Kadet Party was outlawed



Provisional Government (1917). Kerensky is standing second from the right

and the oppositional press was prohibited. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks obtained only 25% of the popular vote during the Constituent Assembly elections (November, 24 (12)). They dispelled The Constituent Assembly (Petrograd, January, 5 (18)) which refused to accept a number of demands of the Bolsheviks. This led to further splits and divisions in the Russian countryside, exacerbating the Civil War. The Soviet Government was firmly established in European Russia; it nationalized the banks and enterprises and wrapped up a truce with Germany. The Triple Entente countries tried to preclude Russia from disengagement and consolidation of Soviets authority. This is when the intervention of foreign countries started.

How do Revolutions begin? Theoretically, this is a trivial question.

While searching for a non-trivial answer, it would be interesting to observe the behavior of the “leaders” on the eve of the revolution. For example, what happened during the Revolution of 1905? After much contemplation, Nicholas II signed the decree “The Outline for a Course of Government Perfection” on the 14 of December, 1904. In



Assault on the Winter Palace on the night of October 25/26 1917

order to calm the nation after a number of defeats in the Russo-Japanese War Nicholas II promised to improve peasants life, to expand the rights of Zemstvos (district councils) and City Duma, to abolish press restrictions and to reduce the scope of emergency measures in inflamed regions of the Russian Empire (such as Finland). Nevertheless this document didn't contain any information about real land reform, political liberties, or a new constitution. Several days before that, on the 9 of January, 1905, the Emperor and his advisors decided that people should be “taught a lesson” and be discouraged from complaining about lawlessness and hardships. It is well known that the rejection of the reforms turned into “Bloody Sunday”, Moscow barricades and The Battleship “Potemkin”

Pavel Milyukov, a Liberal political leader and historian, was one of the main figures of the year 1917. He offered a scheme according to which the revolutions become inevitable:

- When the people urgently need a large-scale political or social reform;
- When the government is against peaceful settlement of the problem;
- When the government is no longer able to act by force;
- When the people not only stop fearing the government but also start despising it and laughing at it openly.

What Surprises Contemporaries in during Revolutions? All Russia's Revolutions prove the famous Napoleonic phrase: "You cannot start or stop a revolution." Therefore, it is little wonder that it is impossible to separate synthetically a political revolution from a social one. What is most surprising about revolutionary times is the rapid devaluation of democratic ideals, a phenomenon characteristic among both the "leaders" and the "masses." There are clear reasons for this. For example, in 1917–1918 there were two forms of democracy: an "established" form which was based on Duma traditions and oriented towards European standards, and a soviet form which had never been practiced in history before. These two forms could not find any middle ground; first there was crisis and then they turned to ostensibly outdated systems of rule.

Thus the Soviet "democracy" turned to single-party rule based on military patterns. "Established" democracy, on the other hand, was forced to cooperate with and later comply to "white" generals with pseudo-fascist ambitions. As a result, the country had to choose not between two forms of democracy, but rather between "red" and "white" dictatorships.

But these realities were not well understood by contemporaries who analyzed events using highly emotional language to express their feelings about the revolution: "flood", "windstorm", "maelstrom", "hurricane", "explosion", and "ecstasy". "Purification" and "regeneration" – this is what was expected to be seen after the cataclysm. And even Lev Tolstoy, one of the most vigorous critics of violence, compared the revolution of 1905 with the birth of a new life and admitted that it was beneficial and creates an "abyss of good".

Thus, carried away by revolutionary enthusiasm, few paid any attention to the actions of The Black Hundreds or the appearance of a



Revolutionary Russian sailors – “Death to the petty bourgeois”

great number of adventurers – people without any past, with made-up biographies. But as time went on, the “dirty foam” of the revolution and the immorality of its participants moved to the forefront. The well-known Manifesto of the 17 of October, 1905 (which guaranteed Russia the main civil liberties and gave the country the Legislative Duma) evoked the massacres of “patriots” in hundreds of cities in 36 Russian provinces. During one month more than 4,000 people died and about 10,000 people were disabled in the course of The Black Hundreds pogroms. Universities and gymnasiums were under siege. Due to nonfeasance of the authorities and particularly Nicholas II, in many towns a terror set in.

During the months of February and March 1917, the cruel chaos grew: there were corpses of gendarmes with ripped open bellies in Petrograd, the mad chase of officers in Kronstadt, vigilante justice in Yelets. An officer Fyodor Stepun, a future philosopher and sociologist, described Petrograd of 1917:

“I thought that I would find it exasperate, magnificent, filled with revolutionary romantics... My impression was indeed strong but the opposite of what I expected. Petrograd – from the outside to the



inside – presented an utter picture of dissoluteness, monotony and platitude. The town looked unusual and was definitely going through rough times. Endless red flags were fluttering in the air, but not as banners and colors of revolution, but, instead, they were hanging down along grey walls as dusty red pieces of cloth. A crowd of grey soldiers wearing shirts and greatcoats was drilling around grand squares and wide streets of the city, a picture obviously contradicting the scale and grandeur of the event. Occasionally, armored cars and trucks full of soldiers and workers passed by with noise: guns atilt, tumbled hair and angry, mad eyes. No, this is not the great idea of the revolution that I had heard about at the front, neither is it the nation desire to justify freedom, but its vile antithesis... This is a drunken joy that “the day is ours,” that we are making merry and not going to have to explain anything to anybody.”

“The source of true folk-spirit of the people” often produced something that didn’t comply with the primary ideas of the revolutionaries. The spontaneous socialism of the opposed contained not only constructive but also destructive principles. Those who had faced it were ready to put testify that the revolution “evokes in a person not only a beast but also a fool.” (Emigrant Sociologist Pitirim Sorokin).

One of the Bolsheviks’ leaders – while complaining about the economical crisis after October, 1917 – admitted regrettably that a worker turns into a pensioner of the state, into a parasite sponging on it. But this remark as well as many others was lost in the overall appetite to a new culture, a new man. Few indeed thought about the consequences and the costs of the revolution. There was no need to think about the past and the present when the old was being replaced by the new, when the “new man” was being formed.

The Russian Revolutions of the XX century have not avoided the destiny of The French Revolution: some people glorify them as a historical landmark in humanity’s liberation from oppression, others curse them as a catastrophe and crime; some consider the revolutionaries as saints, while for others they are monsters.

### Is it Possible to Control a Revolution?

Sometimes a revolution is compared to an abdominal surgical operation, the charge that one has to pay for having rejected preventive routine treatment. At the same time drastic intervention can sometimes be the only guarantee of recovery.



Pyotr Stolypin



Sergey Witte

The Twentieth century produced two paths towards revolution: either the current power regime quickly intercepts the initiative from revolutionists and extinguishes as soon as possible the flames of popular indignation, or revolutionists themselves fully bring their slogans to life. The revolution of 1905 made the government cast away its endless hesitation and doubts, stop talking and start doing. At that, a more radical reform project of a larger scale was chosen. The two greatest Russian reformers, Sergey Witte and Pyotr Stolypin, headed the Council of Ministers. During the revolution situation, they worked to simultaneously suppressed popular anger and rebellion, while conducting reform measures. In short, they followed the classical rule: if all forces are spent fighting the revolution, its consequences can be temporarily eliminated. But while, relying on force, if fundamental changes and reforms are implemented, the revolutions causes can be eliminated.

In 1905–1907, personal immunity, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of unions were declared, agrarian reform was put into practice, redemption of payments for peasants were cancelled, duration of military service was reduced, universities received their autonomy, fines for participating in economic strikes were abolished.

But at the same time, there were dragoons and drum-head court martial to stifle mass rebellions.

After February Revolution of 1917, along with democratic changes the Provisional Government also initiated an institutional basis for forced measures. To settle the summer crisis of 1917 the Provisional Government instigated, for instance, armed food detachments, which withdrew bread from peasants in the villages. The Provisional Government based itself on the brutal examples of the recent past: food requisitions, on the basis of set prices in 1914; a bread allotment of November of 1916 on the initiative of Rittikh, the tsar's land minister; and "soldier groups" for compulsory agricultural tasks. Thus brutality led to brutality.

The Bolsheviks having taken power in Russia continued orienting themselves towards world revolution – the new era, in which working people all over the world would unite in a single world-commune. From October 1917 until March 1918, Lenin and his entourage took pains to indicate the form of the new Soviet State system and its regime. This led not only to anarchy, but massive armed rebellions of an absolutely anarchical mood and vision.

A bewildering number of different institutions appeared ("labor communes"; federations of "labor communes"). Many of these institutions enjoyed some autonomy; they had their own councils of people's commissars. Soon each of them considered itself the legitimate local power, accepting the decrees of the central power as they saw fit. The same slogan of expropriation of expropriators was understood as "steal what has been stolen," as an appeal to take piece by piece all national property back to one's own houses, attics and cellars.

All of this could have been predicted. But in that case Nikolay Berdyaev could not have been amazed by the "superhuman efforts" of Lenin, who in the span of five months came from being a marginalized party functionary to leading a massive national transformation. He called for the communization of all property, discipline, responsibility, and a complete restructuring. He exposed revolutionary phrase mongering, anarchic tastes and making "conjurations over an abyss."

Indeed the most pitiless truth was discovered in the spring of 1918: it was impossible to overcome the crisis in the situation when each province represented "an independent republic," while there was individual and group egoism, and anarchy ruled the market. Nothing

but strong central power was able to reestablish lost economic ties and reversed tries with the countryside rehabilitate a broken financial system, establish order and discipline.

In their practical activity the Bolsheviks too resorted to force, but on a much more massive scale than ever before witnessed in Russian history. At first force was used systematically only in the limited patches of the most critical areas of supplying food. These methods continued the authoritarian tendencies of the war period. However, from May-June 1918 – a period, when there was a threat of restoration and counter-revolution, the Bolsheviks openly choose the way of defending soviet “strength” by any available means.

It is clear that the gradual retreat of both revolutionaries and their adversaries into “emergency” policy of force and violence was preceded by a long chain of events. The question “Who was the first to start?” usually leads nowhere. It is important to define the logic of the escalation violence itself because only that type of knowledge can inform politicians of the dangers in their decisions and actions. Perhaps we could accept the thesis “any violence is evil.” But when social confrontation reaches the point of civil war, society disintegrates. At such moments enemies and adversaries are kept beyond the moral, they are considered “inhuman,” to which common human standards don’t apply. Then mere statements on the immorality of violence cannot stop anyone.

Long lasting extreme conditions were beneficial for the bureaucracy and state machinery because they received ever increasing power. This was the situation in 1905–1907, but it was even more evident after October 1917, when the old party Guard consisting of professional revolutionists exhausted itself. When new groups, led by “the common man,” arrived, the question of whether Russia was actually ready for a new regime became acute. Holding important posts, “the common man” introduced a whole range of new understandings to professional revolutionary activity, most notably the golden age of bureaucracy.

When directly connected to different social groups, bureaucracy is not dreadful. It’s not dreadful even when people infected by some anarchical illnesses come to the front. But when “the common man” is in charge, bureaucracy, the eternal problem of Russia comes to the fore. In fact, as Nikolay Osinskiy wrote to Lenin in October 1919: “the

people actually bringing the dry algebraic formulas (created by Lenin) into practice are either poor managers or good functionaries (and often even bad functionaries). Only “bureaucrats” work at the most important posts. For important jobs we have a large amount of those who “know how to be on good terms with others”, without hurting them.”

In bureaucracy form dominates over content. Bureaucracy in Russia became not only archaism but in a way a compensating machine in conditions when superficial forms do not have a proper support in industrial or technological potential. The efforts to artificially maintain sagging quasi-socialistic forms required social power. It was the Bureaucracy and national security forces which came to embody this power.

Is it Possible to avoid the Catastrophe of Revolution? Often the history of revolution turns out to be nothing more than a code of notions about revolutions. These histories characterize the mentality of those who reconstruct history, rather than the real history of the revolution itself. It seems clear enough, however that the “mystery” of Russian revolutions lies in the passion for extremes, a hope and belief that at in one stroke all problems can be solved, that unwanted past stays buried, and right away something new will be created.

Only smart policy can resist the logic of Russian radicalism and maximalism. Where there isn't enough of it, an extraordinary commissar or commissioner appears. Yes, Russian revolutionaries along with Saint-Just might: the nature of events themselves leads us to results that we never had in mind. However, before 1905 as well as before 1917, reality contained a large diversity of evolutionary paths. But most importantly, history demonstrates that Russia could have been reformed. These are the true reforms that can prevent catastrophic situations; they represent the best way to break the spirit of revolution and lead its energy in a peaceful direction without turning towards radicalism.

However, nowadays most historians admit that the link between revolution and reform is more complicated, than it was once believed. Reforms can prevent a revolution but in certain cases they can give it an incentive. Late or half-completed reforms may stoke the flames of revolution. To avoid this, one shouldn't be scared into not recognizing defects in the system and the need for corrections. By looking for excuses – functionaries are to blame, local officials are to blame,

overzealous bureaucrats are the problem – sooner or later the blame will inevitably concentrate on the state itself.

Revolutionary forces can be held in check not only by the state, but also by society. Society is not a rival of to the state but a partner equally responsible for finding solutions in critical situations. It is society that is able to exercise pressure on the authorities; society can bring about timely renovation of the political elite, create a system of renovation and control its functions.

Revolution cannot be cast away, no matter how much someone wishes to do so. The heritage of revolution is still in institutions of the present. The revolution is no longer seen as infallible. Yes, it is true that its image is now vague and unclear, but the symbols of revolution have not disappeared, have not lost their value, regardless of subjective intentions of those who wish to control the past and the present. The Revolution will always have adherents, who see in it the realization of such ideals as freedom, equality and fraternity of people and nations. The revolution will also have adversaries unwilling to forget radical tendencies. The question posed by great humanist Jean-Jaures remains unanswered: “Revolution is a barbaric form of progress. Will we have a chance to see the day when the form of human progress will be truly humane?”

---

## *Theme 4*

### **Emergency Measures and the “Extreme Emergency Regime” in the Soviet Republic and Other State Formations on the Territory of Russia, 1918–1920**

In 1917, a democratic republic with maximum political legality began to take shape. It was the first time that the state began to reject authoritarian mechanisms; retributive policies declined; police and the secret political police force “Okhranka” were disbanded. That was the moment when two alternative forms of democracy came into sight on the political arena: one of them was Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, an unofficial but highly legitimate body elected by workers, soldiers, and sailors to represent their interests – but it was untested. The other was the Provisional Government, which based itself on Duma (that is, parliamentary) traditions and embraced European models. This government promised to convene a “Constituent Assembly” in order to establish a new form of government for Russia. The holders of both types promised people to pull the country out of World War I and overcome the extreme crisis the country found itself in. Moreover, all sides promised to do so without resorting to a regime of so-called “high state of alert” based on the Statute on Measures to Protect State Order and Public Peace (the security law of August 14, 1881), the rules of which were so intimately known to the majority of territories of the Russian Empire since 1881.

History gave the possibility to test this crucial statement both to the Bolsheviks and their political opponents. Soon the idea of democracy lost widespread public support. The Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government failed compromise or find agreement on basis issues, and subsequently found themselves in the state of crisis. Both sides turned to seemingly outmoded forms of authoritarian politics. The country had to choose between two kinds of dictatorship:

“the Whites” and “the Reds,” and not between two forms of democracy, based on either the Provisional Government or the Petrograd Soviet. Soviet democracy was transformed into a one-party militarized dictatorship. The members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly began to cooperate with, and later knuckled under to, the “white” restorationist generals.

In the Soviet Republic and new state formations that appeared on the territory of Russia during 1918–1920, this process was accompanied by the establishment of “firm authority.” Extraordinary forces played a certain role in this, but more than anything else the “emergency regime” that was announced by the ruling circles – quite consciously but without any real need – was put in place for the sake of keeping power in their hands. There was a certain synchronicity in this process, with both sides exhibiting similar tendencies. In addition, this process occurred despite doctrinal statements from each of the opposing forces that rejected such a regime.

What set apart the regime of emergency measures? First of all, it began the turn to mass terror as a form of governance, as a means of liquidating enemies, moral intimidation and suppression of any resistance. This process was inevitably cloaked in some appropriate ideological language (“a threat of counterrevolution,” “radicalization of the class struggle,” “a threat to democracy,” etc.). Part of the population was declared to be “enemies of the people”: they were double-dealers, betrayers, spies, diversionists, saboteurs. It meant that they were not “friends” but “foes,” and so any means were admissible in the fight against them. The “extreme emergency” regime also meant the suppression of regular governing bodies by extraordinary ones, and the simplification of justice through bypassing legal proceedings. In general, it enabled a particular style of leadership and empowered certain social groups.

The emergency situation (withdrawal from the World War, accompanied by demilitarization of the economy and demobilization of the army, famine, the threat of the restoration of the former regime, etc.) objectively called into existence the idea of a “firm authority.” This idea entailed a system of extraordinary bodies, which, according to Lenin’s order, were vested with full dictatorial powers; as well as progressive delegation of some emergency functions to a number of the regular state forces (for instance, to the People’s Commissariat of



Communications and Provisions). At first this process was perceived as a temporary phenomenon, which no one associated with the Bolsheviks' basic prescriptions. The staff of the extraordinary bodies was not numerous; their creation came with a proviso on the observance of certain conditions – they were to function under broad local control; they were to be temporary, local, and finally subordinated directly to Lenin, who was not seen as dictatorial.

The decree of The Council of People's Commissars on November 22, 1917 confirmed the principles governing the activities of people's courts and revolutionary tribunals, which had under their jurisdiction special committees of inquiry fighting against counterrevolution. They were elected by the Soviets, consisted of the chairman and two members and considered cases of counterrevolutionary misdeeds, speculation and anti-regime agitation. On May 29, 1918, under the jurisdiction of All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK), the Revolutionary courts martial (Revtribunal) was founded. It investigated cases of special importance. It was not unusual that the Soviets carried out judicial functions since the “bourgeois principle” of the separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial branches was totally abandoned.

By the term “revolutionary justice” most Bolshevik chairmen did not mean equal justice for everybody, because, according to their opinion, there was no and could not be any justice in a class society. At the same time, until the summer of 1918, when the Civil War re-intensified, people witnessed mild sanctions being applied to the most evident oppositionists to the Revolution, such as release from custody on parole and conditional sentences, even as they also witnessed cruel lynchings, pogroms and slaughter. For example, in January 1918, Moscow courts passed out thirteen percent suspended sentences, while in the second part of the year, the number of such sentences mounted to 40%.

On December 7, 1917, the decree of The Council of People's Commissars established All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Speculation and Sabotage (the Cheka) to protect the gains of the Revolution. Felix Dzerzhinsky became the Cheka's head. He made the relationship of these organs to law enforcement agencies clear in his inaugural address: “Do not think that I am seeking any forms of revolutionary justice; we do not need

justice today. Now we have to fight, face to face, it is a struggle for life or death, who will win out?! I propose – indeed, I insist on organizing revolutionary slaughter of counter-revolutionary agents”

However, only three months later did the Cheka obtain the right to found local Extraordinary Commissions in provincial and district centers. The decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of February 21, 1918 – “The Socialist motherland in danger” – gave it the right of extrajudicial killing of “enemy agents, speculators, housebreakers, hooligans, counter-revolutionary propagandists as well as German spies.”

It goes without saying that there was nothing unusual in the formation of extraordinary agencies. However, there was one condition – that their activity should have been based on the people’s self-activity; emergency measures and corresponding bodies should have compensated for the failures and weaknesses of the Soviets. Under an authoritarian administration, special governing bodies take a different meaning and play a different role in the power structure.

In May 1918, the Bolshevik government found itself at an impasse regarding economic policy. It was impossible to establish a bread monopoly gently. External as well as internal military pressure had reached its critical point. In such conditions for their own sake the authorities made a conscious decision to go beyond the limits of simple emergency measures. They plunged themselves and the society into the “extreme emergency” regime. The commissars believed that only extreme measures, and not planned legal activities, could solve acute contradictions and transform them into something new. Provisional dictatorship was imposed; the VTsIK began to expel the Mensheviks, right orientated social revolutionaries and then left orientated social revolutionaries from the Committee. In his speech at the rally in Butyrsky district of Moscow, after the attempted assassination of Lenin, which took place on August 30, 1918, Nikolai Osinskii said: “All the bourgeois elements placed on record and taken under public supervision must be divided into three groups. We will annihilate the active ones and those who constitute a threat. The others will be clapped by the heels. The third group will be subjected to hard labor, and those who are not able to work will go to camps.

Little by little, such methods assumed an uncontrollable character. Moreover, extraordinary agencies did not yet have strictly deter-

mined prescriptions and legitimate principles regulating their activity. The committees of the poor (kombeds), food brigades (prodotryads), blocking troops (barrier troops), revolutionary tribunals and local authorities were becoming almost uncontrollable. Quite soon the Cheka formed its net in all guberniyas and uyezds (provincial centers); it gained the right of peremptory judgments on questions of life and death. In a number of offices it could even exercise control over the activity of local judicial bodies and subordinate local committees of the ruling party.

In their letters people asked Lenin avowedly and harshly: “Why has the dictatorship of the proletariat in local offices turned into a criminal dictatorship of lower class criminals?” “How come, that even on this great day, the day of the anniversary of the Great October Revolution, working people do not have any real rights and possibilities but have to fear the Cheka agents and their searches?”

The “extreme emergency” regime did not manage to strengthen the communist government. On the contrary it weakened it and generated a situation of anarchy. Neither the upper class, nor the lower class could control the activity of the other. A weak system of power was rapidly losing its social foundation. All classes of the society tired of the anarchy engulfing the country. Peasants and ordinary citizens had only one dream: order. The destiny of the Bolsheviks depended on the transformation of the “extreme emergency” regime into a strictly organized form of dictatorship.

Beginning in September 1918, one could record the reining in of some manifestations of the “extreme emergency” regime, first and foremost the use of mass terror as a form of governing. The emergency measures and agencies were also brought within bounds of the law and strict regulatory activity. Only with this strategy could they manage to win over the majority of the population and form a firm rear echelon.

The decrees of the IV All-Russian Extraordinary Congress of Soviets in November 1918 proclaimed amnesty. Local extraordinary committees lost the right to seize hostages, and consequently only the central office of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission was authorized to do so. A considerable number of hostages who had been seized before were freed. The committees of the poor (the kombeds) were eliminated. “Revolutionary law” came into force. All these deci-



Vladimir Lenin in his Kremlin office (1918)

sions manifested the readiness of the Bolsheviks for a long-term war, as well as comprehension that they could not make war in the conditions of disorder and instability that marked the “extreme emergency” regime. In justifying the necessity of the aforementioned decrees, and primarily of the one concerning amnesty, the authorities wanted to demonstrate that they were sufficiently strong, and that they were ready to reconcile with all their enemies who would agree to submit to Soviet power.

On February 17, 1919, with reference to the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the VTsIK declared the transfer of the right of adjudication from the extraordinary commissions to revolutionary tribunals. But this did not mean that these measures put an end to the manifestations of the “extreme emergency” regime. The Cheka kept its full powers in the regions where Soviet power had proclaimed martial law, and in 1919 such regions prevailed. Revolutionary tribunals were not, and could not be, a model of justice. Extraordinary commissions issued their judgments at the end of a trial, and revolutionary tribunals examined the cases on the basis of these judgments. Moreover, members of extraordinary committees were required to be members of the revolutionary tribunals. Standing orders on the revolutionary tribunals, which were adopted by VTsIK on

April 12, 1919, prescribed that they were to be governed only by the conditions of the case and revolutionary conscience while judging.

Revolutionary tribunals were formed in the Military Revolutionary Councils at the fronts, and in the armies and corps as well; they were called Military Revolutionary Tribunals. Not only military men and prisoners of war were under their jurisdiction, but all criminals who had committed crimes within the zone of military operations as well. The sentences were enforced immediately. Death sentences were executed after two days; their enforcement could be stopped by the corresponding Military Revolutionary Council.

All extraordinary committees underwent organizational changes. This was, perhaps, the main sign of a return to the regime of regular emergency measures. Indicative in this context were the warnings by Petr Kropotkin, the anarchist theorist, in his letter to Lenin dated September 17, 1918, that the extraordinary bodies were on the eve of a serious trial. Like all other theorists of the revolution, Kropotkin appealed to the experience of the French Revolution. He tried to show how the terrorists of the Committee of General Security (the National Guard) became its grave-diggers in 1794. His studies of the literature made Kropotkin conclude that along with the Committee of General Rescue and particularly with the Paris Commune founded in 1793, “along with this revolutionary force, which was already partly constructive, another type appeared that was a police force, presented by Committee of General Security and its police departments. At first, this police force that had achieved momentum during the Reign of Terror, demolished the Sections (agencies of the People’s Revolution that appeared in large cities – G.B.), then the Commune and finally the Committee of General Security itself,” he wrote to Lenin.

Kropotkin did not conceal from Lenin the reason why he needed to examine this period of history: “Your comrades/terrorists are about to do the same in the Soviet Republic.” The Russian people have a great reserve of creative potential. Hardly had these forces begun to rebuild life on a new foundation from the complete ruin brought on by the war and revolution, when “the police, with their duties imposed on them by the Terror, commenced their corrosive and pernicious activity.” They paralyzed any kind of construction and appointed completely inadequate people. Police cannot be a “builder” of a new life.

But nevertheless it was the police who were becoming the supreme power in all small towns and villages. “Where will such a situation lead Russia?” asked Kropotkin. “I believe it will provoke the fiercest reaction.” The first signal of understanding this danger was “The decree on the All-Russian and local extraordinary committees” adopted by VTsIK in October 28, 1918. The document stipulated the controlled status of the local Chekas and their subordination to the Soviets and executive committees. In January 1919,



Petr Kropotkin

Political Bureaus replaced local extraordinary committees in the districts. They were headed by the chiefs of the local police departments. Beginning February 17, 1919, in accordance with the decree of VTsIK, the All-Russian Extraordinary Committee had the right to administer punishment only in regions under martial law.

However, regulation of the activity of all extraordinary committees as well as of revolutionary tribunals had an ambiguous character and in reality its effect was minimal. Their activity was directly subordinate to Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party through Dzerzhinsky's office; to be more precise, it was subordinated to Lenin personally.

All of these contradictions in reforming the structure of the extraordinary bodies caused new surges of the “extreme emergency regime” throughout the Civil War. It would be enough to mention how they tried to solve the food problem of February and April of 1919, the summer punitive expedition of 1919 to Ukraine, the Crimean events in late 1920, and the events in Tambov guberniya in 1920–1921.

The dissolution of the Ukrainian Rada at the end of 1918 and the foundation of the Ukrainian State in place of the Ukrainian People's Republic signaled the dictatorial tendency of numerous newly organized state formations which were out of Bolshevik control. “The law



The famous poster: “Have you volunteered for the Red Army?”

on the interim state structure of the Ukrainian government” vested hetman Skoropadski with dictatorial authority.

The situation in the North of Russia was almost the same. At the end of 1918, in Archangelsk, Soviet power was overthrown and a “socialist” supreme government of the North region was formed. The city was opened to the troops of interventionist countries. However, after a failed military coup undertaken by the “Rightists,” contradictions between “democratic” authorities and the occupation administration finally led to the formation in early October of a new “neosocialist”

Provisional government. Socio-political powers were reorganized toward the “Rightists” and a regime of “hard power.”

In August, political organizations such as “The Unity of Renaissance” and “The National Center” – masterminds of the “White cause” – formed a consolidated platform, the meaning of which was articulated in the following statement: “In the process of state formation and until the moment the state structure is completed, authority [...] must be vested in an authorized, strong, and independent supreme body capable of acting. Its structure will consist of a directorate of three: a Commander-in-Chief of counterrevolutionary armies and two representatives of socialist and non-socialist movements”

When in September the destiny of the Committee of Russian Constituent Assembly members was called in question due to the activity of the Red Army, state power started to concentrate in Omsk. The Council of Ministers was deprived of its decision-making function,

which was delegated to the Administrative Council. It embodied the heads of all ministries of the Siberian regional government and their deputies. On September 8, the Siberian regional Duma came under full jurisdiction of the Administrative Council, which even had the right to dissolve it.

At the same time Grishin-Almazov, a moderate defense minister, was removed from office and replaced by Ivanov-Rinov. The latter did not just quickly restore the signs and symbols of the former regime



The Red Army soldiers

but also gave the army absolute freedom of action by his directives. The army was permitted to do with civilians whatever it wished. Any semblance of civilian control over the military was eliminated.

The Directory of Ufa shared the same fate. Finally, in September 1918, during a meeting of merchants and manufacturers in Omsk the following statement was announced: “We’ve seen all the political parties in power, but the only result has been the destruction of Russia. We need a strong reasonable authority with a heart of stone to keep Russia alive. Russia is at war, every piece of its territory is a theater of operations, so there cannot be two ruling powers, there has to be only one, and that one should be the military.”

It was Admiral Kolchak who was entrusted with the mission of creating a strong power structure. As a consequence of the coup d’état of November 1918, he became Supreme Leader of the Russian State.





Admiral Kolchak

He stated then: “They call me a “dictator” – so be it... I’m not afraid of this word and I always remember that from the earliest times dictatorship has been a republican institution. As well as the Senate of ancient Rome, which appointed a dictator to rule the country passing through hard times, the Council of Ministers of Russia named me to the Supreme Governor during the most difficult period of the state.”

The extraordinary bodies formed in Kolchak’s administration (under such generals

as Denikin, Yudenich and others), strongly resembled “state power,” though under the generals’ jurisdiction. Military bodies played a particular role in the machinery of punishment and repression. Those military bodies were represented by front-line and military field courts, but particularly by the counter-intelligence agencies that appeared haphazardly and everywhere. These departments of military control never were as much applied as during the Civil War. They were created by the main headquarters, military governors, in almost every military unit, political organization and governmental authority. Like extraordinary committees in the Soviet Republic, they symbolized the lack of trust and suspiciousness that reigned all over the country.

Apart from a counterintelligence service, Kolchak formed special purpose police units. In March 1919, the agencies of “state security” were founded under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. They were attached to the regional governors; their purpose was to fight against political criminals. According to the law enacted in April, an enterprise or any other establishment using their private funds could hire “police teams” for their own protection.

The creation of special extraordinary bodies, such as Osvag (agencies controlling a web of informants under the jurisdiction of the head of the special Council affiliated to the Commander-in-Chief), was a

peculiar feature of the southern armed forces. Besides fulfilling counterintelligence functions, it had to supervise the political moods of the population. Special committees of the Volunteer armies (the generals’ extraordinary agency) were also founded to examine the pre-revolutionary background of the officer corps.

“The Whites” exercised judicial authority as strangely as the Reds, despite official separation of powers. “Regular” law enforcement agencies of the new state formations as well as of regions freed from the “Reds” went by pre-revolutionary legislation, though with certain alterations. But they acted only after military field courts. According to the “white” court procedure, an arrested person’s case was to be examined within 24 hours. Then the prisoner, whoever he might be, was either released (in this case he was supplied with an appropriate paper) or executed by shooting.

According to the legislation of war time, the list of grounds for prosecution included such causes as Bolshevik party membership or a top rank or political post in the Red Army. However, according to G. William’s (a “white” emigrant) recollections about the activity of the Novorossiisk counterintelligence agency, it was “so very easy to get in that dreadful place that might as well lead you to the grave.” All an agent needed to do to start a classic counterintelligence prosecution was to find out that somebody living in the Volunteer Army region had a nice (in the agent’s opinion) sum of money. Political loyalty of all common people was “questioned.” At the same time, senior officers at the front were above any suspicion. They were supported and protected by counterintelligence, the criminal investigation department, and state guards. From William’s point of view it was that “throng” of protected officers that finally brought the Volunteer Army to destruction.

No state formation before, during or after Kolchak’s dictatorship could avoid manifestations of the extreme emergency regime. The Committee of the Constituent Assembly before its breakdown resorted to execution by shooting of disgruntled inhabitants of towns and villages. Lieutenant general Rychkov, who headed the social revolutionary military units in Kazan, announced the order that confirms this information after a demonstration of Kazan workers in September 1918: “In case of the slightest attempt to disturb the peace on the part of any social group, and particularly workers, in any district where it



“Stand guard!”

asures directed against the local bourgeoisie, became his governing methods.

Admiral Kolchak frankly spoke about his first months in power. He said: “Dissatisfaction with the internal administration is caused by the illegal activity of the lowest government agents, both military and civil. The activity of the heads of local police departments as well as of special purpose units is openly criminal.” Local Cossack organizations, which were taking part in liberating Siberia in the autumn 1918, turned out to be virtually useless as a support for the authorities. Kolchak admitted that atamans Kalmykov, Semenov, Unguern-Shtenberg, Gamov, Annenkov’s detachments “easily assumed functions of the political police and created special counterintelligence bodies.”

These agencies did not have any link with prosecutor's office. The land council of Primorie complained about the fact that Cossack detachments organized private extrajudicial killings of political oppo-

happens, we will open fire.” And indeed, working districts in Kazan were shelled. In October 1918, leaving Samara, the Committee of the Constituent Assembly sent a punitive detachment to the factory center Ivaschenkovo.

Eighteen rebellions, civil disturbances and manifestations of disobedience, which took place from August 1918 until August 1919, indicate what means the Interim Government of the North areas resorted to. In January 1919, General Miller arrived in Arkhangelsk. Extraordinary measures and Terror, including economic extraordinary mea-

nents – that is, everybody they met on their way. The Semipalatinsk cooperative union formally protested against ataman Annenkov’s activity several times, giving a warning note that his actions could destroy the reputation of the Omsk government and threaten the common mission of reconstituting the Russian state.

Admiral Kolchak also complained about the fact that counter-intelligence offices were formed on the pattern of those which acted in Siberia under the Soviet regime, though counterintelligence should be presented only to Kolchak’s headquarters. They did not manage to control and oppress outposts, barrier troops on the railroads, or commissars authorized to represent the commanders at the front.

With the help of a whole range of decrees Kolchak tried to put an end to numerous cases of illegal confiscations, abuse of authority and the existence of police torture chambers. However, six months after coming to power he had to admit that the “malicious evil that has been killing our state and military forces since 1914 has re-appeared and is spreading.”

Sensing imminent defeat, military leaders left no stone unturned. In many places, manifestations of the extreme emergency regime appeared in the rear of Kolchak’s army, initiated from the top. It is sufficient to cite General Matkovsky’s brief order concerning the slaughter of insurgents in the villages near Omsk revolting against Kolchak’s soldiers:

“I. To scrupulously search every armed inhabitant of villages in rebellion; shoot them at the scene as enemies and traitors.

II. On the basis of evidence obtained from the inhabitants, to arrest all propagandists, members of the Soviet of Deputies who helped to organize riots, deserters, sympathizers, and those who conceal rebels and to take them to the military field court.

III. To deport unreliable and depraved persons to the Berezovsky and Nerchensky regions, sending them to the police.

IV. To bring to court, impose harsh sentences, and apply death-penalties to local authorities who did not show adequate resistance to bandits, who executed their orders and did not take steps for the liquidation of the Reds using their own means and capabilities.

V. To demolish villages where repetitive rebellions have been organized with redoubled severity, up to their complete liquidation.”



General Denikin

“White” armies acquired deplorable habits under General Denikin. Robberies, brigandism and other crimes against property were not prosecuted, so they became an ordinary phenomenon. An honest soldier became a prowler. Mean motives and rough arbitrariness replaced political correctness and mere human decency.


The negative influence of these battlefield morals on the rear was particularly felt in the Crimea after the retaking of Novorossiysk. Here are prince Obolensky’s reminiscences:

“One morning on their way to school, children saw dead people with protruded tongues who had been hung from lamp posts in the streets of Simferopol. Never before had Simferopol seen anything like that. Even the Bolsheviks tempered their bloody business without such demonstrations.” It turned out that it was General Kutepov’s order, his way of terrorizing Simferopol Bolsheviks. The local Duma passed an official objection, and the Mayor went to Kutepov to persuade him to immediately remove the corpses from the street lamps. Kutepov gave the following answer to the the petition to cease public executions: “I have never abused public executions, but the current situation forced me to fall back upon such measures.”

In his memoirs Denikin called this and other similar incidents “black chapters” in the history of his Army. He did not hide the fact that most of the counterintelligence offices, particularly in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa and Rostov, represented hotbeds of provocation and organized plundering. A two-way struggle was organized against this kind of offence; on the one hand they fought the agencies themselves, and on the other hand they fought individuals. In the long run the General had to admit the inefficiency and tardiness of the struggle.

Baron Wrangell tried as well to put an end to the ills of the epoch of “voluntarism.” This is demonstrated by his orders from April 1920

to June 1920, which mandated the end to violence against people. On April 27, the Department of Justice was detached from the civil government to fight against criminality. A peculiar judicial measure was Wrangell’s decree dated May 11, which ordered administrative deportation to Soviet Russia. Governors and fortress commandants were authorized to resort to such measures under a prosecutor’s supervision. The counterintelligence agencies, which were brought under control, almost stopped brigandage and acts of outrage. Criminals



The Don Army (1919)

were subject to harsh sentencing. In his order of September 14, 1920 Wrangell expressed the following opinion about the military court commissions formed for civil protection against robbery and plunder: “The whole population living on the territories occupied by the troops of the Russian Army respects and trusts these commissions and their activity; in the immediate battle area, where a civil governing machinery is not yet properly formed, people believe these commissions to be their only protectors and address them with all their complains and problems.”

However, there was another opinion. Ivan Kalinin, former chairman of the Don Army military court commission, related that “Wrangell’s commissions never did any good,” that “the leader’s intention to establish a kind of “White Cheka” for the eradication of the lawlessness went down in flames.” Later on, Wrangell himself

had to admit the inadequacy of the counterintelligence agencies' activities and criminal investigation actions, whose operations, in his opinion, were lagging. He wrote that “the population was tired of the Bolsheviks; at first, people waiting for peace greeted and welcomed enthusiastically the progress of the Army, but toward November 1919, little by little they began to feel again the atrocities of robberies, violence and arbitrariness. As a result the front collapsed and the rear rose in revolt.”

Thus, the Civil War has added new chapters to the history of the emergency regime that plagued Russia for long decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. An estimated 8 to 13 million people died on the battlefield, and of diseases, starvation, and terror. By the end of the war, about 2 million people had left the country. The damage to the national economy amounted to about 50 billion gold imperial rubles, industrial production dropped to between 4 and 20 percent of its 1913 level, and agricultural productivity decreased by almost fifty percent.

Despite the assurances of the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government and its allies to permanently eliminate a system of governance based on the tsarist Statute on Measures to Protect State Order and Public Peace, their regimes added new dimensions to those rules. The extreme emergency regime introduced by the “Reds” and the “Whites” left traces across the whole battleground of the Civil War. In General Denikin's words, this regime “caused the people's cup of sorrow to overflow with new tears and blood, and it blurred the colors of the politico-military spectrum in the minds of the population, erasing the differences between the Savior and the Enemy.” To tell the truth, from time to time the Bolsheviks managed to restrain the war and regularize activity in the rear, which helped the Army and assisted in repulsing the attacks of the enemy. In the long run, it affected the outcome of the Civil War in the Bolsheviks' favor. Nevertheless, extraordinary bodies that were once considered interim proliferated to a huge degree and became a state within a state. It was becoming more and more difficult to keep them within strict bounds and to put them under the supervision of regular state bodies. The end of the Civil War and the transition to the New Economic Policy provided hope that there would be dramatic changes in the structure of state administration.

---

## *Theme 5*

### **From “War Communism” to the New Economic Policy: Contradictions of the NEP**

The disturbances that struck Russia in 1914 reached their peak in early 1920s. Devastation of the industrial and transport sectors, fuel crises, strikes, demobilization, the revolt of the sailors of the Baltic fleet and Kronstadt: these are well-known manifestations of the general crisis. There are two phenomena, however, that more than others influenced the crisis situation. The first was the largest peasant rebellion since the times of Yemelian Pugachev. The second was the terrible famine that struck many regions of the country, mostly the Volga region.

Understanding the essence of the transition from the Civil War to peace requires analyzing the interconnection and correlation of the following phenomena: Soviet government policy, the peasant movement and the famine.

A new stage of the Civil War began in the summer of 1920. A peasant movement against the Bolsheviks, who did not want to change the policy of “War Communism” and its food rationing system (the system of surplus appropriation), spread to almost all provinces of Russia and Ukraine (the most notable rebellions were conducted by Makhno and Antonov). The struggle between peasants and Soviet troops was extremely severe. The struggle began in the context of the 1920 harvest failure and the surplus appropriation system that led to confiscation of more food from peasants than in 1918 and 1919.

So what could end such a vast peasant rebellion? Could it be the change of ration policy by the Bolsheviks, i.e. the replacement of the surplus appropriation system with an agricultural tax in kind? Or perhaps the military suppression of mass rebellions? Or simply famine?



Until recently, historians have regarded the adoption of the agricultural tax in kind as a political decision that made peasants immediately shift their alignment towards the Bolsheviks. But analysis of related documents does not provide any proof for this theory. It was only in central industrial provinces that most of peasants gladly accepted the adoption of agricultural tax in kind. People in other regions regarded it as a new form of surplus appropriation. The strongest resistance to efforts to collect the tax was manifested in Western Russia. Due to a severe crop failures in the South of Russia, the Soviet government made a decision to collect the bulk of the agricultural tax in kind from Siberia. Peasants’ resistance toward the tax collection was followed by punitive actions.

The agricultural tax in kind was perceived as another form of surplus appropriation in many Russian and Ukrainian provinces besides Siberia. This is a report of the State Political Directorate (GPU) made in October 1922: “Over two thirds of the crops will be gathered as the agricultural tax in kind in Pskov province. Peasants of Riazan and Tver provinces will starve if they are forced to pay 100 percent of the agricultural tax in kind. But it all pales in comparison to the incidence of suicides committed by peasants in Kiev province because of the excessive rates of the agricultural tax in kind.”

This is why the agricultural tax in kind did not really mean any relief for most of peasants in the situation of famine and economic chaos in 1921 and 1922, and therefore it could not have had a real impact on pacifying the insurgent peasants. The Bolshevik administration decided to crush the peasant movement. In Tambov province, for instance, regular troops under the command of Mikhail Tukhachevsky were deployed for this purpose. He issued a secret order in June 1921: “The remnants of defeated bands that fled from villages are gathering in forests. To immediately clear these forests I hereby command: Use poisonous gases in the forests where bandits are hiding, so that the poison cloud fills all the forest killing anyone hiding in it.” Concentration camps were established in the province, families of insurgent peasants who refused to surrender became hostages, and their property was confiscated. But, after comparing various sources, we know that all these government steps were ineffective in suppressing the mass insurgency of peasants.

The scale of the famine of 1921–1922 in Russia and part of

Ukraine surpassed by far that of all other famine disasters of previous decades. According to the Central Statistics Office (CSO) over 40 million people from 35 provinces suffered from famine in 1921–1922. According to information from the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture about 60% of agricultural territories of Russia were affected by the disaster. Famine, and the diseases and epidemics that it provoked, caused over 5 million deaths. Thanks to the aid of overseas organizations – the American

Relief Administration first and foremost – the death toll did not increase. The ARA provided food for 10.5 million people at the peak of its activity in August of 1922. Egregiously, this contribution of the United States in saving millions of Russian lives remains unrecognized – even by the current regime of the Russian Federation.

The famine catastrophe had a great demographic, economic, and social impact. The results of a new analysis of the situation in a number of provinces reveal a direct relationship between famine and peasant revolts. The famine was the determinative factor in the pacification of peasant revolts.

The urgent necessity to overcome the crisis and claims by peasants boosted the introduction of market and commodity-money relations. The new Land Code authorized the lease of land and the hiring of labor. Soon after that the agricultural tax in kind was replaced with the unified agricultural tax mostly paid in cash.

With the introduction of the market, private traders appeared in the national economy. The state aimed at privatization of handicraft, small-scale and (some time later) medium-scale industry. The leasing of state companies and licenses to operate (a special form of lease) were authorized. Cooperation was promoted. Industrial companies



Mikhail Tukhachevsky



One silver ruble

under the Supreme Council of National Economy were allowed to form trusts. They operated on the basis of self-support, self-finance and self-repayment. Universal labor duty was abrogated, and the system for equal remuneration of labor at state companies was cancelled. In-kind compensation (rations in kind) was replaced with wages. The rationing system was finally cancelled.

Industrial management was decentralized. The number of branch central offices for industrial management was dramatically decreased. The National bank was created to regulate and revitalize finances. It had the right to issue chervonetses (bank bills backed by the gold standard) instead of devaluated Soviet rubles. The ruble became a convertible currency in Russia and abroad by 1924.

These swift and profound changes in economic policy took place at the same time as important steps in state construction. The state of dis-



25 chervonetses (1922)

unity that had followed the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917–1918 was replaced with a movement toward unification; it resulted in the creation of the United Soviet Socialist Republics in December, 1922. The Russian Communist party played the central role in the unification movement and the creation of a union of equal Slavic (Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia) and Transcaucasian republics (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia). The Central Asian republics (Kirghizia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, Tajikistan) joined the union in late 1920s.

In 1923/1924 the Constitution of the USSR was adopted, the USSR government was created and the second chamber of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR was assembled.

The New Economic Policy led to an economic upturn. Agriculture and related branches of industry started to develop. Commerce contributed to the process, creating a nation-wide market. Social stratification began at the same time. The mass of the population began to envy the prosperous life of kulaks and the city bourgeoisie.

The policy was confronted with its first crisis in 1923; it was the “crisis of sales.” At that time, industrial prices were adjusted according to the needs of the countryside. But the desire to get the highest profits possible provoked a rise in prices of industrial goods by more than three times in relation to prices for agricultural production. The unevenness of prices led to a decreased spending capacity in rural areas. The government intervened in the price formation and administratively lowered industrial production prices and increased prices for agricultural production.

The reconstruction process was over by the mid-twenties. However, it was substantially influenced by a reduction in military spending. The armed forces, for instance, were reduced to 600 thousand people from 5.3 million people. Yet the future of the Soviet Union depended on the activity of capitalist powers. A perception of increased military threats could influence the further support of the NEP.

In 1925 the government decided to move towards industrial modernization of the country to place it among developed countries, making it capable of defending its borders. The industrialization program required an increase in grain exports to purchase necessary machinery and equipment.

The new phase of NEP began at the same time as the intensification of the power after the death of the founder of the Soviet state

Vladimir Lenin. Leon Trotsky started to actively criticize the expanding bureaucracy because administration functionaries were appointed directly by Joseph Stalin instead of being elected by the people. And since Stalin was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the party became the only institution providing access to the nomenklatura. The nomenklatura was to become the basis of Soviet state organization. But Trotsky’s “new course” was based on the idea of free discussion of any issue. He believed that the old guard of the party was turning into a group of “new-style bureaucrats” who had forgotten the language of the revolution and were adopting a “party-style” of speech. This fact made it necessary to replace the old functionaries with new ones.

This was also the moment when Stalin advanced the theory of “Socialism in One Country” – that is, that a socialist regime could be established independently in the USSR. Other party leaders, such as Grigorii Zinoviev and Leo Kamenev, disagreed. They argued that socialism could only triumph if the Western European proletariat revolted as well, which meant in effect a “world revolution.” They regarded Stalin’s theory “national-bolshevist,” implying that it was more nationalist than socialist.

In 1927, with the tenth anniversary of the October revolution at hand the struggle among party leaders became more intense. Besides personal ambitions it was also driven by objective reasons. The NEP had not completely succeeded; it did not reach down to the production collectives – the fundamental components of the economy. Industry could not continue to exist without active state support. Workers demanded an administrative guarantee of their interests, and over a third of the peasantry (proletarians, half-proletarians, and the poor) were directly supported by the government’s intervention in the economy. Tax policy was based on the class principle. The same principle was applied to the elections to different levels of soviets. The bureaucracy became the indispensable component of every sphere of life.

The preceding analysis demonstrates that the country was nearing a historic choice between further pursuit of the NEP and an increase in the centralization of and administrative interference in all domains of state policy. Not only did the new crisis of the NEP reveal all of these contradictions; it also changed the direction of Russia’s development in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

---

## *Theme 6*

### **NEP Downsizing and the Transformation of the Policy of Extraordinary Measures into a Permanent System of Government**

The end of the 1920s – beginning of the 1930s was a period in which the policy of NEP (New Economic Policy, 1921–1928) was overthrown in favor of the Stalinist “revolution from above.” It is extremely important to understand in what way and by what means the Leninist principles embodied in the NEP were revised and replaced by a purely Stalinist understanding of the course to be taken in advancing the country further and strengthening the new, post-Leninist regime.

In December 1927, at its XV congress, the ruling party adopted a program concerning the smooth “reconstruction” of the NEP. This program envisaged the involvement of peasants in cooperative production on a scale realistic for that time, and was orientated towards a gradual, balanced, carefully considered tempo for industrial modernization, the strengthening of ties between city and countryside and, most important, the retention, to quite a considerable extent, of individual peasant ownership as the basis for the development of the agrarian sector of the economy and the market. At the same time the resolutions adopted by the Congress permit us to judge quite precisely the serious ideological changes that had occurred in the position of the ruling party. If the idea of socialism, as a system of civilized co-operatives, survived in the resolutions of the Congress, it was present only in an extremely reduced and stunted form. In one of the principal documents, “Concerning Directives on the Drawing up of a Five-Year Plan for the Economy”, repeated mention was made of the need to overcome the anarchy of the NEP market and to set up a stricter framework for its operation. In general the market was seen in a very negative light; indeed it figured in the document only in one capacity,

as the private market. The market was seen as a capitalist leftover, an attribute of capitalism as such, and was judged accordingly. Moreover, the process of overcoming the anarchy of the market was seen, in the long run, in terms of transforming the system of government regulation of the market into “an apparatus for the socialist distribution of goods.”

The redefinition of socialism implicitly adopted at the Congress strengthened the orientation towards strict centralization and a strictly regulated economic system. It might be said that the ideological shift towards the idea of “state socialism” had begun, but it was still envisaged at this stage as existing within the context of the market, which for doctrinal reasons naturally aroused hostility.

These ideological maneuvers were soon transferred to the practical plane with the occurrence of the grain procurement crisis at the end of 1927 – beginning of 1928. The immediate cause of the crisis had been mistakes in the economic administration, in particular the reduction of government grain prices at the beginning of the procure-

ment campaign. In the winter of 1927/28 the largest granaries effectively ceased selling grain to the cooperation and to state purchasers. Hoping for more favorable market circumstances, and more advantageous conditions for selling, the “middle peasants” too began hoarding grain. The main point, however, was that both concrete tactical mistakes, and a fundamental strategic miscalculation, came together in the procurement crisis of 1927/28.

Analyzing the causes of the crisis in retrospect, Nikolai Bukharin concluded that the grain problem had already been neglected in the period from 1925 to 1927. The coun-



Nikolai Bukharin

try's leadership, including the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Iosif Stalin, had "for some period of time failed to take heed of the state of affairs with regard to grain, and for some time carried on with the process of industrialization, which was financed by foreign currency reserves and taxes." Instead of paying attention, during the previous years, to the situation of the grain sector and achieving a significant increase in the rate of construction, on a firm basis, in one to three years" time, the leadership ran into inevitable difficulties, Bukharin observed. These difficulties became even more evident when the very sources on which we had been relying for some time were exhausted and we all realized that we could no longer continue on that basis. This moment coincided with our greatest problems. But once things had worked out in that way, once these difficulties had become an objective fact, we ended up in the first round of extraordinary measures.

From the very beginning a certain group within the leadership was inclined to see the outbreak of the grain procurement crisis in war-like terms, as a fresh attack on socialism by petty bourgeois elements, as a "kulak strike," an attempt to push apart the limits in which the dictatorship of the proletariat had placed capitalist elements, although in actual fact it was the market that resisted the grain procurements. All the evidence suggests that the Party leadership did not initially intend to apply the extraordinary measures over a long period. Exiled in Alma Ata, Lev Trotskii saw these measures generally as "a crutch for Rykov's policies." Probably, this was the view of all the members of the Politburo, who unanimously supported the extraordinary measures at a meeting on 6 January 1928. At that moment, the Party leaders simply failed to see any other solution. All other alternatives for overcoming the problem were rejected.

The extraordinary measures undertaken in the winter of 1928 proved completely ineffective. In the summer of that year the government was forced to spend its mobilization reserves and purchase grain abroad. Six months earlier such measures would have been sufficient to put out the crisis and buy time for a serious review of policy. But the resort to extraordinary measures set in motion the machine of *chrezvychaishchina* and for the first time since the end of the Civil War the system of forcible purchasing of grain was reinstated. That section of society whose existence depended on the NEP, and who re-



garded it as the only possible normal form of economic and political life, was hit particularly hard by this policy.

These people were distinguished by their inner orientation, their political and sociopsychological outlook. Some of them were ossified, bureaucratized *chinovniki*, resistant to change of any kind; others were principled supporters of the NEP, while yet others favored organic economic growth rather than the various zigzags of the left. In the eyes of the leadership they constituted a force for historic inertia, and as such became the butt of the extraordinary measures. Their active or passive resistance forced the Party leaders from time to time to demand ideological controls and a purge of the Party organization. However, millions of non-Party people had spontaneously formed their own ideology, one remote from complex Party doctrine. It was expressed in the question: who is responsible for the fact that a year ago everything was more or less all right, while now everything is deplorable and unbearable? The Communists, the Komsomol, the Jews – such was one answer given by these despairing and embittered people. Others blamed the “would-be bourgeoisie,” or the kulaks. The search for “enemies,” the attempt to personify the guilty, became a kind of safety-valve through which mass dissatisfaction, both among city workers and among the rural poor, could be expressed.

The Shakhtii case, dubbed by Stalin “the economic counter-revolution,” became the mechanism through which this question, matured in the minds of millions, took form. The “case” arose in March 1928, and the trial took place in May that year, that is to say, during the period when mass discontent and bitterness at the extraordinary measures had swollen into open indignation. The “Shakhtii case” was quite obviously fabricated, but its significance lay in the fact that it gave rise to the theory of “wrecking.” This theory allowed the Party to point the finger at “concrete wrongdoers” and deflect mass dissatisfaction away from the Party leaders. The reaction to the “Shakhtii case” in the consciousness of the masses was quite simple. Statements of the following kind, made by peasants and workers in relation to the Shakhtii specialists, can be found in numerous political summaries and research surveys issued by the OGPU: “The bullet was too good for them, they should have been sent to the crematorium alive.”


Support for the Shakhtii trial and the inferences drawn about the “wreckers” remained a stable socio-psychological phenomenon

over a period of several months. Against the background of growing economic problems, extraordinary measures, queues and strikes, practically no one expressed any doubt or skepticism concerning the judicial correctness of the trial in the “Shakhtii case.” On the contrary, among the lower strata of the proletariat the conclusions of the trial were taken to savage extremes:

What should be done? That’s for the Party Central Committee, our guide, to answer. Probably we should take up our knives and bullets again and get rid of all these famous doctors and generals, those that are still alive.

Thus in the spring of 1928 this growing social aggression was offered a personal target: the “wreckers.” But the first target had already been named in January, when blame was laid on the kulaks who had organized the “grain strike.” In this way a specific ideological and socio-psychological mood was created, which to some extent filtered into the Party’s ranks as well. Attempts were made to overcome the reluctance among many Communists to “activate,” in carrying out the extraordinary measures, Party “radicals,” who at the slightest difficulty would pose the question: “Isn’t there a Shakhtii plot here?” – a reluctance that was put down to degeneration and demoralization among the Party ranks. But if facts of this kind were occasionally made known to the whole country, the political struggle which occurred among the Party leadership in March 1928 was carefully concealed from the rest of society.

Bukharin, in particular, characterized the external and internal situation of the country as “very grave.” The program of the XV Congress of the Communist Party was effectively torn apart by the crisis. Bukharin did not admit this directly, but his view was made evident in his demand for a new “overall plan” and the admission that the Party leadership had behaved worse than “superempiricists of the crudest kind.” The failure, or at any rate partial failure, of the programme of the XV Congress – instead of the smooth “reconstruction” of the NEP, the country had been dragged into crisis – was also obvious to Stalin. But he did not share the forebodings that the extraordinary measures would inevitably lead to civil war. By contrast, Bukharin considered his main task to be that of proving the real danger of civil war and the need for urgent and public repeal of the extraordinary measures. The anti-crisis programme of the “right faction,” set out at a key moment in



Anastas Mikoyan, Joseph Stalin and Grigory Ordzhonikidze (1925)

the plenum of the Central Committee in July 1928, was quite simple: the repeal of the extraordinary measures, an increase in the purchase price of grain, the abolition of the ration system, differentiated taxes, and so on.


In the key speech to the plenum, delivered on the Politburo's orders by Anastas Mikoyan, it was emphasized that the Party had no intention of transforming the temporary extraordinary measures into a permanent policy, since this would threaten the alliance of peasants and workers, the stability of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction. With regard to the extraordinary measures even Lazar Kaganovich declared: "They must not be brought into the system... It is all the more necessary to declare a decisive struggle against an ideology that wants to legitimize distortions."

Nevertheless Aleksei Rykov observed, first, that Kaganovich, in his speech, had identified administrative with economic measures, proof of which could be found in the restriction of the law of value in Soviet society and in the fact that bourgeois economy was perceived as the opposite of the Soviet economic system, and, second,

that he had called for effort to be put into denouncing “distortions,” rather than into considering the further application of the extraordinary measures themselves, or into analyzing the actual results of the grain procurement campaign. In a word, the plenum left a wide margin for very different interpretations of official policy. It is not accidental that members of the Central Committee repeatedly asked for clarification: to be precise, “what was the strike about?” The extreme left faction found the answer in the situation of the collective farms, the extreme “right” in the thesis “look to the market,” still others in the development of individual peasant ownership. Under these conditions it was extremely difficult to imagine precisely how, and under what slogans, the next grain procurement campaign of 1928/9 would be conducted.

It was all the more difficult to predict the further course of events because the July plenum had seen the emergence of a faction that was far to the left of Stalin. The position of this faction was expressed, in particular, by several secretaries from regional committees: “Our task is not to stamp out the hatred of the poor towards the kulak, but to organize it”.

Vyacheslav Molotov also attempted to give a theoretical foundation to the events of the winter and spring of 1928. He accused those who forgot about the real class basis of the crisis of committing a sin against Marxism. Thus there formed within the Central Committee a group that was orientated towards the use of very harsh anti-NEP measures. And although Stalin himself took a more moderate position, he made a number of theoretical and political gestures towards the new left. This appeal to the far left was manifest, for example, in the theory of “tribute,” that is, an additional tax which he proposed should be imposed on the peasants, and which the state would need to levy on a temporary basis in order to preserve and develop further the present tempo of



Vyacheslav Molotov

industrial development. The following pronouncement was typical of Stalin's utterances at the plenum:

"Our policy is not a policy of inflaming the class struggle... but that is not to say that the class struggle has been abandoned or that it – this very same class struggle – will not become more acute."

It is also worth pointing out that the views of those who were actually further to the right than the "right faction" made little impact on the plenum. Nikolai Osinskii and Grigorii Sokolnikov spoke out in favour of sharply decreasing the "pumping" of resources from the countryside into the industrial sector, and argued for equality between city and countryside. To a far greater extent than the "official right faction," the supporters of these views were in fact prepared to see an extension of the NEP.

Bukharin's group found itself in a complicated position. They were not in favor of an unlimited extension of the NEP, and saw dangers in the country's being "agrarianized"; but at the same time they regarded the resort to extraordinary measures as completely unacceptable. To retreat, or to attack and escalate the conflict to the point of civil war – that was the dilemma that confronted Bukharin and like-minded supporters such as Rykov and Mikhail Tomskii. In essence not only Stalin, but Bukharin's group ended by taking a position of "unprincipled centrism" (Trotskii's expression), and the resolutions of the plenum were an obvious case of "rotten" political compromise.

In fact this gave much greater opportunity for Stalin's extraordinary tactical improvisations than did the strategic proposals of the "right faction." Their in-between stance placed Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskii in a complicated position. They could only hope that their middle way would yield practical results. Stalin, on the other hand, had created political instruments which strengthened his position irrespective of the subsequent course of events. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskii had fought a battle for the "general line" of the Party, or, as they put it, for an adequate interpretation of this line. If one is to believe their subsequent statements, the Bukharinites consciously avoided a struggle for power. As a result, they lacked sufficient political leverage to improvise, or to take strategic decisions, at the point where their new anti-crisis program collapsed. Moreover, the inclusion of Stalin's supporters on the editorial boards of *Pravda* and *Bol-*

*shevik* meant that the Bukharinites' scope for influence on the Party through the central ideological channels was narrowed.

Only two months after the July plenum, the consequences arising from the new wave of extraordinary measures forced Bukharin once again to speak out on the strategic aspects of the policy. In an article entitled "An Economist's Notes," published in *Pravda* in September 1928, he gave, in cautious terms, his analysis of these alarming phenomena. He raised the point that the position with regard to gold was alarming, that the country had no reserves, that the grain situation was at a standstill, or even deteriorating, that industrialization was going at too fast a pace and that it was this which had caused the ever greater tendency towards the use of extraordinary measures. This publication naturally displeased Stalin's group; however, the Politburo, having discussed the question, took a somewhat evasive stance, noting only that Bukharin had raised a number of controversial points. But on the basis of this thoroughly liberal resolution a campaign of extremely harsh "criticisms" was unleashed. Bukharin would later express his bewilderment:

"I had warned that the position with regard to gold was alarming and raised the question of reserves – this was mocked. I said that the grain situation was at a standstill, or even going backwards. This was declared to be panic and cowardice. I warned that it was unwise to hand out funds if there were no... building materials... I was said to be an opponent of industrialization, of the state farms and collective farms, and a right deviationist. I was slandered anonymously in dozens of articles throughout the press"

The attack was not originally unleashed directly on Bukharin. Stalin's team preferred at first to invent a number of doubtful theories, and then proceed to condemn them for this "doubtfulness"; without directly naming Bukharin. In September 1928 Valer'ian Kuibyshev, developing the ideas that Stalin had put forward at the July plenum, tried to offer a theoretical basis for the thesis concerning the escalation of the class struggle. Emel'yan Yaroslavskii went so far as to ascribe to his opponents a "theory of concessions". In his view, this alleged theory amounted in essence to the idea that the middle peasant would find it advantageous to move closer to the kulak because this would guarantee him concessions on the part of the Party, the Soviets, and the proletariat.

Criticizing the “theory of concessions,” Yaroslavskii declared: The NEP must not be represented as a policy of concessions”

Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that not only Bukharin and his supporters, but even certain members of Stalin’s camp, were seeking some form of political equilibrium. An editorial entitled “The Processes of Collectivization and the Danger from the Right,” published in *Pravda* on 14 November 1928, proceeded, after criticizing those who supported “an extension of the NEP” and the preservation of a market balance, to discuss new conditions for achieving this balance: namely, the creation of a mobile state-cooperative grain fund, without which it would be impossible to safeguard against a repeat of the “grain strikes.” Significantly, the creation of this fund, and the development of collective and state farm production, was still bound up with the necessity of being able freely to maneuver agricultural products on the market, and at the same time of consolidating the state’s leading role in “market relations with the peasant.”

This article appeared the day before the start of the November 1928 plenum of the Central Committee, at a moment of acute conflict in the Politburo about the formulation of a resolution concerning the planning of the new round of grain procurements, the aims thereof and the target figures involved. Bukharin foresaw a recurrence of the same problems unless emphasis were put on political-economic peace with the middle peasant. Since Stalin’s stance on the matter remained as yet undefined, he was determined to find a compromise. The concluding resolutions thus failed to yield any clear political picture. The final resolution of these contradictions was once again indefinitely postponed. All this provided fresh fuel for arbitrary interpretations of the political line, both by the various representatives of the Party leadership, and by workers on the ground.

In December 1928 the country once again found itself in a grave crisis over grain. Serious difficulties arose with regard to foreign payments. One consequence of this was the introduction of bread rations and a reduction in imports. The production programme was put in jeopardy. All this meant a new stage in the infra-Party dispute among the leadership. There were a number of significant indications testifying to the fact that, after the first wave of extraordinary measures, the supporters of the NEP tradition had realized that the policy of *chrezvychaishchina* had gained a momentum of its own. Without

expressing their protest openly, they began to “soften” the policy of extraordinary measures. Finally even Rykov, in November 1928, criticized a certain “right deviation,” making, however, the reservation that this faction should be dealt with not by exclusion from the Party, but through ideological struggle. Among the Party rank and file this “right deviation” was generally treated as something dreamed up by Moscow: the general attitude was that there were no such “deviations” on the ground. Thus calls for engagement in a struggle against these “right-wing deviationists” did not at first achieve the desired effect.

1929 began the new campaign against the Trotskyists. On 12 February 1929 Trotsky left for Constantinople on the steamer *Il'ich*. The Trotskyists had ceased to exist as a significant political factor. The influence of the Zinov'ev and Kamenev factions from the former united opposition was in practice also reduced to nil. Bukharin meanwhile had been engaged in reworking the anti-crisis programme due to be presented at the plenum of the Central Committee planned for January 1929. In a statement dated 30 January Bukharin and his fellow signatories Rykov and Tomskii pointed out the ever greater discrepancy in the decisions taken by the Party and in their practical implementation. One of the main reasons for this, in their view, lay in the personal stance of Stalin himself, in the special position he occupied and in his abuse of the extraordinary power at his disposal.

On 9 February 1929 the Bukharinites came out with a new statement. Why had Stalin found it necessary to change the Leninist idea of “alliance” with the peasants into the idea of “tribute” from them? What had been the purpose of this ideological disorientation of the Party? Deepening their analysis of the symptoms of crisis in the NEP economy, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskii now point-



Lev Kamenev



Grigory Zinoviev



ed not only to errors, in relation to prices, arising from particular circumstances, but added that during the past few years both industrial and non-industrial construction in the country had proceeded on the basis of printing money and spending the country's gold and foreign currency reserves, while the growth-rate in the grain sector had been insufficient. As a result clear signs of inflation had appeared and grave economic problems had arisen. The "alliance" of city and countryside was now under threat and there was a danger that industrialization would fail.

In April 1929, at a Plenum of the Central Committee, Bukharin for the first time severely criticized the Stalinist concept of the escalation of class struggle in step with the country's success in building socialism. He emphasized that the system of *chrezvychaishchina* had been presented at the plenum in July 1928 as a betrayal of Leninism, and condemned it accordingly. Now, as a result of the efforts of the Stalinist group, a different attitude towards the extraordinary measures could be discerned: namely, that these measures served to "rally" the Party; that they set the apparatus in motion, and that they supposedly "united" all the different strata of the rural population in the struggle against the kulak. In Bukharin's view, the introduction of extraordinary measures was based on a theoretical assumption – the idea of the escalation of the class struggle – which mixed together two completely different things: the acknowledged temporary aggravation of the class struggle during a particular stage (the country was going through just such a stage at present), and the general course of the country's development. This assumption elevated the very fact of the present escalation into some inevitable law of development. This "strange theory" led to the conclusion that the further the country progressed in building socialism, the more problems would accumulate, the more intense would the class struggle become, and at the very gates of socialism, apparently, there would be no other option than to "declare civil war", or "perish from hunger and give up the ghost". Bukharin was convinced that "the extraordinary measures, as a system, exclude the NEP". Rykov added, furthermore, that:

With the protracted, systematic application of extraordinary measures a specific ideology will inevitably be created, elevating these measures to a "law" of our development; and these measures will entail a whole series of new phenomena in the realm of commodity

circulation, supplies, the organization of trade and so on. One thing will lead to another.

The Bukharinites' proposed alternative to the "extraordinary ideological confusion" included the following points: the purchase of grain from abroad, the maintenance of revolutionary legality, regulation by means of prices, increased output of the means of agricultural production, and a flexible policy on taxation. However, this programme was not approved – first and foremost because of the political position taken by Stalin, who was able to guarantee for himself the support of a majority of the Central Committee. The proposals put forward by Bukharin's group were regarded as a retreat which carried no serious guarantees for the future. This gave a pretext for a serious ideological change within the Central Committee. It was announced that the choice lay not between the import of grain from abroad and the use of extraordinary measures, but between the import of grain and the achievement of industrialization. For a majority in the Party leadership, of course, industrialization was the first priority – the keystone of their ideology. The substitution of one concept for another, in effect equating *chrezvychnaya* with industrialization, took the ground away from under Bukharin's other proposals, including his principled insistence that revolutionary legality be observed. In essence, the extraordinary measures were given ideological legitimation.

Given the situation in the late 1920s – early 1930s, two alternative forms of development were theoretically possible. One lay in the direction of a form of "state socialism" that would function within the framework of the market and not exclude individual peasant ownership, or, in that sense, a pluralist economy; the other lay in the direction of extreme "state socialism," with the market "switched off, and the peasants stimulated into production by force. Probably, Stalin felt that these questions could no longer be left unanswered, nor could he continue to take an undefined stance as far as doctrine was concerned. Thus in the spring of 1929 serious doctrinal changes were made in the position of the Stalin group.

Now Stalin set out to show that there were two aspects to the NEP: the controlling role of the state and freedom of private trade. The first regulator was, in his opinion, more important than the second. It was in April 1929 that the departure from NEP reformism in favor

of “revolutionary” methods, presented as part of the struggle for “the socialist content of the October Revolution”; was actually declared:

At the XVI Party conference the “doctrine of class peace”; propagated by the Bukharinites on the basis of Lenin’s work, was rejected in favour of the theory of the escalation of class struggle. Henceforth, it was maintained, economic development should be run on the principles of “attack and onslaught”, relying on class consciousness and the use of force. By the autumn of 1929, an acceleration in the tempo of grain procurements had been combined with attacks on the market, and the rejection of any “weakness of will or spinelessness” in carrying out “decisive” repressions. The complete isolation of Bukharin’s group, moreover, was achieved through the repudiation of all his articles and speeches.

Practically every letter in the correspondence between Stalin and Molotov in the period from July to November 1929 contains some cynical reference to Bukharin. True, Stalin sometimes seems to play the hypocrite to himself, portraying his own irreproachable morality, forgetting for a moment his unworthy methods of battle, and demonstrating a “righteous anger” against his opponent. In a note to Molotov on 21 August 1929 Stalin lamented:

“You’re right in saying that Bukharin is sliding downhill. It’s sad, but that’s the fact. I suppose it must be “fate.” The only strange thing is that he hopes to cheat the Party with his petty swindler’s manoeuvres. A typical case of a cross between a spineless, barren intellectual in politics and a Constitutional Democrat lawyer.”

To hell with him”, the General Secretary significantly concluded this routine epistle. By November 1929 the question of the “right faction” had already been decided. Stalin seems finally to have made up his mind at the beginning of 1929, when he wrote to Molotov: “We’ll have to reckon with Bukharin leaving the Politburo”.

The November plenum was notable not only for the fact that its participants finished off the “right wing” and excluded Bukharin from the Politburo, and not only for the fact that they in essence gave a vote of confidence to Stalin and to his course of political and economic *chrezvychaishchina*, which was to culminate eventually in the Great Terror.

The political struggle of the 1920s and 1930s so radically changed the nature of intraparty relations, “freeing” the Party from the last

“remnants” of internal democracy, that it can justifiably be considered “a quiet political revolution.” The price of this “creeping revolution,” which in the final analysis broke the back of the Leninist old guard as the officially dissenting opposition, was extremely high. The ideological battle during this period turned into a fierce skirmish between the representatives of NEP-style Bolshevik reformism on the one hand and, on the other, the supporters of the “third revolution” and of a streamlined, industrial leap forward based on the forcible, quasi-socialist transformation of the countryside.

Leaving to one side the naive “Stalinocentrism” characteristic of a certain strand in sovietology, with its tendency to run together things that are incompatible (for example, A. Avtorkhanov’s assertion that there existed a comprehensive Stalinist plan conceived in the spirit of communist doctrine, and his thesis that Stalinist policy was entirely subjugated to the struggle for power, and that Stalin had nothing but scorn for Marxist-Leninist dogma), authors such as Avtorkhanov have nevertheless made a valid observation: the intraparty ideological struggle in the period we have examined had an immeasurably greater impact on the fate of ordinary people than all the previous political upheavals combined. If, up to this time, the intraparty struggle had done little damage to the interests of ordinary people (both the Stalinists and the Bukharinites claimed to be waging this struggle in the interests of these people – through the preservation of the NEP and the rejection of “force”), now the entire fate of the class which made up 80% of the population – namely, the peasantry – was being decided.

Not only the Party, but the entire country would be forced both to accept in silence the routine shifts in the leadership, and to experience for themselves all the consequences of the radical new course, and in the last analysis decide its fate. Thus one can hardly agree with the judgment widespread in our historiography, which in effect attributes all subsequent events to the skirmish among a relatively narrow group of Party oligarchs. Precisely the point is that the struggle at the summit, which to begin with resembled a battle with a shadow – the mythical bugbear of the “right deviation” – soon involved the entire country. This happened to a large degree as a result of the ideological manipulations examined in this article, which contributed to the establishment of harsh control over the attitudes and behavior of millions of people.

---

## *Theme 7*

### **The 1930s: Crises, Reforms, Repressions**

There are three prevailing notions about the 1930s both in academic history and the popular historical consciousness. The first is a “bright” myth: the 1930s were the epoch of general enthusiasm and grandiose achievements. The second explanation of the 30s is a “black” myth: the 30s were the time of unprecedented crimes; it was a “black period” in national and world history. The third notion represents a so-called “bipartite approach.” On one hand, there was real enthusiasm, on the other – persecutions. This bastardization of the scientific method of analysis once ridiculed by Karl Marx: “Napoleon is a great man. He did much good. But he also did much that was bad.” One must keep the good and remove the bad.

A new outlook on the 30s has recently been presented. It regards the 1930s as a period of “dialectic movements.” Two contradictory sides coexisted in those movements. They fought and thus created a new reality.

According to this scheme, by the late 20s, Stalin and his retinue had gained their foothold in a power play. Their program was as follows: To liquidate the private-ownership sector by force, to subordinate everything to the state, to reject the market with its problems and then to abolish money altogether. Their aim was to direct all of society’s effort to a common purpose – the construction of a powerful heavy industry. Moreover, this had to be accomplished in the shortest possible time, in a “leap.” This “revolutionary leap” would, as Stalin hoped, make it possible to outdistance the USA and Europe. Hence the tasks were: to concentrate on the main goal; to suppress any differences of opinion; to call for blind obedience; to put public interests before private ones. Stalin and his group conceived an “ideal society” as a well-organized mechanism, as a pyramid with the all-knowing



Let's Come to abundance!

government, the only reliable guide to progress, – at the top, and with conscious and disciplined masses – at the bottom. It was “general party line.”

The ruling clique indeed succeeded in achieving many of its partial goal, but at the enormous price of forsaking its true ideal. Stalin had soon to resign himself to many things. For example, to the failure of abolishing money, to the impossibility of changing economic laws, and to the indestructibility of human interests. But this was not apparent immediately; throughout the 1930s there were leaps, attacks and retreats creating a chaotic disorder.

In 1931 the results of the revolution from above have already become clear. Agriculture was in collapse. The surplus-appropriation system has triumphed. Peasants didn't care anymore to work hard. A number of regions were stricken with famine. Trying to escape, the rural population left for cities and construction sites. A run of disintegration of collective-farms started.

Industrial labor productivity had fallen. A great increase in manpower supply entailed an increase in prime cost of production. Enormous subsidies for industry had ruined the budget.

A rapid decrease of living standards increased social tensions. Open actions, silent sabotage, flight from collective farms – all this became the usual picture of the countryside. Moreover, when in 1932 the Government reduced the bread rations because of the poor harvest, unrests started in towns too.

A massive wave of rebellions rolled over the towns, when any opposition to the regime seemed to be suppressed by the “revolution from above.” These rebellions have never been described in the Soviet press. But they were very real. People looted bread stores and bakeries, demonstrators



Comrade, come and join us in kolkhoz!

drove local authorities away. An anecdote was wide-spread among workers: “In five years, after the 5 year plan, all that will be left in USSR will be – a party card, Stalin’s portrait and the skeleton of a worker”

Those in power used force to suppress mass protests. They arrested imaginary “instigators.” Certainly, the real cause of the crisis was not the work of wreckers; that is of the people who had wrecked the economy. Stalin knew this well. And in order to minimize unpredictable consequences, he started to change the “big leap” policy.

What was the reason for the change? In May 1932 the Government decided to give people a chance to feed themselves. The plan of grain procurements was reduced. Kolkhozes were permitted to market the grain left after the state procurements. Free market prices were permitted too.

What are state procurements? They are the quantities of grain the collectives had to deliver every year to the state before being able to use or sell the remainder of the harvest.

The aim of such decisions was clear. The surplus-appropriation system had led the country to hunger. Now the leaders recalled the NEP. They appealed to the personal interest of peasants.

What else did the Government do in the spring and summer of 1932? It prohibited liquidation of subsidiary small holdings of collective farmers, restricted officials arbitrary rule in the village and freed the cooperative system. An essential part of the change was the reduction of capital investments in industrial construction. It almost seemed as if a “Neo-NEP” was coming.

Stalin, however, considered these measures as inappropriate. “Neo-NEP” was politically unacceptable. Why? Stalin’s group had to

come to power under the “anti-NEP” slogans. Hence, stepping back to the NEP methods now meant admitting the failure of the “big leap”, admitting that the revolution from above was a political mistake, if not a crime. But Stalin had no intention of confessing his mistakes. In 1932 the Soviet leaders denied categorically the fact of abandoning their former positions. They branded all talk about “Neo-NEP” as opportunistic. Local authorities used to sabotage the liberal measures. But in spite of such conditions, peasants and collective farmers set out to the market. Even this half-way change on Stalin’s part proved to be effective.

Everything now depended on the Government’s resolution to implement the new course and on the available time to do so. In reality, there was neither the needed resolution, nor available time. Meanwhile the autumn of 1932 was approaching. It was time to gather a new harvest.

It became clear that the resolutions on free trade would be too late to change the course of grain procurements. The peasants had just one thought – how to survive? They did not trust the authorities. They couldn’t care less as to what happened to the crops in the field. Everybody tried to save themselves.

Many peasants left their villages. The grain procurements were catastrophically inadequate. The new harvest had not helped. The food situation became more critical. Masses of peasants and homeless children from famine-stricken regions rushed to the cities. The OGPU secret reports were full of cannibalism. Various epidemics were breaking out everywhere.

Industries were in deep crisis as well. Hungry workers couldn’t work productively. The cold winter of 1932–1933 disorganized the functioning of railroads.

One may go on enumerating the troubles of the country. In more than 10 peaceful years after the First World War and the Civil War the Soviet Union found itself in as bad situation as in 1921. An opinion spread among communists and others that Stalin was unable to bring the country out of the crisis and that he should leave.

Stalin himself, however, thought otherwise. In the fall of 1932 he abandoned any attempt to introduce liberal reforms and decided to use all necessary force to get his way. He ascribed the troubles to the enemies’ intrigues. Now grain procurements turned into general





The First Five-Year Plan: A hydroelectric dam in construction

searches, mass arrests shooting or ejection of whole villages. In spite of the famine, the grain of grain-producing regions was all confiscated, including seed funds. Famine-stricken regions were cordoned off. It became impossible to escape hunger. From the beginning of 1933, the power in the countryside passed into the hands of extraordinary bodies-political departments of MTS (machine and tractor stations). The Government tightened the screws on towns. At the end of 1932, a new law was passed. According to it, a worker could be dismissed, deprived of ration cards or evicted for a single case of absence from work without any reason. The purge of towns from “alien elements” began. In this way the “tramps,” that is those who succeeded in breaking through the cordons surrounding famine-stricken regions, were thrown out of towns. The “alien elements,” the “tramps” were sent to labor camps, colonies, or special settlements.

Thus, in 1933 the political regime was growing more and more oppressive. The least discontent were suppressed. And then the government suggested a dangerous measure – to balance the state budget by bereaving the people of their last means of existence. The wages fund was frozen and the prices of necessities, meat, butter, fish, and matches were increased. The Soviet leadership banked on the expan-

sion of “commercial trade” (that is profitable trade), and also on additional 500 million roubles of a vodka-selling campaign. Numerous compulsory state loans were issued.

This suppressive policy was designed to stabilize the situation. After the abundant harvest of 1933, Stalin and his supporters were a relieved. It was a victory, but at what price! According to the Robert Davis and Steven Witcroft and demographers Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver, the number of victims of the 1932–1933 famine reached 3 to 4 million people.

At the beginning of 1934, many people thought that the most horrible times had passed. At that time indeed signs of a moderate policy were appearing. Stalin promised people to stop “urging the country,” on promised to slacken the disastrous rate of industrial development. At first it seemed that Stalin would live up to his promises. The signs of moderation showed a new change in the “general party line” already in 1934. The rate of growth slackened. Economic methods of governing were used more intensively. Personal interests in one’s work as well as the role of material incentives were allowed. The necessity of money was admitted too. And above all the two most important buttresses of the previous extraordinary policy, the bread-ration system



The First Five-Year Plan: An Automobile Plant

and the political departments of machine and tractor stations were liquidated in 1934.

There were other aspects of the change seen. Previous calls for asceticism and self-denial were replaced by the advocacy of a “cultural and prosperous life”; however, not the life that had been promised at the beginning of the first five-year plan. At that time, the Government had promised the people to create “garden-towns” and over-abundant socialism. Now specific promises were made for other goods: apartments, furniture, clothes and food.

“Red Russia is turning pink,” wrote “The Baltimore Sun” of November 18, 1934. It was true indeed. Persecutions subsided. Politics became less extreme. The slightly appeased society was quickly healing the wounds of the past “leaps.” During the 30s the years of 1934–1935 proved to be very successful from the economic point of view.

However, this change for the better, as well as previous attempts was ruined by the adventurous policy of the country’s leaders. Stalin believed that a moderate course was a concession to circumstances. He decided that the time for a new leap was ripe. It was the Stakhanov movement that was used as a cause for the leap. (Aleksej Stakhanov was a miner of Donbass region who increased his coal output 12 times per shift). At the end of 1935, Molotov, the head of the government, announced, referring to Stalin’s directions, that the Stakhanov movement could double and treble industrial production. The 1936 plan targets were increased. Why? “Breakneck rates” again?

But the efforts of the “all-round stakhanovization” of the country failed in 1936. Storms and leaps disorganized production again. Social tension increased. The failure of mass “stakhanovization” was probably to serve as an argument in favor of the Great Terror started in 1937. According to the organizers, the Great Terror was to have an economic benefit. First of all, because new, young and vigorous appointees were nominated instead. Then, the Great Terror would also make order in the economic life of the Soviet Union. And finally because of the labor of numerous prisoners at various construction sites organized by NKVD.

Certainly, the Great Terror also served a political purpose by suppressing any critical thought. It depersonalized the society. Millions of people perished. The years 1937 and 1938 were the most horrible. It was the period of mass annihilation, without any prosecution.

Mass terror caused not only great moral suffering, but also economic damage. The rate of growth in general industrial output, even according to the official data, fell: from 28, 8% in 1936 to 11,1% in 1937. The great expansion of the NKVD economic activity couldn't save the situation.

On September 1st, 1939, World War II (or the "Great Patriotic War") began. This increased the use of extraordinary measures. In June 1940 industrial and office workers were attached to their works. Absenteeism became a crime. In July 1940, the decree of criminal responsibility for low quality production was issued. In the same month, the working day of the GULAG prisoners was increased to 11 hours.

However, the tightening the screws: couldn't solve the problems of low efficiency and low quality. In 1941, on the very eve of the Soviet-German war, the government decided to change the policy once more. The government again resorted to self-accounting system for the enterprises and material incentive for the workers. A new round "from violence to political moderation" was over.

To summarize the argument, we can state the following. There is a wide-spread opinion that Stalin's model of society, that is an administrative, command model, was proper for a high-speed, catching-up style of development. Indeed, in the late 30s the USSR became the second after the USA in absolute industrial output, while in 1913 Russia was the fifth, lagging behind the developed countries in industrial productivity. Between 1928 and 1941 nine thousand large industrial objects came into operation that is 600–700 each year. Mass production of aircraft, trucks and cars, tractors, combines and synthetic rubber started for the first time. At that time the USSR was one of 3 or 4 countries capable of producing any kind of industrial production. The World War II severely tested Soviet industry and the Soviet industry has stood the test.

A famous expression of F. Engels, reads: "Economics avenges us for every victory over itself." A leap in the development of heavy industry was bought at a high price, the price of a stagnation of the agrarian sector, at the price of a backwardness in light, industries and in construction. It was considered an axiom formerly that rapid growth of the economy would change the everyday life of the people, as well as labor conditions, in a fundamental way. At the same time other aspects of Soviet society were neglected. For example, manual

labor remained predominant. And in the late 30s a city-dweller had less floor-space than even before the revolution. Most people lived in communal flats, that is, one apartment for a number of tenants, in hut of cellars, or even in mud huts. The death rate of children exceeded that of the late 20s. According to the census in 1939, 90% of working people had only primary education. Every fifth man 50 and over couldn't read or write. Only one-sixth of the population had access to the radio.

The "leap" was also brought at the price of over-centralization of economic life. Industry was shared between branch super-monopolies. Commanding methods penetrated every sector of the economy. The interests of departments and the plan became superior to the interests of people.

It can be argued that the periods of leap and "breakneck rate", in fact, impeded the development of the country. Much more useful and effective were the years of moderate policy. This means that the elements of a different, really anti-Stalin system kept hidden under the "general party line" of Stalin. English historian Robert Davis believes that the use of the term "command, administrative system" with regard, to the economic system of the 30s, oversimplifies the situation. In spite of the predominance of over-centralization and repressive methods, a key component part of the system was the so-called secondary market. Much of the 30s achievements were due to the fact that the government was forced to introduce material incentives and initiatives. They were the consequence of the spontaneous functioning of natural regulators which smoothed over the contradictions of over-centralization. This side of the problem has not been studied by Russian historians.

The Stalin government, at times, displayed sometimes a more flexible policy. For example, in the spring and summer of 1932, in 1934 to 1935, in 1941. Of course, it doesn't mean that the development of the country was arbitrary. The number of possible variants was limited. The limitation was caused by the necessity to realize late industrialization, by social and cultural backwardness, by the existence of certain political realistic. However, even the command, administrative variant was by no means reduced to the one Stalin's chose. The conditions of society determined the successful functioning of a moderate, predictable and non-repressive command, administrative system.

---

## Theme 8

### The Hierarchy of the Great Terror

On August 5, 1937, political repressions on a mass scale, known as Great Terror, began in the USSR. How did the idea of mass purges emerge? Who was in the “target groups” of terror? Who controlled the repressions – Stalin or Yezhov? Or was social violence from below, characterized by its own logic, the reason for the Terror?

On July 3, 1937, Joseph Stalin sent a decision, made by the Politburo the day before, to Nikolai Yezhov, head of the state security services. Krai and oblast party committees and Central Committees of the national communist parties in the Republics were directed to register all former kulaks and criminals who had returned from the exile. These people were associated with numerous crimes and acts of economic sabotage. The results of this work were to be reported within five days. Between July 4 and 26 the requested information on the proposed scale of the repression was presented to the Central Committee and the NKVD. A directive was announced at regional meetings: to keep absolutely top secret the scale of the repressions as well as the suspension of the procedures for arrest and of the authority of the prosecutor’s office as stated by the Constitution.

A.N. Poskrebishev, head of the chancery of the secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee received a 19-page typed document – Order No. 00447. The preamble of the document clearly stated: the action is aimed at *a definitive solution of the problem of internal enemies of the Soviet Union, i.e. at a preventive societal purge in a pre-war situation.*

Issue No. 1 of the document contained a list of subjects of the operation: a large and mixed mass of enemies of the Soviet regime. It is important to note that the directive did not mention administration heads and party workers, military men and writers, i.e. the elite,



Nikolai Yezhov

representatives of which were placed in the dock during the notorious Moscow show trials, and who formed our first impression of the Great terror victims. The political purge (the so called “cadre revolution” that began in the autumn of 1936) was another side of the repressions.

Special lists determined “target groups” in a general way. Their peculiar feature was that to the traditional groups of “enemies of the system” (“former kulaks,” “members of anti-Soviet parties,” “participants in

rebel, fascist and spy groups, “churchmen,” and so on) a new category was added: criminals (ruffians, burglars, thieves, smugglers, con men and so on). This combination indicates the main intent of Order No. 00447. The political administration of the USSR criminalized social spontaneity and insubordination on the one hand, and on the other hand politicized ordinary crimes, thus making them equal in their anti-Soviet character.

Issue No. 2 specified the punishment (the death sentence to the first category convicts, 10 year imprisonment in a prison or a labor camp for the second category). It also determined repression quotas in oblasts, krais and republics of the USSR. A total number of 268,950 “anti-soviet elements” was declared. The fact that the quotas in the decree were mere approximations was crucial for the dynamic of the operation. This was a facility that stimulated regional authorities to compete for the highest numbers and at the same time allowed the central authorities to control the scale of the operation. Later on, one of the NKVD apparatchiks would explain: “The chief that was the first to fulfill his limit of several thousands of people would get a new additional limit from the people’s commissar and be regarded as the best worker.” Thus on November 20, 1937, the troika in Karelia convicted 705 people, 629 of them were sentenced to death. That result

that was bested by the troika of Omsk, that sentenced 1301 people on October 10, 1937, and 1014 people on March 15, 1938. 937 and 354 people were sentenced to death respectively.

Issue No. 3 determined the initiation date of the operation (August 5, 10, or 15 depending on the region) and its duration (4 months originally). The investigation was to be conducted “in a speedy and simplified way” i.e. with no legal aid to the defendant, confrontation or accumulation and verification of evidence.

Order No. 00447 specified names of judges of 67 extrajudicial “troikas.” They represented almost all the eminent leaders of the NKVD, while the party administration was represented by second secretaries. Members of troikas were assigned by the Politburo. Every newly appointed person enabled the intensification of prosecutions. Yet those who had the power of life and death became vulnerable themselves, turning from prosecutors into prosecuted.

What were meetings of troikas like? The secretary and a representative of the corresponding regional department were present along with “judges.” When the “court” reporter stated the case, “judges” would pass sentence based on the case description. Normally, this would be done at night behind closed doors. Judges would not see or listen to the defendant. No appeal was provided for. Those sentenced to death would be executed without even learning the sentence. This way it was intended to prevent any opposition, suicides or collective protests.

The instruction “to keep the time and place of the sentence execution ultra-confidential” was respected by the NKVD for half a century. All inquiries of relatives were prescribed to be answered with the notorious statement “ten years of imprisonment in labor camps



J. Stalin and A. Poskryobyshev



without the right to correspond with anybody.” Only during the rehabilitation campaign, started after 1989, did many people learn the real reason and date of their relatives’ and friends’ deaths. Execution sites and mass graves were also discovered only in the 1990s.

The resolution issued with Order No. 00447 settled important details of the operation. 75 million rubles were allocated for operational



Prisoner labor at construction of Belomorkanal

expenditures; 25 million rubles were allocated for railway transportation of convicts; 10 million rubles were allocated for new prison camps.

The operation was yet to begin, when on 1 of August V.A. Karutskii, head of Western oblast NKVD administration, asked Moscow to increase the limit specified

by the order. Similar requests overwhelmed the NKVD and Central Committee during the following months, almost always being approved. In his report on the first month of the operation Yezhov asked Stalin to support regions in their opinion that the registration of “anti-Soviet elements,” carried out before the operation, was insufficient and the number of repressed people did not correspond to the real number of “hostile elements.” The people’s commissar insisted on the final date of the operation being set on December 10, 1937. By that time the scale of the troikas’ “conveyer-belt justice” activity reached its peak.


This was the state of the “kulak operation” on December 31, 1937: 555,641 people were arrested and 553,362 were sentenced, 239,252 were executed. Among them: 105,124 former kulaks, 36,063 criminals, 78,237 “other counter-revolutionary elements,” 19,828 people with no group specification. 314,110 were sent to prisons and labor camps. Among them: 138,588 former kulaks, 75,950 criminals, 83,591 of “other counter-revolutionary elements,” 16,001 people with no

group specification. 14,600 of camp prisoners were sentenced to death.

At the beginning of 1938 uncertainty emerged in the ranks of the USSR leaders. Though the plenum of the Central Committee announced in January the end of “indiscriminate, sweeping” repressions, this order applied only to members of the party. Neither speeches, nor the resolution of the plenum contained any criticism against the NKVD. State security chiefs meant to continue the campaign. The Politburo decree of January 31, 1938, clarified the situation.

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party resolved to continue the operation. Nine union republics, two autonomous republics and eleven krais and oblasts of RSFSR were allotted additional repression limits. The operation was to be finished by March 15 (and by April 1 in the Far East of the Soviet Union). The work of troikas was prolonged until February 15, 1938. Comparing the number of those condemned to death by this new decree with quotas allotted by the order No. 00447, a tendency to pass more severe sentences can be observed: the proportion of death sentences in comparison to the number of people sent to prisons and labor camps was increased. Moreover the NKVD and Central Committee of the party even had to curb the zeal of the provinces. This was a sign that from the Central Committee’s point of view that the high point of the operation had passed.

Officially, liquidation of “counter-revolutionary national contingents” was the major objective of the Terror from February until the middle of April, but in fact it lasted until November 1938. Up to that moment national minorities remained in the shade of the main “kulak” operation. However, at the end of July 1937, the “German” operation started, in August, “liquidation of Polish sabotage and spy groups” began, from early autumn Korean people were arrested and deported from the Far East, and then the “Latvian” operation began. From January 31, 1938, repressions targeted large groups of Afghans, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Iranians, Chinese, Romanians, and finally Bulgarians and Macedonians, who lived in the USSR. As a result of all national operations of the NKVD 335,513 people were found guilty of “espionage and sabotage on behalf and in favor of foreign states” (over 73% people were sentenced to death).



GULAG prisoner mortality rate

In the autumn of 1938 the first symptoms of a policy shift appear. The appointment of Lavrentii Beria as deputy head of the NKVD was a part of this shift. A Politburo commission was established to provide new decrees “On Arrests, Prosecutorial Supervision and the Course of Investigations.” It consisted of Nikolai Yezhov, head of the NKVD, Lavrentii Beria, Andrei Vyshinskii, procurator general, Georgii Malenkov, head of Central Committee department of party administrative bodies, Nikolai Rychkov, People’s Commissar of Justice. The troikas ceased their activity: on November 15, the Politburo approved a directive on the “suspension” of all investigations by troikas, courts-martial, and in the Military Commission of the Supreme Court. The next day the Council of People’s Commissars’ directive “On Arrests, Prosecutorial Supervision and the Course of Investigations” was signed by Viacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, and the Secretary General of Communist Party Central Committee, and then it was sent to the regional authorities.

While Molotov and Stalin the found campaigns against kulaks, “national counter-revolutionary contingents” and criminals and other “anti-Soviet elements” quite successful, they also criticized the NKVD and the prosecutor’s office for “mistakes” that had prevented a “complete victory over enemies of the Soviet Union.” In the light

of this criticism, groundless and illegal mass arrests were condemned, as were multiple violations of basic principles in the course of investigations. The resolution, however, remained silent on the ordinary practice of extracting confessions through torture that was common in these years.

Mass arrests and deportations were forbidden and troikas liquidated; an end to the “Great Terror” was declared. From that time on, all arrests were to be made only with the prosecutor’s sanction or after the court’s decision, according to article 127 of the Constitution of the USSR. All criminal cases were to be considered in regular courts or in the Special commission of the NKVD. Analysing 1937–1938 events, the resolution relieved the Party administration and Government authorities of any responsibility for mass repressions.

An early appearance of the term “Yezhovshchina” to describe the “Great Terror” corresponded to this policy. The term became popular with Stalinists and was long used by certain historians. Yezhov’s resignation suited the theory well too. The resignation was accepted on November 24, and just two days later, on November 26 the new head of the NKVD Lavrentii Beria in his report promised to restore “Soviet legality.” Eighteen orders, circular letters and instructions of the NKVD, dated from July 1937 to September 1938, were cancelled in one day.

Beria’s directive made appeals against extrajudicial sentences possible until 1941. That is why 1939 was marked by mass protests. The special department of the prosecutor’s office of the Novosibirsk region alone received 15,915 appeals against extrajudicial sentences. The prosecutor’s office sent an order to the UNKVD of Novosibirsk to make supplementary inquiries. That did not mean, however, that the cases would be reheard: all they did was re-question old witnesses and interview new ones. An analysis of cases that were heard by troikas in other regions indicates that most of the convicted were not rehabilitated by the NKVD. Besides slowing the process of analyzing a case, investigators would ask witnesses only those questions, which helped to reaffirm the indictments. Supplementary investigation and decisions on rehabilitation were supervised by the very same department that was responsible for sentences handed down by the troikas.

The small numbers of rehabilitation verdicts issued in 1939–1940

proves that the campaign to “restore the socialist rule of law” was not designed for the benefit of those who suffered in the purges. The prosecutor’s office was intent on finding violations of the law by NKVD officers and to gather evidence that allowed the prosecutor’s office to arrest and condemn them. In this way the party administration was released from responsibility for the purges, and the power of the NKVD was gradually reduced to its original level.

Arguments over the causes and reasons of this national tragedy still consume both scientists and the ordinary Russians after seventy years’ time. Those who argue, primarily on ideological grounds, that the Terror had a “positive effect” would probably agree with the argument made by Molotov: “1937 was absolutely necessary, if we take into consideration that although after the revolution we struggled violently and gained victory, some enemies of different hues still managed to survive and could try to unite, when the country was threatened by fascist aggression. To 1937 we owe the fact that we had no fifth column during the war.”

But is this true? Was the “preventive purge” effective and necessary? Was it at all possible to provide economic development (even if one includes the labor camps) or to make life happier through terror? And was it really thanks to a “purged” society (a society without selfish leaders, mediocre commanders or collaborators?) that the Soviet Union won the Great Patriotic War? Did people become totally controllable after the war or stop “stealing” ears of corn not to starve to death? Clearly something other than the Terror must account for the post-war stability of the Soviet Union.

Sooner or later society will manage to find answers to these and other difficult and painful questions. One of these questions is why tens of thousands of Soviet people would willingly denounce their workfellows, neighbours and even relatives, and why some Chekists (members of the secret police – PTC) sacrificed themselves in order to save people they did not even know by not reporting denunciations? If we do not find honest answers, there is no guarantee that such a horror will never happen again, for in some ways the Great Terror of the 1930s was but a repeat of the terror of the French and Russian revolutions.

The massive operations of 1937-38 were secret, and at first the consequences were almost intangible. But the Terror did not only affect



A memorial to victims of the Gulag

the “target groups”, everyone suffered: some people lost their job or stopped their studies; some renounced their parents or teachers, or betrayed their friends to save themselves.

The peculiarity of the notion that there were “different Stalins” (as some historians claim) was that it served to give people hope during the Terror. An inverted “logic of decimation” emerged: it was not that one out of ten was killed; on the contrary, it was that one out of ten was spared. That may have been the reason for the absence of any resistance: everybody could have thought that he or she would be the one out of ten to be spared. That may be the basis for the undying magnetism of Stalin’s personality. At first he, like Bonaparte, balanced between classes, after that he did the same between the apparatus and the masses, between disunited state officials, between family members, between people seized with panic and those in desperate hope. For some people – for the one out of ten who was spared – he will always be right. And this means that we still have a much longer road to travel in order to arrive at a clear understanding of our common past.

---

## *Theme 9*


### **Illusions and Awakening of the Generation of 1930s**

We concluded our previous theme with the picture of the Great Terror. We also discussed the repressions against millions of innocent people. Today, the younger generation sternly asks the older one: “Why did not you resist?”

The author of a well-known book “Gulag Archipelago”, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, also asks this question. He concludes that it is precisely the lack of any resistance that was the cause of the mass terror. In Leningrad, – the writer notices, – three quarters of the inhabitants were hiding while one quarter was put behind bars. Nobody denounced the murderers. Nobody punctured the tires of the NKVD cars. Nobody stopped the machine of the NKVD. Therefore the people deserved what they got. Is it possible to agree with Solzhenitsyn? Did the Soviet people really deserve the terror? Soviet historians haven’t as yet studied the problem of the Soviet society’s opposition to terror. Who has counted how many people happened to be saved by those who opposed Stalin’s state during the harvest of times? And what did the people who suspected the extent of the terror, do? What did the generation of the 1930 believe in?

If one looks through the Soviet newspapers of the great purge period, one will find them full of “people’s anger”, against “wreckers”, against so-called “spies”, trotskysts and bukharinists. But was the indignation sincere and unanimous? In Russia, there are several opinions on that score today. We would begin with the two extremes. Some people take official indignation for the true public feelings of the majority. Others believe that those who lived in that period of terror kept silence not because they had faith in Stalin, but because they were afraid.

It might seem strange that we have evidence in support of both points of view. Indeed, there were people who believed in the ex-



Alexander Solzhenitsyn

istence of hundreds and thousands of enemies. There were also those who pretended to believe. We find a normal distribution curve of opinions in between the two extremes. The generation of the 30s had every reason both for agreement with the official propaganda and for doubting it that is grounds both for silence and for frankness.

Let us start with the believers. It was difficult for an ordinary man to understand the situation. He was probably not a highly cultured man; he had scant information available.

Many people were really defenseless in the face of the overpowering official propaganda. For years there were accustomed to the thought that the new society has many enemies inside and outside their homeland. That was not always a myth. In 1933 Hitler came to power in Germany. There were troubles in the Far East due to Japanese provocations. Stalin's policy of terror constantly increased the number of people, who were discontent and embittered by the violence and injustice. Of course, these people were not the enemies of their own country. But there is no doubt that many of them hated (with plenty of reason) the Stalin made state system. Most people went along with the official propaganda and considered all critics of the regime to be "enemies of the people."

Furthermore, some innocent people often put all the blame for every trouble in the countries on those enemies. The economic system, established in 1930s generated a horrible managerial bureaucracy; the lack of democracy increased bureaucracy and corruption. As for the people, they readily believed that only the enemies of the country were to blame. The government sensed such moods and conducted repressions in the form of demagogic campaigns of "struggle against bureaucracy and corruption."





A prisoner of the Gulag (1946)

Repressions affected in one way or another, millions of people, but not everyone was affected. Many lived quite happy lives, even in those tragic years. They were youths; they worked and enjoyed life. We would like to refer to the memories of one well-known writer Vyacheslav Kondratiev. In 1930 he was about 20 years old. Recollecting that time, he asks himself: “Was our life really terrible then?” And answers his own question: “Strange as it might seem, but it wasn’t.” Why? “We have been born in a cage,” writes Kondratiev, “and were not aware anymore of being in a cage, and so we were happy”.

Solzhenitsyn also recalled: “Enemies were arrested at night while we were living by daylight, with banners flying. Why should we know and think of arrests? Every regional leader was replaced – it was indeed all the same to us. Two or three professors got arrested – it only meant it would be easier to pass our exams. We were marching with our October (1917) age group and the very bright future was in store for us.”

Such optimism was not uniquely the result of the official propaganda. Compared with famine of 1932–1933, the absence of rationing and sufficient food-supplies in 1937 was regarded as a great blessing. The authority of the leaders was growing. They seemed to be forgiven for the former hunger. People worried about food and clothes.

Anything connected with the NKVD activity, with prisons and labor camps, was not discussed. People lived a double life. Night-time arrests and executions, prisons and camps were one side of life. In the daylight life – ruby stars were put on the Kremlin towers, prices were lowered, and expeditions were sent to the North Pole. The heroic aviators Chkalov, Beliakov and Baidukov who did the first historic non-stop flight over the North Pole to America, were enthusiastically

welcomed. It became common to get together for weekends, country trips and celebrations of various, so-called “profession-holidays,” for example, Miners’ Day, Fishermen’s Day etc. In July 1938 the 4<sup>th</sup> Carnival opened in the Moscow Central Park. One hundred thousand people participated.

We must highlight a special satisfied group of Soviet people at that time. In those years, and just owing to mass repressions, many people could gain quick promotion. And if they were lucky enough to survive, and, if moreover, they became part of the “nomenclatura,” no one could really demonstrate that they were living in the period of arbitrary rule and lawlessness.

How else to understand the readiness of the 30s generation to trust in the official versions of the events? It was doubtlessly dangerous to express any doubt. We happened to question many eyewitnesses of the Great Terror. Their stories make it possible to outline several ways of behavior. We’ll list four modes, although certainly there were more.

The first mode was to actively oppose the Party; this meant opposing the Soviet regime.

The second way of existence was to keep away from any social activities to retreat into one’s shell, to turn into a philistine in the long run.

The third mode was the way of hypocrisy. This was a rather common but not a very easy way. It’s not as simple as it may seem, to constantly pretend that one is an active participant of the construction of socialism.

And the last but not the least important way was the way to believe. To believe in bitter class struggles, to believe that struggles caused all the troubles, to believe that Stalin defended the interests of common people and fought against enemies and the opposition. It’s obvious that this way was the easiest. Therefore, many people followed this way of willful disbelief. “Surviving needs believing” became the credo for millions. Deliberately or not, they tried getting rid of seditious thoughts. They preferred not to burden their minds and conscience by thinking about the difference between propaganda and reality. In addition, the mechanism of ideological repression was so sophisticated that it was difficult to resist. Now we’ll outline how this mechanism worked.

In 1930s Soviet people found themselves involved in an unprecedented “vigilance” campaign. General hysteria about the presence of “enemies” was stirred up by the authorities and mass media. How? The organizers’ imagination was very rich. Sometimes it came to the point of absurdity. Surely, you don’t know anything about the so-called “printing vigilance.” But the Soviet people do. In 1937, Soviet society was stricken with a fever of discovering “wrecker’s” misprints in newspapers, books etc. Even an accidental omission or replacement

of a letter could be regarded as a counter-revolutionary plot.

For example, instead of the word “vskryt” (to open, to disclose) the word “skryt” (to conceal) was printed, instead of “groznoye preduprezhdenie” (stormy warning) “griaznoe preduprezhdenie”



Entering Gulag (a page from from Eufrosinia Kersnovskaya's notebook)

(dirty warning) was misprinted, instead of “StalinGRAD” – city of Stalin – “StalinGAD” (GAD is a vermin in Russian) was printed. As a result, such misprints lead to repressive measures against editors, correctors, composers.

Here is another example. Many people became excited about searching disguised signs of the enemy in the pictures printed in newspapers, matchboxes, wrappers, fabrics and so on. Some vigilant citizens equipped with a magnifying-glass succeeded in discovering now a fascist swastika, now a Japanese helmet, now a portrait of the tsar or Trotsky. And then new repressions followed.

In the 1930s, the official propaganda persistently instilled the ideology of “virtuous denunciation.” A communist who kept silence about something suspicious could be regarded as “an accomplice of the enemy.” Anyone could be arrested for not reporting the felony (felony meant any crime against the party or regime) and, on the other hand, the one who informed the NKVD about suspicious persons, was glorified as a hero of vigilance. He or she

then enjoyed the state patronage, was given bonuses, and sent to sanatoriums and so on. Acting as an informer often turned into a profitable business.

Inform against your boss – and you may get his place. Tell tales about your neighbor – and you may move into room, or apartment.

A significant part of Stalin's repression mechanism was the organization of special meetings. Large halls and the like turned into confessionals.

Anyone who wanted to avoid punishment had to confess, to humiliate himself or herself to denounce the State's enemies. Every meeting has a special trend. The participants of the meeting might confess that they had misinterpreted the theory of permanent revolution, or underestimated the second five-year plan, having been keen on Meyerhold's far out theatre. The penitents openly castigated themselves. They severely criticize themselves for having lost political vigilance, for showing "rotten liberalism" and so on. Then there was the procedure of publicly blaming the relatives of the "people's enemies." Many people were made to renounce their persecuted wives, husbands, fathers, or mothers.

All of these and many other facts presented a sad and intricate picture. Reality and falsehood, urgent problems, wrong solutions, fear and belief in leaders, in Soviet power – were blended in it.

Nevertheless, awakening was bound to come. Some people began to look around with their eyes wide open. The large-scaled persecutions the impossible charges against the people who had nothing to do with politics at all, or against the leaders who had recently been worshipped, all this was an eye opener for many. Doubt appeared on the horizon. Then people began seeking their own answers to the key questions, apart from the official versions. This often resulted in direct protest.

In December 1936 a new (so-called Stalin's) Constitution was pompously adopted in the USSR. It was called "the most democratic in the world." But here is an example of what the NKVD, bugging telephone conversations, had recorded. A student Yakhno from Zaporozhie (Ukraine) said: "We in the USSR have no democracy and shall not have any. Everything went on and will go on as the dictator Stalin orders. We will have neither freedom of the press, nor freedom of speech."

The second half of 1937 brought important changes. In accordance with the new Constitution, the election campaign to the Supreme Soviet was being prepared. Believing the papers of that time, the country enjoyed order. The enemies of the people had been repressed. All the rest welcomed the party and the Government. But that was so only at first sight. Meanwhile closed plenary sessions of the Party Central Committee could not foresee the results of the poll. They regarded the church, the “dekulakized” peasants, the people expelled from the



Gulag prisoners (1937)

party, the intelligentsia, the latter was considered “minor people” by the Party as possible opponents? The situation was rather serious. As a matter of fact, if the election campaign had been democratic enough, with freedom of nomination of candidates, it would have shown the real attitude of the people

to Stalin’s leadership. Molotov, the next important person after Stalin, declared openly that failure would be unavoidable in many areas. And the Authorities chose the way of preparing various instructions, actually unconstitutional ones. The electoral procedure was taken under the strictest control.

Cases were known when “enemies of the people” or “wreckers” succeeded to win the support of electors. But the destiny of these supporters was sad; they were denounced as “accomplices of enemies.” Despite this, many people rushed to fight for their relatives, never believing them to be real state enemies.

As to those in power, the heads of various departments and institutions did not all behave the same. They often had to sign warrants to arrest their subordinates. Indeed, there were those who signed. But some, for example, People’s Commissars Ordzhonikidze and Zave-niagin, acted otherwise. They took the subordinates under their own

protection, taking responsibility for them even confronting Stalin. On August 26, 1937 the central newspaper “Izvestia”, circulation about 10 million., published the article of its correspondent Suvinsky under the headline “Panic-mongers.” For the first time, the warning sounded openly: the policy of repression was supported by incompetent and dishonorable people, who hold their positions with the help of repressions. When these bureaucrats encounter an awkward situation, they begin to prosecute kolkhoz chairmen, directors of works etc. In this way they try to hide their own mismanagement.

The Communist Party Central Committee viewed this article as a challenge, as an enemy attack. Suvinsky was immediately dismissed, and fell NKVD hands.

Let us mention data about military prosecutors. We now know that about 80 military prosecutors who were persecuted for the efforts of preventing the NKVD terror. They tried to prevent unlawful arrests. There were, however, honest people in the NKVD itself. It is known today that 20 thousand chekists were repressed because they didn't want to take part in the “Great Terror”.

Suicide was another deliberate protest. It was often the only possible way to be heard. In the summer of 1936 two loud protest-suicides took place in Moscow. The former leader of Soviet trade unions Tomsky and a prominent Moscow party worker Furer committed suicide. The latter left a 15-page letter unmasking Stalin's policy. In 1937 the Chairman of the Ukrainian Government Lubchenko and the Chief of the Red Army Political Administration Gamarnik committed suicide too. On the whole 782 cases of suicide were registered in the Army in 1937 and 832 cases in 1938.

We would like, at this point, to point on the fact that Stalin personally did much to cause hatred and complete indifference towards those who had fallen into the hands of the NKVD.

But Soviet society was filled with compassion, all the same. In spite of the threat of severe punishment, people helped each other not necessarily for ideological reasons but out of the goodness of their heart.


We now have much data available, which combined will recount the History of Destalinization. This will help us to answer the question we have posed at the beginning: “Why did not you not resist?”

---

## Theme 10

### The Great Patriotic War 1941–1945: Main Events and Popular Mood in the Unoccupied Soviet Union

We propose to remember the turning-points of the Great Patriotic War. We'll be helped with the scheme:



1) June 22, 1941 – November 1941. The outbreak of the war; heavy retreat of early months; the loss of strategic initiative.

2) December 1941. The battle and victory at Moscow; stabilizing of the main front; attaining of the strategic balance.

3) Summer 1942. Defeats and retreat again; losing of strategic initiative.

4) The Stalingrad battle of Winter 1942/43. The beginning of the change in war; regaining of the strategic initiative.

5) The battle of Kursk, Summer 1943. The turning-point of the war; a general strategic offensive; the liberation of the occupied territories.



“For the Motherland, for Stalin!”

6) The last stage. War in Europe; the Berlin battle; the capitulation of Germany.

The adherents of the social system created in the USSR during the 1930s, having retreated within their own country in view of ferocious criticism of Stalinism, have fallen back on the victorious war against Hitler’s Germany as their last defensive position. Their logic runs this way: even if Stalin himself did everything wrong, his model of social structure secured the victory over fascism, and by that token alone it was the right structure. But an approach to the issue that strictly follows the historical documents shows something else: the system that, it seems, was created for the conduct of war and that was justified in many people’s eyes by the expectation of a coming war unveiled its incapacity in the first weeks and months of the fighting.



The leaders of the Soviet system at the time, having already taken massive repressive actions against the people, strengthened their power as the German invasion began at the price of the submission of the whole country to the secret police. The leadership achieved the alienation of those people capable of thinking for themselves. The illusion arose that a monolithic unity had been created, but this monolith baked in the ovens of Stalinism, as quickly became evident in the fighting, was simply not in a position to conduct the war.

The first clashes with the Germans showed that many people who had been advanced to commanding positions after the purges and repressions of the 1930s were of poor quality, incapable of demonstrating initiative. The extraordinary situation of the early days of the war, both at the front and in the rear, required extraordinary action, not the blind fulfillment of an order no matter how petty. Independent and creative actions were required; blanket orders had no effect and sometimes led to disastrous results. A completely different kind of logic for action was required: the unconditional fulfillment of an order but with freedom of choice of the means to carry it out. However, such thinking was absolutely contradictory to the logic beaten into the heads of the new stratum of commanders on the eve of the war. Time was necessary to allow those with some intellectual, cultural, and political potential to rise through the system.

Perhaps it was Stalin himself who was the first to sense this crisis of his brand of socialism. At the end of the war, he let out a secret: in 1941 the people had the right to demand the government's resignation, but had not done so. We can say today: yes, but not because the government had done such a good job. The "system" proved to be wrong for the war; it was fit only to strengthen Stalin's personal dictatorship. Fundamental changes were required to overcome the crisis of the first days of the invasion.

The rapidly changing situation at the front and in the rear did not require giving up a hierarchical, inflexible mode of leadership. On the contrary, under wartime conditions power must be concentrated in a single center. But the problem was how to divide power and functions between the center and local authorities. The type of management that had been created by the end of the 1930s permitted no autonomy of action. Ordinary people were reduced to "little screws" of the mechanism.



"The Motherland calls!"

On the surface it seemed that all Soviet citizens were for the regime and for comrade Stalin. But that is a myth; reality was vastly different. Not the official, public documents, but others now available to researchers reflect the real feelings of the people. These new sources allow us to reconstruct a more accurate picture of the past in place of the one that Stalinist leaders and other Soviet officials into recent years so ardently desired.

The study of popular attitudes during wartime is indeed complicated. Popular attitudes have meaning that one wants to understand, but which one

should not judge. Although we have our own ideas and notions about World War II, we do not have the right to impose these views of history and life on the wartime generation, which after all operated under extreme pressure from various directions.

There is another, possibly even more serious difficulty in trying to draw a composite picture of people's mentality during the war. Frank accounts of popular attitudes for the years 1941 through 1945 have been saved in unusual and rare sources – namely, the closed channels of party and state information, intended only for the Stalinist elite. In its analysis of popular attitudes, Soviet historiography long relied on exclusively official sources: the central and local press and lectures and speeches from all types of meetings (usually censored in advance). All of these materials had a particular orientation, demonstrating social unity, patriotism, and loyalty to the party and Stalin. In this way, a unified picture of popular attitudes developed. Almost to the very end of the USSR's existence, its leadership considered discussions of diversity in popular wartime perceptions and reactions to be unacceptable. The party hierarchy therefore diligently kept much

information on the war secret from all but a limited circle of high officials.

Documents made available in 1991 by the Communist Party Central Committee's Bureau of Propaganda and Agitation, preserved in the former Central Party Archive in Moscow, point toward a picture of widely varying responses, hopes, and criticisms expressed during the war. Who recorded social attitudes from 1941 to 1945? Answering this question identifies the main channels through which information reached the top authorities.

Surveillance of public attitudes mainly occurred in small social groups and was led by party cadres and workers of the regional NKVD-NKGB, the security police. As a rule, on this level, the most pervasive, spontaneous, emotional, and often fluctuating feelings and opinions of simple people were recorded. In such records there is no precise personalization. Instead there are anonymous mass rumors, as well as rejoinders, slips of the tongue, and so on – everything that might be called “the voice of the people.”

Reports to higher party echelons by leaders and members of the propaganda groups of the Central Committee (CC), which traveled around the country, were also clear and constant channels of information. The most interesting component in these reports is the voluminous lists of questions asked in very different places, from lectures on factory floors or collective farms to plenary sessions and meetings of active party members. All these questions were categorized according to standard methods and directed to the CC.

On the local level, spontaneous and unconscious moments rarely appeared, in proportion to the small share of anonymity accorded people as they participated in meetings. Yet the questions sometimes illuminate popular attitudes. In their content, these questions are much more valuable and interesting than the texts of lectures, which had to be approved in advance by central authorities.

The next traditional channel of surveillance was opening private correspondence. This process was carried out by the departments of censorship in the NKVD-NKGB. However, in spite of its wide use, this source of information yielded practically no ideological content. The summaries of correspondence prepared by the departments of censorship between 1941 and 1945 are filled with everyday materials as well as coverage of complaints about disastrous conditions, for

instance, among workers of evacuated enterprises. This means that after the machinery of repression began to work well during the 1930s, people learned not to trust personal writings for the elaboration of their thoughts and ideological views.

It is possible to use anonymous letters (often signed with fake surnames) as an important source and wide channel of information. These letters were received in enormous quantities by central and regional party committees and by newspapers.



In the battlefield

Of the relatively nontraditional channels of surveillance of popular attitudes, the following were most important: selective secret recording of conversations involving representatives of various elites (academic, military, etc.) by NKGB agents; reports to the authorities by security employees circulating among the population; and reports by magazine salespeople about discussions among people in line at kiosks.

What were the main features of the secret information about popular attitudes? Throughout, this information reveals popular reactions to the major events of the war: the retreat of the Red Army, the opening of the second front when the western Allies invaded Normandy in June 1944, and so forth. The regime closely monitored anti-Soviet

dispositions; dissatisfaction with the leadership; attitudes toward Germans and Hitler; attitudes toward the dissolution of the Communist International (Comintern, the organization to which all communist parties recognized by the Soviet party belonged) in 1943; perspectives for international revolution; attitudes toward collective farms and the private, commercial trade that was allowed during wartime and was traditionally associated in popular memory with the New Economic Policy of the more liberal 1920s; and views of postwar society and further developments in Soviet relations with the country's allies.

In principle, these subjects are also indicators of popular attitudes before the war. Having directed its attention toward these topics, the regime inadvertently found the weak places in its policy and doctrine. At these points lies the strongest confrontation, however much it was hidden, between society and the state.

Of course, popular thought hardly ended with the problems listed above. During wartime, human consciousness intensifies its consideration of questions about the meaning of existence, life, death, love, fear, aggression, treason, charity, and altruism. However, for the Stalin regime, these were questions about elevated subjects and were, consequently, superfluous and irrelevant.

The sources imply that some people fought for socialism, though perhaps not for Stalin's particular brand of it. Others fought not for socialism but for the homeland. Still other citizens seemed to act from bitterness accumulated in the long prewar years. At least at the start of the invasion the officials, the leaders of the "system," often did not act at all: they found themselves paralyzed in the face of the immense German attack.

When the war began, the Soviet people as a whole did not at once realize how fateful the situation was. As an engineer of the Leningrad Metal Factory, G. Kulagin, put it, "Who do they [the Germans] think they're fooling with, what's going on, have they gone completely out of their minds?! Of course the German workers will support us, and all the other peoples will rise. It can't be any other way!" There was no lack of happy prognoses. "I think," said one of the workers of the Leningrad Metal Factory, "that now our forces will thrash them, so that it will all be over in a week." "Well, in a week, maybe, it won't be over," answered another; "we have to go to Berlin... Three or four weeks will be needed."

This “domestic strategy,” the expectation of a quick victory, was the fruit of ignorance of the real relationship of strength between the two sides. In fact the complete confusion of the first hours of the sudden German attack, when Stalin still could not believe in Hitler’s “treason” in breaking the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939, cost uncounted victims and secured for the invaders their initial successes.

A different mood soon emerged. In October 1941 the enemy was approaching Moscow. In Privolzhsk, a town in the Ivanovo region some 175 miles (265 kilometers) to the northeast of the capital, two to three hundred workers started a strike. The workers were dissatisfied with the methods of mobilization, the construction of defensive positions in the area, and the lack of consumer goods. They voiced their complaints openly. From 15 to 20 October, a critical period in the fighting around Moscow, disorder broke out in Ivanovo, the district capital. Shouts rang out: “Every boss has run away from the town, while we are left alone”; “The People’s Commissariat of Light Industry, the NKVD, the *obkom* [provincial party committee] have evacuated their families, while we are still here”; “they didn’t let us dismantle and remove the equipment”; “they didn’t ask us and started to take down the work benches on a day off”; “they didn’t let us take the benches apart [for evacuation]”. When local party officials tried to disperse the workers who were spreading these rumors, people shouted, “Don’t listen to them, they know nothing, they have been deceiving us for 23 years now! Such words could not have been spoken before the war.

These incidents occurred in the birthplace of the country’s first Soviets, which sprang up during the turbulent year 1905, an area where the capacity for critical, sober views of things had not been completely expunged. But negative comments about the course of the war appeared elsewhere as well. The former director of a rural primary school, the party member Koniakhin, who had served in Latvia, appeared in Tula province, south of Moscow. He told collective farmers there that the Red Army was not ready for the war, that Soviet airplanes were sitting at the aerodromes without gasoline, and that not one of them got into the air.

The mood was bad in Archangel province: “Everyone said that we would beat the enemy on his territory. It turned out the other way around. ... Our government fed the Germans for two years, it would have been better to have saved food for our army and for the people,

but now all of us expect hunger.” Such conversations occurred not only among rank-and-file peasants and workers; a former partisan of the civil war and a party member S. Romanov, announced that, “The Germans are squeezing us badly, while our people don’t have the enthusiasm they had during the Civil War, especially among us partisans. We went ourselves and fired people up. The present leaders are incapable of organizing and raising the masses.”

Attitudes like these were officially called “defeatism” and “alarmism,” but were in fact neither. A worker from the Kaluga region named Balakin declared in July 1941 that he would defend the Soviet land but not those sitting in the Kremlin. That is, he distinguished between the Soviet system as a whole and the current evil and inept leaders in the Kremlin. To him the Soviet system was *nash*, the Russian term that can simply mean “ours” but often connotes a deep division between what is “ours” and what is foreign, with a great deal of affection and loyalty attached to the first category. Balakin hardly considered Stalin and his cronies to be “ours,” yet his statement suggests that he would fight hard for what he had come to believe was his Soviet homeland.

At first the regime did not respond to people as human beings but instead tried its usual levers of control. All radio receivers were removed; Moscow was stricken with “spy-mania.” Distrusting the soldiers at the front, the leadership restored the institution of “military commissars,” whose job was to oversee the regular officers in the army. “Political departments” in the rural machine and tractor stations (which managed and allocated large farm machinery), abolished several years earlier, were also restored. Stalin did not trust the rear either. In prisons and labor camps mass executions took place. Inmates of camps knew that mass executions meant that another city was taken by the Germans or that another army was defeated. Yet soon it became clear that “screw-tightening” in order to intimidate people and to support the unstable system was possible only in peacetime. In wartime, however paradoxical it may seem, repression was the shortest way to a collapse of the system. Overly zealous control, like tightening a screw too much, could break key parts of the political structure and render it unable to respond effectively to emergencies. Serious changes in approaches to the extreme demands of war had to occur, and they soon began. This trend started spontaneously among the people but was quickly co-opted and directed from above.

Stalin participated personally in this change, however forced upon him it was by the situation and however late it came to save millions from death and occupation. In his address to the country on 3 July he touched the people's feelings, ignored hitherto: "Brothers and Sisters!" he began, instead of the usual "Comrades." He pretended, of course, that the situation was improving, saying that "the best divisions of the enemy and the best units of its air force are destroyed." Soviet propaganda took the same line at the time, announcing to the populace that Red Army losses had not been severe. Despite these lies Stalin himself became a necessary, uniting factor when the fatherland was in grave danger. There was no other choice.

Ordinary citizens began singing that "the people's war is going on." After a while the decorations of Suvorov and Kutuzov, great commanders of tsarist Russia, were introduced. The slogan of the socialist mass media, "Workers of the world, unite!" was replaced by the slogan "Death to German occupiers!" All these facts meant a collapse, not of the people, but of the system of repression, not of a patriotic idea, but of the official ideology. The command system – with its bureaucratic nature, supremacy of careerism, and ignoring of people's interests – had collapsed.

Stalin had to rely on the people who had taken the place of those removed in the 1938. Merit in battle became the key criterion for command appointments, in sharp contrast to the recent system of promotion according to political loyalty. The heavy fighting of the summer and fall of 1941 forced the removal of incapable commanders in favor of those with talent and ability.

Contrary to the usual tough repression, some prisoners were released from the camps. Following decrees of 12 July and 24 November 1941, issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, over 600,000 people were freed from the labor camps; 175,000 of them were mobilized. And they were true champions of the USSR. They coped with their new military tasks, since the liberation of the homeland was their personal concern. As for the former leaders, they did not disappear, of course. They hid, entrenched for the time being. Stalin needed them too, though for a different purpose – as spies to remember the creative, independent individuals who were to be disciplined later on.

The Soviet state began to resemble any other state at war. The re-



gime could only step aside and let the people display all their might. After the fighting the people would have to be put back in their place. In the meantime, an important change had happened in the people's consciousness.

Let us take a closer look at the Ivanovo region in the center of Russia. The regional newspaper, *Rabochii Krai*, received about six thousand letters in 1942. In one of them, a woman wrote, "I have never thought that I could hate our leaders so much, the leaders who have their party-membership cards in their pockets. They have exemptions from military service that give them the right to hide like mice in holes. But when we defeat the fascists, they will be the first to shout about their merits. They will assert that they are victors. And they will again use the advantages of their position."

What was the direct reason for this woman's anger? It was the fate of her husband. He had an exemption from military service, but volunteered and perished at the front. The war indeed brought grief and privations to people, but it also awakened them. Under such extreme conditions, the people's instinct of self-preservation made them behave differently from before the war: the woman's husband had made a deliberate choice instead of obediently following orders. His wife then dared to severely criticize local *apparatchiki* (party or other bureaucrats) who had hidden from military service, and had signed her name, Zhalkova, on her letter. This name could be a pseudonym based on *zhaloba* (complaint), *zhalkii* (pitiful), or *zhalit'* (to sting). Even if she did use a pseudonym, not necessarily much protection if the police wished to find her, the very sound of the name has a painful ring in Russian and thus added emotional weight to her protest.

People were learning to think independently. Tragic events at the front determined the nature of changes in the minds of many people. The fate of the USSR was a matter of life and death that touched everyone, that produced a degree of freedom and helped people to rise above *klassovaia obida* (class offense). Referring to the way grievances had to be expressed as those of an entire class, this term had been applied to any independent opinion and action before the war and had helped to create a herd mentality. But now people were beginning to think for themselves. A woman who before the war had earned good pay making children's toys quit work and moved to a defense plant, in violation of the labor laws, when the fighting be-



German prisoners in Moscow (1944)

gan. She explained, “Our leaders [at the toy enterprise] made a lot of noise. Two weeks of the war went by, but we were still knocking out some kind of idiotic toys. ... They threatened to take me to court for leaving without permission, but I didn’t even dignify them with a glance. Having come to work here, I’m learning how to weld. What kinds of things I’ll weld here, I don’t know, but I’m sure that these “toys’ will have their effect.”

Thus the initial period of the war witnessed a crisis in governing, a huge effort by society as a whole to respond to the invasion, and the abandonment of repressive and punitive socialism spontaneously from below and deliberately from above. When this stage passed, by November 1941, Moscow had been saved. A first strategic offensive against the Germans was organized. But despite the great enthusiasm and self-sacrifice of the Soviet people, it became clear that the war would be long. The battles before Moscow had inflicted heavy losses on the German army, but not on German industry. The Reich used the economic and manpower capacity of occupied countries and, as it turned out, continued to be a powerful military opponent. In the summer of 1942 the situation at the front again grew serious. A Soviet

strategic initiative failed. The military measures undertaken were not enough to change the course of the war, and once more an impasse arose.

More profound changes unconnected to military action had to be introduced. Such changes occurred in 1942. Some rights of the people, the defenders of the Fatherland, were stipulated, though never formally or in writing. People recognized as defenders, usually a result of excellent work records, could, for example, make frank comments about production plans in their factories; offer various ideas and initiatives on their own; criticize the factory administration freely and without fear; or go to the front on their own account, without waiting for orders from the military command. In short, they had various opportunities to cut through or circumvent existing regulations.

An army drawn from the whole eligible population was created. Elite guards units, similar to those under the tsar, were restored. The dual command system of regular commanders and political commissars was abolished in 1942. Something great and significant seemed to manifest itself. This trend is evident in the tone of party propaganda and instructions to its own cadres in the summer of 1942: “The party is interested in having people think”; “stop instructing the masses, learn from them”; “the main object of party work is not the [production] plan, but those who fulfill it”; “don’t whitewash the danger, don’t downplay the difficulties, don’t hide the unavoidability of serious deprivations and sacrifices”; “we can’t underestimate the strength of the Germans, they are strong and organized.”

Several serious steps almost bordering on real reforms were taken, such as a rapprochement with the church and the dissolution of the Comintern. Of course, these moves were far from constituting substantial reform. Reform presupposes a system of action, an overall conception. Such a course is impossible under wartime conditions. Stalin was simply taking the actions necessary at the moment to change the course of the war. For this purpose he leaned on the new people who had come to the fore. Nevertheless, the image of a “monolith” was broken by the war.

In 1943–1944 a highly differentiated public atmosphere arose, a real mosaic of moods. During a church ceremony in the village of Nikolo-Azias, Penza province, peasants cried out to passersby, “If there weren’t any collective farms, you wouldn’t see such torment.”

In the same area the opinion that churches had to be reopened was widespread. A collective farmer from a village in Kuibyshev province said, “I want to live the way I want to.” When asked what he had in mind, he replied, “This way, that I don’t have all sorts of chairmen and brigadiers above me giving orders. Just let the government give me as much land as I can work.” In Rostov province, party lectur-



“The Big Three”: Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin

ers from Moscow were asked: “When will the kolkhozy be divided?” “When will trade in manufactured goods be free?” “When will there be freedom for various political parties?” There was a rumor that not only would other parties be allowed but that free trade would open and even that a new tsar would be elected, while America and Britain “will rule the world after the war.” Thus peasants, speaking more freely than they had for many years, indicated their ardent desire to see the end of the collective farms and the reopening of free trade for their produce.

However, workers still indicated interest in some of the standard socialist notions about the future. In Sverdlovsk province rumors and questions asked of party cadres in one factory pointed in this direc-

tion: “Will the slogan ‘Workers of the world, unite’ still be used?” “Well, so what, it’s the price of the second front [an invasion of Western Europe by the United States and Britain] that we are giving up the Comintern, so they, of course, are preparing the second front.” “Who will lead the world revolution now?” These workers accepted more of the Soviet system as theirs than the peasants did, although some of the workers, like their peer Balakin cited earlier, may well have distinguished between that system and Stalin.

The intelligentsia, the brain of the nation, had been persecuted for years. Many were expelled from the country or to remote places, left to rot in labor camps, shot, and so on. Only a small part of the old intelligentsia survived. But the sprouts of a new one were vigorously shooting up. Of course, the new intelligentsia did not match the old one in the quality of its education; however, the school of war could not but form an independent way of thinking. All these developments had profound implications for the future of the country; they were forerunners or preconditions for later liberalization.

Much of the Soviet intelligentsia had been closely connected with the prewar regime and had become suffused with Stalinism. But this was far from true of the entire intelligentsia. The articles of the Ukrainian writer and film director Aleksandr Dovzhenko differed little from any official Soviet publications during the war. Yet in his “Notes for Myself,” published in 1989, he wrote, “The quality of war reflects the quality of the organization of a society, of a nation. All our falsehood, all our dullness ... all our pseudodemocratism mixed with satrapism – everything turns out badly.... But over all this – “We will



The Red Banner of Victory over Berlin  
(1945)

win!” ... We had no culture of life before the war, [now] we have no culture of war.”

As the war began, Vladimir Vernadskii wrote in his diary, 1) ... the real power is the Central C[ommittee] and even dictatorship by Stalin. ... 2) [There is] a state within a state, the power – the real power – of the GPU [the political police, called NKVD after 1934] and its decades-long transformations. *This is a growth, gangrene, which is driving the party in all directions – but without which it cannot get along in real life.* As a result – millions of prisoner-slaves, among whom are ... the flower of the nation, the flower of the party, who created its victory in the civil war. ... 4) the removal by the GPU and the party of [the country’s] intelligentsia. ... The party was “stripped of people” [*obezliudilas’*], many from its [leading] staff – this presents a riddle for the future. ... Simultaneously with this [removal] has been created i) a tradition of such a policy, 2) *a lowering of the moral and intellectual level in comparison with the average level ... of the country*, (emphasis added)

In October 1941 Vernadskii added, “the weakness of our army’s leaders is clear to all.” In November he found that “the great defeats of our power – are the result of its cultural weakening: *the average level of the communists. ... is lower than the average level of non-party people.* ... The flower of our nation is comprised of affairists and career-ration seekers” (emphasis added).

Vernadskii commented that the alliance with “the Anglo-Saxon states” was of “huge significance.” They are “democracies in which the ideas of freedom of thought, freedom of faith, and forms of great economic changes have been profoundly established.... In the global conflict we are a totalitarian state – despite the principles which drove our revolution forward and [which] are the cause of the at[tack] [on us by the Germans]. ... The near future will bring us much unexpected and basic change in the conditions of our life. *Can we find people for this?*” (emphasis added).

Other citizens began to look at the future more fearlessly and practically. In liberated Khar’kov in 1944 a university professor named Tereshchenko said, “After all that we have lived through, the government must change its policy. In the political life of the country must take place, in fact are already proceeding, serious changes [the agreement with capitalist England and the United States, the disbanding of

the Comintern, the division of educational institutions into male and female, the creation of the church committee, private trade, and others]. The changes taking place should *go further, in particular, toward more democratization in the life of the country*” (emphasis added).

An assistant professor, Seligeev, expelled from the Communist Party for disagreeing with its policy, reasoned this way: “In the process of future [postwar] reconstruction there will occur what might be called diffusion: *the best thoughts, the ideas of western culture not only in the sphere of science and technology, but also in the area of morals and politics, in the area of worldview* will unavoidably begin to penetrate to us and will leave their stamp on our entire life” (emphasis added). The “keystone” to this “moral-political, ideological reconstruction,” he thought, would be “the refusal to realize any kind of socialist ideas by force of arms” together with “the general penetration” of the ideas he had mentioned in their “best western sense.”

What is most striking about these ideas is that they were expressed in 1943, when the Commissariat of State Security was highly active both in liberated towns and behind the front lines. It took considerable bravery for the innovators of new actions and ideas to speak out. Nevertheless their voices were heard; V.A. Malyshev, the people’s commissar of the tank industry, told executives of the Uralmash plant, “I assume that for you now and in the future a legal basis for displaying bravery will be necessary, so to speak.”

Other industrial leaders began to think about making self-responsibility possible for all citizens, not to pay wages according to a standard scale but according to what work was worth, and not to shift responsibility to a higher level. These notions contained the threat of weakening the planned and centralized nature of the economy. The director of Moscow’s important Stalin Auto Factory, I.A. Likhachev, said, “the time will come when we will forget altogether about [specified] funds [to be used for determining pay and allocating resources in production], and the consumer will deal directly with the producer.” Likhachev wanted a type of national economic management that would not limit freedom of movement for the sake of socially important goals, but would “create the basis for the appearance of broad technical and economic initiatives.” In 1944 he decisively refused to allow production shops in his plant to do their accounting separately, using the fixed prices and costs assigned from above. Instead

Likhachev demanded assignment of work tasks according to the rule that production of each part should at least pay for itself. Likhachev did not suffer for his views, but continued in his place as one of the USSR's most prominent industrial managers until his retirement in the 1950s. His ashes are buried in the Kremlin Wall, the USSR's highest honor for its dead.

Also in 1944 the engineer K.V. Belov wrote a memorandum to his superiors in the Commissariat of Lathe Construction in which he



The Victory Parade in Moscow (1945)

praised American industrial sociology and called for the introduction into the USSR of its principles of “human relations.” Before the war Belov and his wife had traveled to the United States to take delivery of industrial equipment ordered there by the Soviet authorities. The Belovs returned impressed by American methods, which could be used to improve the organization of production in Soviet factories. Such methods would create optimum conditions for unfettering the capabilities of Soviet workers, allowing their inventiveness and initiative to flower.

K.V. Belov's superior found that the memorandum's ideas almost smacked of “cosmopolitanism,” which in Soviet parlance meant in-





The Victory Parade in Moscow (1945)

adequate patriotism, a dangerous charge. The memorandum, according to this superior, “lays out theories of bourgeois scholars concerned with issues of sociology and psychology of human relations which are alien to us.” Yet the commissar of the lathe industry, A. I. Efremov, appraised the Belovs’ work highly and deemed it worthy of serious attention. Still, the time for that consideration did not arrive quickly.

All the new ideas and innovations were crowned by the work of the economist N.I. Sazonov in his “Introduction to the Theory of

Political Economy,” presented in 1943 as his doctoral dissertation for the Institute of Economy of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In his opinion, ignoring such economic laws as the circulation of money and goods and the formation and movement of prices by the market had led to major mistakes and had held back the development of the country in the 1930s. The liquidation of trade by state and cooperative organizations in favor of a ration system in the early 1930s had affected the economy negatively. The absence of free trade in towns at prices set by the market brought forth a sharp decline in agricultural production by the peasants. This situation complicated issues of food supply to the cities, which led in turn to a lowering of labor productivity and to great labor turnover.

Sazonov believed that the main cause of the serious financial crisis in the country was that the largest portion of profits made by individual enterprises was not left to them but was taken by the state. Handling most of the income and expenses of the country through the state budget produced a huge increase in its size, which in turn led

to the rapid growth of state institutions. This structure bureaucratized the whole financial arrangement of the country and was one of the most serious reasons for the large breakdowns in the economy in the first months of the war.

To fix these problems Sazonov recommended “reestablishing the work of economic exchange on commercial rails.” Goods might be sold through a rationing system but according to the prices developed in a free market. He considered it essential to end interference in economic processes through national planning and the system of central funding. Enterprise directors should have the freedom to arrange expenditures for materials, the size of the work force, and pay as they saw fit. Central planning should be limited to the regulation of economic processes, record keeping, and prognoses of trends.

Sazonov also called for large foreign investments in the Soviet economy through the sale of stock in enterprises and concessions in various areas of the economy. Stocks could be both sold privately and held by the government, which should always retain a majority interest. The state’s monopoly on foreign trade should be abolished. Sazonov commented that those who might oppose his ideas would do so because they operated from the point of view of “statistical well-being,” which had already cost the country dearly in the war with Germany.

The Central Committee reacted by condemning his work as a “seditious attempt” to vilify prewar policy and to argue for the need to return the country to capitalism after the war. For his efforts Sazonov was subjected to party discipline – what, exactly, is not known – and was forbidden to defend his doctoral dissertation, thus depriving him of the USSR’s highest academic degree. Nevertheless, the fact that someone of his stature had the initiative to think about the economy in a fundamentally different way than was typical under Stalin, and then to write up his ideas and present them to the party, is indicative of broader trends during the war. Once again, the great pressure of the fighting and its results throughout the country made people question their surroundings profoundly.

Dovzhenko noticed this tendency among more ordinary people. He wrote in January 1944, “I was very astonished at one of my talks with a soldier-driver, a Siberian youth: “We live badly... and you know, every one of us looks forward to some changes and revisions

in our life. We all look forward to that. Everyone. It's just that they don't say it." Dovzhenko commented, "The people have some sort of massive, huge need for some other, new forms of life on the earth. I hear it everywhere. I don't hear it and I won't hear it among our leaders."

During the war there were two interconnected but heterogeneous active forces, the people and the system. In the first stage of the war, the system was the leading but ineffectual force. It was the people who turned into the real leading force and produced talented commanders from their ranks. It was the people who sacrificed twenty-seven million lives. The people made their contribution to the victory. But while the force of the people brought about victory, the force of the system gripped the victory in its iron vice.

From late 1943, Stalin again began to be idolized in the press and other media. The defeats of 1941–1942 were explained as the actions of "panic-mongers," "cowards," and "traitors." The victories of 1943–1945 were ascribed to the genius of Stalin. The war still went on, while the renewal of the totalitarian regime was already regarded as an important task of the current moment. It was suddenly realized that ideological work had been neglected. Immediate measures were taken.

In Russian literature it has been popular to quote a famous toast that Stalin made in May 1945 to the long-suffering Russian people. But few remember that only a month later he belittled these same people by calling them "little screws," substituting a single word in the initial toast.

A tale about the end of the war still circulates among Russians. They say that at a rehearsal held before the victory parade of June 1945, Stalin mounted a white horse to ride in the procession. The animal had the impertinence to throw him. This story is just a legend, but it shows more convincingly than truth what the people indeed wished to happen. Did they want to keep the dictator and his system in the saddle? No, they wished a white horse to throw the dictator. They wanted to see Marshal Georgii Zhukov, George the Victorious, the symbol of the people's role in the war and their capabilities, riding the white horse, as he in fact did during the victory parade. Thus the people distinguished between the two forces on the scene, one worthy of their approval and one not, and in their minds placed one on the white horse of victory.

---

## *Theme 11*

### **The People and Problems of the Post-War Era**

We'd like to begin this theme with two historical episodes. Before we tell the first story, we'd like to remind you that Stalin means "the man of steel"

June 24, 1945. The Victory Parade is going on in the Red Square in Moscow. It is raining. Stalin is standing on the tribune of the Mausoleum. The dialogue of a father and a son in the crowd:

Father: Do you see Stalin well?

Son: Yes, Dad. He is standing in the rain. He is old. Won't he get wet?

Father: Tempered steel doesn't mind.

Son: Then, he is a steel man? That's why he is called Stalin? Right?

Father: He is an ordinary man, but his power is like steel.

Son: Dad, why isn't he happy? Is he angry with somebody?

Father: With God, perhaps, who hasn't sent us good weather today.

Son: But why hasn't Stalin ordered God to make good weather for us?

The year 1945 was the peak of Stalin's authority and the cult of Stalin was at its height. Many thought that he was superior even to God. One veteran had reproached, that we could never know what the Stalin cult was really like, in its developed form. Then this veteran shared his recollections with us:

In the war-years I was a People's Commissariat worker. Once, at daybreak, Stalin called me to his cabinet. He asked me questions and I answered him. Then Stalin came up to me and looked attentively in my eyes. Blinking was not allowed. Everybody knew that Stalin wanted everybody to look him straight in the eyes. Stalin used to say:



Marshal Georgii Zhukov riding the white horse on the Victory Parade

"If your eyes rove, you have a guilty conscience?" A minute passed. Stalin said: "Thank you, comrade", and shook my hand. When I felt his hand, it seemed to me, that a spark ran through me. I hid my hand in the cuff of my coat, and rushed home. Paying no need to my wife's questions, I came up to the bed of my little son. Then I took out my hand and put it on his forehead so that Stalin's warmth would reach him. That is what cult is.

Of course, Stalin didn't want to share the victory over Germany with anybody and soon we will examine how he treated the "generation of winners". But at first, Stalin simply wanted to enjoy the fruits of victory.

The war altered the world and ordinary lives had radically changed. A common threat brought everybody together, removed old quarrels. The paradox was that the world disaster gave rise to the priority of human values, to a desire to unite. It seemed that this happened right after the war. Even the Cold War, which replaced the period of alliance, could not cancel the reality of "common home" idea. It was this very idea that started a process, later called convergence, that is a term signifying the slowly disappearing differences between systems, that is political system, economic system, etc. It seems to me that former allies proved to be more perceptive to the reality of the post-war world,

than the USSR. Stalin half-opened the “iron curtain.” The Kremlin was making plans of anti-American and anti-English propaganda. Any film, book, or play of a Western author was banned; the circulation of the magazines *America* and *England* was reduced. Only a few “worthy” people were allowed to read them.

This caused the country to return to isolation, that is the total absence of freedom. Soviet people could only guess what was happening in the world. Defeated Germans and Japanese were rapidly recovering and starting new lives. The victorious authorities referred to war consequences in order to excuse poor living conditions in USSR.

Perhaps this was true, but objectively the living conditions did not have to be so dreadful. The victory presented an option to the Soviet Union: to live like the rest of the civilized world or to seek “its unique path” again. After the war many were inclined to think that it was possible to democratize the Soviet regime that is to eliminate every form of violence and tyranny. Indeed, the rebirth of Germany began with an elimination of the fascist ideology and practice. It was just the opposite in Russia country. Famous writer Fedor Abramov commented on the post-war situation in the following way: “Drunk with victory and conceited, we decided that our system was ideal... and we didn’t start to improve it, but, on the contrary, began to dogmatize it much more”

Nevertheless, “intoxication with victory” didn’t immediately curtail the tendency of a democratic renewal of the Soviet system. An analysis of previously closed archives shows that there were doubts and hesitations among the leaders about the expediency of continuing to a “tough time”

In 1946, a new draft of the Constitution of the USSR was in progress. This draft contained, for the first time a number of progressive points, for instance, about small private holdings of peasants and artisans, or about decentralization of economic life, or about a liquidation



The Order of Victory



Soviet post-war poster “We will rebuild!”

of court-martials and military tribunals. We should, of course, not overestimate the degree of this radicalism. The proposed improvements were only details and did not change the system as a whole. Nevertheless, even these proposals were not published. The idea of a new Constitution was finally buried.

Who were the authors of such liberal ideas at that time? Who had gone through the war, who had seen much and had understood much. The war taught these people to think, to doubt and to criticize, to replace usual exclamation marks by questions. The emergence of critically-thinking men was, perhaps, a moral and psychological

result of the war. Pink glasses did not cloud our eyes anymore. But the paradox was that the new radicalism was half baked. People didn't see the Stalin system as it really was. At the same time they could not imagine any other system. That is why the critical mood of the “generation of winners” remained unrealized. But it must be pointed out that this critical mood was inherited by the post-war youth. That youth went farther than the elder generation. They suddenly assumed a truly dissident political attitude. But then the machine of the ideological dictatorship took over. In 1946 and 1947 a wave of youth group trials rolled all over the country.

Let us analyze what kind of youth groups there were.

The archives qualified them as “anti-Soviet” and even “terroristic.” How old were these “terrorists”? As a rule, they were high school and university students. Usually it was a group of 3 to 10. They did

not gather for political reasons. Young people met to study literature, philosophy and history. The official cliché of school and university syllabuses didn't suit them. After a while the students started asking political questions. An idea emerged that the Stalin regime was not what it pretended to be. So they started to study. And evaluate it. They also tried to go back to basic socialist democratic and communist ideals.

These young people became the forces that capable to could have headed the process of a democratic renewal. But the youth movement was not allowed to survive. In August 1946 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation investigated 3 cases of the "counter-revolutionary activity" of Cheliabinsk youth in the Urals. The first case concerned five young men accused of organizing secret meetings and propagating "stander" about a degeneration of the Communist Party, about the lack of democracy in the USSR. The second case was also connected with a group of students. They were accused of organizing an "illegal anti-Soviet society." The society really existed. It was called "Snowy Wine." They just published poetic works in the Symbolist tradition. As for the third case, it was staged against high school students. They were accused of writing and multiplying leaflets which called for an overthrow of the Government and this was, of course, the only political group.

The trial took place. All the accused were sentenced to imprisonment of from 10 to 25 years.

Analogous trials of youth organizations in Moscow, Sverdlovsk, Voronezh and many other cities took place in 1947. A campaign against dissidents was launched. The authorities dictated to artists and scientists, how they were to think. According to the March 1947 decision of the Communist Party, Central Committee courts were organized in ministries and central departments. These courts were to fight against those who discredited the honor and dignity of the Soviet officials. These "courts of honor" were a starting point for the future war against "cosmopolitanism." People were accused of "antipatriotism," of collaboration with foreigners. By the way, "cosmopolitanism" was later used to lead an anti-Semitic campaign against Jews. In 1947 these kinds of "sins" were punished by public reprimand for the time being. The "Sinners" kept on being Soviet citizens. A year later they were labeled "enemies of the people." In 1949 the "courts of honor" ceased to



exist. They were replaced by punitive bodies. This is how a new round of terror started.

Why did preventive “educational” measures in respect to the youth and to the intelligentsia seem to be unsatisfactory to Stalin? What did he need new “enemies of the people” for?

To answer that question, one should imagine the whole picture of public moods at that time. A stronger discontent with the realities was growing among the Soviets were held. Newspapers were full of triumphant reports of the leaders, who were praised to the sky.

At the same time NKVD’s secret reports show other moods and opinions:

*“The State is only wasting money on the elections. Only those State like will be elected anyhow?”*

*“The elections will give us nothing. If only they were conducted like in other countries, we would have other results”*

*“I’m not going to vote, I will not. The Soviet power is rotten all the way through.”*

*“This election does not make me happier. The war is over, but there is no change for the better”*

*“Millions of our soldiers have been to other countries, have seen how people live there. And everybody tells me that our country is the worst”*

Discontent was caused by life itself, by the contrast between people’s expectations and their realistic analysis of conditions as they were.

In the two or three post-war years not only the most important expectations, like the dissolution of Kolkhozes either. But the secondary ones were not realized. The conditions and living standards of most people remained at the level of war-time. Everyday life was uneven. Food supplies were inadequate and crippled veterans were poor. Families were often without bread-winners; there were many orphans.

The countryside was living through bad times too. Besides the war ruins, it faced a new disaster – the drought of 1946. Peasants were starving. The situation in the cities was not better. At first everybody believed that everything will change for the better very soon. The main thing was that the war was over. There were just “temporary difficulties”. But in 1947–1948 the limit of “temporary difficulties” was exhausted.

The monetary reform of 1947 and the abolition of war-time ration system served as a detonator for social troubles. The 1947 reform freed commerce. Shelves got filled with goods. For most people, however, these goods were inaccessible, a part from necessary minimum. Prices were higher than before the war. The criticism of conditions developed into a criticism of authorities. Some said: "It will not get better as long as the Soviet power exist." But more frequently there was another explanation: "It's hard to live now. The "higher ups" overeat, grow fat. Nobody does anything, Stalin is being deceived".

Notions of some "dark forces" that "deceived" Stalin created a specific psychological background. It could be used for a strengthening and a stabilization of the regime. Protecting Stalin from criticism, it did not save merely the leader's name, but also the very regime sanctified by his name. The aggravation of the economic situation as well as political unrest made the Government faces a dilemma: either drastic reforms, or terror which would provide forced stabilization. The power chose terror.

The year 1948 was marked by a change which put an end to the leader's post-war hesitations. This change became possible greatly owing to the support "from below". The majority of the Soviet people easily accepted a new variation of the old tale of "enemies", "murderers" and "spies". All the troubles of the post-war time were ascribed to them.

In 1948 a punitive campaign was launched. It ended only in 1953, because of the death of Stalin. Repressive measures exterminated all of political dissent. The "obstinate" young people were punished severely. "Liberals" were done away with. It was more complicated to deal with former front-line soldiers. I have already told you that these soldiers were prone to criticize. Besides they were extremely popular. Big hopes were connected with their return. But the regime succeeded in "pacifying" front-line soldiers. How? They were made to serve the regime. After the war, various positions in the party and in the economic system were gradually replaced by front-line cadres. Those who had their doubts about the regime and who dissented experienced the whole weight of the 1948–1952 repressions.

The early post-war years were nearing completion; they ended with Stalin's death in March 1953.

---

## *Theme 12*

### **The Khrushchev Thaw and Its Reverse Side**

Thus, in March 1953 Stalin died. As he left no directions about a successor, there were three possible successors: Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev. Malenkov succeeded Stalin as Chairman of the council of ministers. Beria headed the United Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security. Khrushchev took the leadership of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee.

In June 1953 Beria, the most dangerous among Stalin's possible successors, was arrested as a result of a "palace plot." He was executed in December. He had broken the rules of the game. He had tried to increase his power. The rest of the successors were afraid to reach out for a greater power, as they feared to follow Beria's deadly fate. That is why any personal dictatorship became impossible after Stalin's death.

A transformation of the power began. A "dictator's" model seemed to become a thing of the past. But nobody could imagine the outline of the future State. There was only a vague slogan "collective leadership" as an alternative to the cult of personality.

When the term "cult of personality" appeared in the newspapers for the first time contemporaries didn't regard that event as an omen of a drastic change. At the first the criticism of the cult didn't go very far. Outwardly, everything seemed as before. But soon, the first source of social tension appeared up. Where? In forced labor camps, in the GULAG.

According to the latest calculations there were at that moment almost 1, 5 million people alive in the camps and colonies of the NKVD in 1945. During 8 post-war years the number of prisoners had increased. By 1953, there were a million more prisoners.

Stalin's death raised hopes of amnesty for the prisoners and their

rehabilitation. These hopes stirred up a rising wave of unrest which rolled over camps and colonies in 1953–1954. Something had to happen. Then Malenkov and Khrushchev took the first step. They authorized the amnesty, not only for criminals, but for political prisoners as well. Many camps were closed. Watch-towers fell; watchdogs were killed. In the cities, at railway stations, in the streets amnestied prisoners – the old men and women with grey hair and sunken eyes, could be seen everywhere.

Aged wives and grown-up children waited for them at home, if anybody waited at all.

Many of the returned soon died. They could not adapt themselves to a free life, couldn't swallow a "drink of freedom".

Those were the first steps: from the permanent civil war to a civil peace. The closing of camps was an enormous change. But this had to be supported by economic measures, which were to be conducted in the long run. The Government shifted to a course of a social re-orientation of economics. In August 1954 Malenkov announced a reduction of agricultural tax by about 50%, providing thus more ample opportunities for the development of the Kolkhoz market. Moreover, individual holdings of the kolkhozniks were increased. Paper reporting Malenkov's decrees were read by the kolkhozniks over and over again. The kolkhozniks said: "He is on our side".

The countryside supported Malenkov. But "the apparatus" didn't recognize him. Why? Maybe, it is because he wanted to fight the bureaucracy, because he spoke frequently about the degeneration of the State "apparatus", about and corruption. That was what the bureaucrats were afraid of. In the long run, this tactical error cost Malenkov his career. At that time government functioned only through the "apparatus". Hence, only those who kept the "apparatus" under their control could be masters of the situation. Malenkov had overestimated his power. Khrushchev understood this and began to use the support of the apparatchiki suit his own ends.

As it often happened with Soviet leaders, the authority of Malenkov was greater abroad than at home. As early as August 1953, he had uttered a word that spread all over the world "razriadka" (detente). A year later he came out against the general Cold War policy, against preparations of a new world war, which could bring the final destruction of the world civilization.



Nikita Khrushchev

All this seemed strange to Stalinists. The political and military doctrines of that time divided the globe into two worlds – the world of socialism and the world of the capitalism. The latter was the enemy to be fought against until final victory. Malenkov was “misunderstood” by his comrades-in-arms. His statements were regarded as “apostasy.” As a result, he was asked to resign in February 1955. It was Khrushchev’s hour of “apparatus”; he couldn’t abandon the policy of reforms, which as confirmed by the XX Congress of the CPSU.

February 25, 1956, the last day of the Congress, went down in history as a sensational turning point. The delegates were stunned when Khrushchev mounted the platform and addressed the Congress with the report “On the cult of personality and its consequences.” The meeting was closed. The delegates were notified in advance about the secrecy of what would happen. Can you imagine that this report was published in the USSR only in 1989? In fact, Khrushchev made the first serious attempt to understand Stalinism and to appraise it honestly.

Was there any danger of being misunderstood and of losing the needed support? Yes, indeed! Khrushchev, you see, had to break down common stereotypes about “the authority of the party” and about the “principles of socialism.” That was one of the rarest occasions in the history, when a politician risked his future and even his life. Khrushchev was the only man among the after Stalin leaders who dared it. But Khrushchev was infected with Stalinism. So, everything got mixed up: a mystic fear of Stalin, horror over innocent bloodshed, personal guilt, and long-accumulating, but silent criticism of the regime.

Khrushchev was open about the past betrayal of democratic principles, about repressions and, about violations of laws, about famines, about unjustified losses during the war, and about the poverty of the countryside.

It should be noted however, that he explained all the facts following an old tradition: capitalist encirclement, the difficulties of pioneers, and other excuses. The essential thing Khrushchev emphasized was the “subjective factor”; the personality of Stalin himself. Khrushchev thus blamed all shortcomings on Stalin, not on the system. But, we feel that it is important to stress, that it was the system that was to blame.

Moreover, Khrushchev thought that this subjective factor explained all errors. According to Khrushchev the main problem was Stalin’s temper. His activities were divided into two periods: a “positive” one (fight against the opposition, industrialization, collectivization and the Great Patriotic War) and a “negative” one, when Stalin’s temper began to “get worse.” That was a shallow criticism of the cult of personality. Stalin’s “evil will” was to account for the “negative” period of his rule. In spite of all his radicalism, Khrushchev scorned the advice of leaders of the Italian Communist Party to seek the roots of Stalinism in the system itself. But the initial and decisive step was taken.

The truth about Stalin was a shock for his Soviet contemporaries. The facts (figures, names of the victims of repressions) were stunning. At the closed meeting of the XX Congress, where these facts were announced, several delegates fainted. When Khrushchev’s report became known, at first to the party activists and then to the general public, every one was traumatized. Here are two remarks of ordinary people. One said: “No other event in my whole life was as hard to take as the revelations about Stalin.” But another said: “Why did they put a dead man on trial! I wanted so much that Stalin is remembered as an honest person who led us for more than three decades.”

Not everything was taken on trust. “Why Stalin only?” people asked. “Why was the party policy right and was Stalin wrong?”

Meetings and discussions went on everywhere. In all apartments, at work, in canteens and in the subway people were talking about Stalin. At supper parents related what they had heard at meetings, children listened. Children had believed that Stalin had been a wise man, a genius. But all of a sudden, they learned that he had killed his close friends. A son or a daughter asked parents: “Why? How come you didn’t know that?”

One discussion followed another. Nobody knew how to react. Nobody was ready with answers to the many questions that came up. But



Nikita Khrushchev and John Kennedy

times were not yet ripe for organizations, who would discuss these issues, to form.

Nobody knew, what to say, what to reply. It was decided to cease reading Khrushchev's secrets for a while, in order, first of all, to avoid the impact of Western propaganda, and also in order to try to find explanations among communists, thus avoiding "exaggerations".

But it was too late. The situation became irreversible.

Everyone saw that Stalin, the emperor, had had no clothes. The "halo of invisibility" was torn as well from the Soviet state and Stalin's friends. A system of fear was broken. Khrushchev, whether he liked it or not, found himself in the spotlight. Was Khrushchev ready for such a turn of events?

He began to display his impatience. It looked like he wanted to correct everything overnight. Hence, new leaps, campaigns and so forth began. However, something had changed, due to the people's

support. Management of the national economy was reorganized on the basis of decentralization. Science got the green light. Under Stalin the Kolkhozniks had had no right to leave their kolkhozes, the workers had no right to leave their factories without the boss's permission. A new labor law changed all this. Under Khrushchev, peasants received passports and pensions. State purchase prices of agricultural products were raised. Taxes were lowered. Wages of some low-paid categories of workers were increased. Large-scale house-construction was undertaken. In 1957 Khrushchev was named the "Man of the year" by *Time* magazine.

A further analysis of the situation shows, however, that complications were unavoidable. The old principle of distribution of raw materials and finished products was preserved. Commodity-money relations, a self-financing system, profit and profitability were "rehabilitated." What was really happening? We think Khrushchev had inherited one of the worst of Stalin's traits that is the discrepancy between words and deeds. The initial course of increasing the production of consumer goods was replaced by the intensified development of heavy industry and of the war-industrial complex. Private initiative was again viewed with suspicion. The self-financing system was announced to be a "revisionist" principle.

Nevertheless, Khrushchev set the clock back even further. In the early 60s he did his best to revive the spirit of revolutionary romanticism and the belief in Communism. In 1961 a new Program of the CPSU was adopted. It was aimed at an accelerated building of Communism. The USSR was bound to achieve the highest living standards in 20 years, and to "overtake and surpass" the USA in every respect. The country was to create a society of equal chance for everybody. How? Very easily. For example, how to make cars available to everybody? Khrushchev answered: the private-ownership the capitalist way doesn't suit us. We will create a broad network of garages where cars can be rented. It will be the socialist method of services. Another of Khrushchev's statement was that building of individuals "dachas" (that is small country houses) was inexpedient from collectivist point of view. And it was not only Khrushchev, but the majority of people who thought so.

Questions of "collectivization" of everyday life, of an organization of various "communes" were discussed in earnest. A campaign





Yuri Gagarin

was launched for the development of an industrial democracy and of local governments. At the same time the bureaucratic system continue to exist. Nobody disturbed it; nobody disturbed the inviolable one-party system, the dictatorship of the party, as prescribed by Communist doctrine. As a symbol of old traditions, Khrushchev's name soon became an object of general approval.

A slackening of the democratization process was to turn later into the Brezhnev Stagnation. But that came later. Now we'd like to mention the optimism that

was reflected in the Programme of Communist Construction. Today most agree that this optimism was misplaced.

Since 1954 a rapid growth in industrial and agricultural production became evident. The USSR began to produce one-fifth of the world industrial output. *Sputnik* was launched in 1957. In 1961 the first man, Yuri Gagarin, flew in space. The space era of mankind has started. Apparently Khrushchev thought that the Soviet people were ready to sacrifice and fight for a "bright future"

Western politicians used to ask Khrushchev: "We believe in the achievements of your industry, but will you be able to improve your agriculture?" Khrushchev replied: "Wait a bit! We will show you what we are capable of, in all domains, including agriculture"

In 1962, the year after the adoption of the New Party Program, milk and meat prices went up. There were serious food shortages in 1963. Bread and milk lines appeared. The USSR began to import grain from abroad. Many factors were to blame: the struggle against individual holdings of *kolkhozniks* because Khrushchev believed, that they were

incompatible with Communism, survival of a surplus-appropriation system in agricultural planning, command-administrative methods of Kolkhoz and sovkhoz management, and lack of the worker's interest in profits because of the lack of consumer goods.

As it happened often in history, an unfinished reform was followed by a counter-reform. In October 1964 Khrushchev was removed as a result of "Government plot." Everything went off quietly. The people quietly accepted the resignation of the aged leader, ostensibly "for reasons of health." People were tired of stormy and unpredictable experiments. As to the apparatus, it welcomed the resignation of Khrushchev. Bureaucrats were uneasy in the conditions of permanent reforms. Generally speaking, most people were not ready for profound changes. Ideological stereotypes were still very strong. For many Stalin's name remained a symbol of socialist achievements. Inertia of the old days persisted.

The "Thaw" was over. But spring never came.

Khrushchev's decade left a mixed memory behind. Those whom he liberated from camps and exile, those who had the good names of their parents and relatives restored were for him. Those who were afraid of changes regarded the "thaw" as a time of vain hopes. For Stalinists, Khrushchev is a hated "over thrower" and destroyer of their dearest ideals. Khrushchev was a leader, who did not abuse his authority and who promised a lot without carrying out all promises.

Khrushchev was the product of a certain epoch, of a certain social and political environment. And he wanted to overcome this environment's laws, to destroy them by its own methods. He wanted to crush bureaucracy in a bureaucratic way, to dethrone the cult of personality of Stalin, all the time building a cult of personality for himself. Khrushchev proved to be a hostage of the apparatus which detested all innovation. Possibly Khrushchev thought he had risen beyond the system. But in actual fact, the system held him firmly. When he made an attempt to break down this System, it merely pulled him off his pedestal.

Today, more and more people in Russian society understand that Khrushchev was an outstanding man and accomplished much. As a result, public opinion has changed greatly. It did not just happen by chance that the "children" of 1956, of the XX Party Congress became the leaders of the Perestroika in 1985.

---

## *Theme 13*

### **The 1960s and the 1970s: From Reforms to Stagnation**

Our theme in this essay will argue that there was real progress in Brezhnev's USSR, in economic as well as in cultural-political terms, if we define progress as a movement away from a command economy, and as greater room for dissent. This progress was not the result of Brezhnev's thought out goals, but had to happen because of the increasing complexity of the economy.

The change of leaders in October 1964 was the beginning of a new turn in Soviet History. Spokesmen of the "Third Generation" Soviet leadership, headed by Leonid Brezhnev, occupied positions at the upper power levels.

Who were they? Many of them started their careers during Stalin's purges at the end of the Thirties. The new administrators were educated inside the school of the Stalinist system. A special generation of leaders disappeared with Khrushchev. They were apparatchiks, but not typical ones. They were still full of revolutionary ideas; they were fighters, soldiers of the revolution. They felt themselves to be participants of "the march for bright future for the whole of mankind." Their positions were now occupied by featureless "executives", who were trained never to take any responsibility or to produce any original ideas. Double moral standards and intrigues became the rule of their conduct, and they could survive only by keeping their true thoughts to themselves. They combined a rather small store of knowledge with a yearning for material wealth. The main qualifications of this "elite" were not professional skills or moral principles, but controllability and devotion to their leaders the main method of selecting one's personnel. Patronage and nepotism became one.

In these conditions the role of the main leader increased tremendously. Brezhnev, a cunning and rather active statesman, firmly held



Leonid Brezhnev – in office 1964–1982

the reins of the government. But he lacked the gift of foresight and his education was scanty. A man of rather archaic mentality, he tried to create the image of a reasonable, calm politician, who wouldn't make a step without the advice of his comrades. Brezhnev was against sudden turns, and weary of situations. He didn't enjoy a great authority among the Soviet people. He was considered to be an ungrateful Khrushchev protege. Everybody remembered his glee when he decorated "dear Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev"

When he had taken the top position in the Soviet hierarchy, Brezhnev began to grope cautiously for his own style. He and his people couldn't ignore that changes were imperative. In reality, the efforts to reform the economy were mainly owing to the head of the Government Aleksey Kosygin. The essence of reforms may be summed up as follows:

1. Changes in the administrative structure. (Khrushchev's territorial Councils of National Economy were abolished, and a management through the system of bureaucratic monopolies of the Soviet Union and of its Republics, for each branch of the industry, was reinstituted.)

2. Correction of the planning system. Plans were made in order not to sell more products, without increasing total production.

3. Improvement of material incentives and wages. The main concept of these reforms was to extend the economic independence of enterprises.

Methods of management were to replace administrative methods. The economic development of the country was not to be aimed at growth but at quality.

Nevertheless, the new leadership was not able to break the old expenditure mechanism. In the second half of the Sixties and in the Seventies it was even reinforced.

Urban population in the USSR was 47, 9% of the whole population in 1959, 56, 9% in 1970 and 63, 4% in 1981. Objectively, it was a progressive process. But one must take into consideration the following: large-scale transfers of rural young people to large cities took place without corresponding improvements of the social infrastructure. They lost their connection with their home villages, but couldn't completely adopt themselves to urban life. They established a typical marginal subculture. Within this subculture rural traditions and norms of behavior were oddly combined with hastily learned "values" of a quasi-urban civilization. As a consequence there was alcoholism, violence, and other social evils.

There existed, moreover, a complicated system of bureaucratic impediments, such as the right of permanent residence to be acquired, distribution of apartments through enterprises, where the worker was employed, and the necessity to acquire a great number of papers and documents. In its essence this was a feudal system. This hindered the free movement of manpower to disperse workers and specialists among numerous departmental and regional groups. These groups differed in their relationship to legal protection and social welfare, supplies etc. In Moscow there were many "limitchiks," deprived of most civil rights; the word "limitchik" even became a swear-word in Russian. Job-hunters came to Moscow to work at an enterprise, which had no right to employ them due to the established "limits to the employment of non-Moscow manpower." They lived in hostels, but had no right of a permanent residence, which they could obtain only after five years of work at the same enterprise. They waited for a flat, which could be obtained only through this enterprise, for 5 to 10 years. It was only at that point that they could leave the enterprise that had employed them and look for another job.

This system had various consequences. 50 million people lived by hard manual labor and the rate of elimination of manual labor was very low.

In the early Seventies economic reforms were ineffective and productivity fell. The country itself was in a state of decay. But the most surprising fact is that many older Russians recall this recent period as the “good times.” They could buy all they needed. How could people’s needs be met? This made possible by two economic factors: vodka and oil sales. Sale of vodka received from the State 50 billion every year. Then, the world oil prices increase 8 fold and 15 fold in the trade with developed countries in the Seventies. Thus, the Soviet Union received 176 billion rubles in foreign currency from 1974 to 1984. It was a real torrent of oil dollars.

Let us now consider other aspects of the economy and the system. If you remember our essay on the Thirties, you will recall that we drew your attention to two aspects of the economy. They existed simultaneously with administrative and command methods. We had then called “NeoNEP” and “secondary market”.

We’d like to continue this line of argument in relation to the situation in the Seventies. The command economy seemed to exist in its pure form. But it was not so. As a matter of fact, other system took shape gradually and spontaneously. We can apply to it the term invented by American economist Buchanan: a “bureaucratic market”.

In Brezhnev’s time enterprises made applications for resources. These applications were sent to governmental bodies which had the authority to give production quotas to producers. The quotas were then distributed among the producers. The latter, then, applied for necessary resources. And in this way the planning cycle repeated itself on and on.

Planning was not “from above” as in the Stalinist command system. It was carried out “from below” and was already more of a coordinating than of a directive nature. The “upward” movement of applications and “downward” stream of orders went along with a heated controversy between managers and their subordinates. Subordinates, of course, tried to receive minimal production quotas, and the largest possible needed resources.

The system of vertical bargaining was extended by both legal and illegal horizontal bargaining between enterprises. Why? Because as

the economy developed and became more complex, the torrent of applications intensified and created real “traffic jams” at the upper power levels. The “Center” couldn’t digest everything. It couldn’t control the whole system, even with the help of the newest computers. It would have been still possible under Stalin. There were only 20 or 30 ministries and departments responsible for separate industrial branches. In the Seventies their number reached 150 to 160. The distribution of resources through the system of vertical bargaining was getting more and more difficult.

According to some Soviet economists, about two thirds of all the resources were distributed through the system of horizontal bargaining up to 1982, the end of Brezhnev’s rule. But the center still pretended to control everything. By the way, today these very horizontal relations, which given birth to contemporary Soviet regional barter markets, still prevent our economy from a total collapse.

Vertical and horizontal bargaining depended, of course, in the highest degree on the partners’ bureaucratic status. The Soviet bureaucratic market of the Seventies boasted thus not only the usual Western goods and services. The values of hierarchical society were also on sale: social positions, authority, laws. For example, the secretary of a rural district Party Committee could explain “hold back”; that is prevent, the district public prosecutor from prosecuting in order to let a kolkhoz chairman illegally employ a workers’ team from outside. Thus enabling the kolkhoz chairman fulfills the kolkhoz and district plan. It is not corruption from the point of view of the law. Nobody enriched himself and fulfilled plan let everybody keep their posts, get bonuses and rewards. This is a complicated system of a total “bureaucratic market”; where everything is on sale.

In the Seventies the command society gradually evolved into a trade society. But the former retained its ideological socialist cover. Socialist phrases hid, of course, the quite different content of the process.

Thus Brezhnev’s bureaucratic market showed itself to be able of spontaneous de-centralization and de-regulation. The lowest sections of the hierarchy got more and more rights for themselves. The rights were consolidated by custom, which in some cases evolved to legal norms.

Complex processes were in progress in the political life of the country as well. The political climate grew colder under Brezhnev;

there arose the threat of a Stalinist revival. The hopes for further liberalization of the progressive elements of the society faded away. But at that time some of the intellectuals established the first dissident groups. They openly protested against violations of civil rights. Authorities tried to suppress the movement, but failed.

Protests and appeals to the Soviet leadership, courts, and other authorities, were the main manifestations of dissent. A free that is uncensored press (“Samizdat”) emerged. People read typewritten copies of works by writers and scholars that the authorities refused to publish.

In the mid-Sixties the first unofficial literary association – SMOG was formed by young people. The name had various possible interpretations, for example, Courage, Idea, Image, Depth, or, the most frequent one, Young Society of Geniuses. In April, 1965, the group organized the first unofficial manifestation in post-war Moscow.

Dissident circles firmly adhered to the principles of individualism, hence their slogans of “no party”; “no politics”; “no ideology”. Hence, also, their interest in legal problems. Laws were needed not only as defense against authorities, but, first of all, as means of building a civil society. The dissident leaders: Sakharov, Galanskov, Ginzburg, Bukovsky, Amalrik, Bogoraz, Gorbanevskaya, Volpin began to fight.

Dissent grew not only in Moscow, but in big scientific and cultural centers in all the Soviet republics as well. In the late Sixties and early Seventies, the civil activities of dissidents began to turn into a broad social movement. There appeared elements of co-ordination. Thus “Samizdat” published not only fiction, but social and political works as well, among them Sakharov’s pamphlet “reflections on progress, peaceful co-existence, and intellectual freedom”.

It was a time of outstanding creative individuals. In 1968 Solzhenitsyn’s novel *The First Circle* was published in the West. It provoked such strong reaction in the USSR that the author was expelled from the Union of Writers. When Solzhenitsyn was awarded a Nobel Prize, Soviet mass media started a real storm of indignation, calling the awarded Nobel Prize “the mark of Cain for betrayal of his own people”. In 1973 the first volume of “Archipelago GULAG” was published abroad. The authorities wanted to discredit of its author and the whole dissident movement. Before long they saw that they could



not do it. Then KGB received the order to exile Solzhenitsyn, and to take away his citizenship. The order was carried out in February, 1974. At first, Solzhenitsyn lived in West Germany, then in Vermont, USA.

In those years the academician Sakharov became more active in the fight for civil rights as well as against the cold war. In 1971 he sent a memorandum to Brezhnev, proposing broad reforms, among them the permission of free movement of people across borders. He protested against the KGB use of special psychiatric clinics where political prisoners were incarcerated.

Sakharov was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1975. Thus the dissident movement took shape in the USSR. It became more and more popular, especially as the Soviet leadership and their chief lost ground.

From the end of 1974, after a serious illness, Brezhnev weakened mentally and physically. His behavior became the center of many funny anecdotes. Here is one of them: When in December of 1975 the Party's anthem, the "International" was sung at the meeting of the Polish Workers' Party before an audience of 2000, Brezhnev suddenly began to conduct. He puffed and clapped his hands. The audience perked up, some laughed. Everybody thought that Brezhnev had had a drop too much, but actually being sick he had taken too many pills. This story became widely known. But the highest party's hierarchy and Brezhnev's team tried to keep their leader on the captain's bridge at any cost.

It seems that the leadership felt the impending general crisis, but pragmatic personal aims prevailed over strategic ones, depriving the leaders of political will. All the attempts of necessary reforms stopped. Meanwhile Brezhnev had a stroke. He lost control of the "successes" were invented. Lies, juggling of facts, became the way of survival at all levels.



Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel Prize winner (1975)



Brezhnev on the meeting with Nickson (1973)

The idea of political reforms was in the air. A new stage in the dissident movement had begun. In 1976 the group to help the fulfillment of the Helsinki agreements of 1975 was organized in the USSR. Radical young people joined the movement. The authorities answered with repressions. KGB formed the 5th Special Department of fight the dissidents and managed to practically wipe out the movement in 1984. 90% of the activists (about a thousand people) were arrested of put into special mental hospitals. Without any trail Sakharov was deprived of all his decorations and exiled to the town of Gorki (now Nizhny Novgorod). He was punished for his protests against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; although the war in Afghanistan accelerated the country's slipping towards a crisis.

In the Eighties Russian society was full of contradictory moods and opinions. There were supporters of extraordinary measures, proposing to search for a way out of troubles, in radical actions. Some advocated purges in the Communist Party and a swift move against the bureaucracy. The leading expectation was that a strongman from above would stop the crisis, save the people from the omnipotent bureaucrats and do away with social injustices. Thus, vague expectations of changes in the society met the autumn of 1982 that is Brezhnev's death and Yuri Andropov's ascent to power.

---

## *Theme 14*

### **The 1980s: The Space of Power and a Search for New Ways of Historical Progress**

Let us note in brief the Soviet history of the 1980s.

In the first half of the decade, political life in the Soviet Union was shaken with frequent changes of leaders. In January 1982 Mikhail Suslov, the chief ideologist of the party, died. Later that year, in November, Leonid Brezhnev, the long-time head of the party and state died, too. He was replaced by Yuri Andropov who died in less than 15 months, in February 1984. Konstantin Chernenko acquired the highest authority, but in March 1985 there was another funeral and another changing of power.

Mikhail Gorbachev and his new team staked their early program on “acceleration,” but this policy appeared to result in a growing number of accidents in different sectors of economy. More than anything, the Chernobyl nuclear power station accident of April 1986 became a gloomy symbol of catastrophe.

In 1987 Gorbachev launched “perestroika,” which meant radical economic and political reforms as well as ideological revision.

In 1989 the First Congress of People’s Deputies elected by a new electoral law was convened.

At the same time, the Baltic republics planned to withdraw fully from the Soviet Union. In response, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation headed by Boris Yeltsin passed a declaration on national sovereignty. In 1990 the Communist Party ceased to be the nucleus of the Soviet political system, and this fact was reflected in the new Constitution. The multiparty system started to revive. In December 1990 Nikolai Ryzhkov, the head of the Government, stated the economy had collapsed and with it the “breakdown of perestroika. He then resigned.

Let us also remind you about international factors. What did the early 80s internationally? There were only a few, really significant developments:

1. The “Solidarity” Movement in Poland signifying a starting-point for the crisis of Soviet satellite system in Central Eastern Europe;

2. The Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan gradually bleeding the USSR dry;

3. The disposition of American cruise missiles in Western Germany, Great Britain and Italy, and then, of Soviet missiles in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany, which marked a turn from the detente policy to confrontation;

4. The shooting-down of a South Korean passenger aircraft which encouraged Reagan to brand the Soviet Union an “evil empire”

In 1987–1988 Gorbachev proposed the idea of “new thinking” in international relations. Soviet-American summits were restored. An agreement was reached about the elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons. Soviet troops began withdrawing from Afghanistan. In 1989–1990 “velvet revolutions” took place in East European countries. Communist parties there were deposed from power. The German Democratic Republic as a state, disappeared and merged with the Federative Republic of Germany.

Even a brief enumeration of these significant events demonstrates how difficult it is to analyze the 1980s historically. A possible key to it can be found in a question worded in the Soviet Academy of Science in 1980 – “Have we built the right society?” A bit later it was publicly repeated by Andropov himself. Why was the question put in just this way?

By the early 80s, an illusion had reigned in the Soviet Union about a successful economic development based on the changes enacted af-



Mikhail Gorbachev

ter Stalin's death – The Command Administration System. Steel, cement and tractor production were increasing rapidly. But traditional, out-of-date branches consumed a lot of natural resources which often were not used efficiently. Modern high technology productions formed only a small sector of economy. Moreover, they worked mostly for military orders.

After 1960s, when in West Siberia huge resources of oil and gas were discovered, Soviet assets grew significantly and made economic reform unnecessary, at least for some time. As an economist later put it, oil became a drug for the Soviet economy. The country was turning into an oil and gas addict. Huge pipe-lines transferred oil and gas to the West in exchange of hard currency. "Oil dollars" were spent for import consumer goods, foodstuffs and high technology equipment. Framed against the background of national agricultural crises, Soviet dependency on food imports became more clear and dangerous. In the late 70s, another attempt to initiate economic reforms was made, but it was blocked by the political leadership. As it was the case in the late 60s, they saw in economic transformation a threat to their political authority.

It is not a coincidence that many scholars tend to see the reason of Soviet economic stagnation, deepening crises and, consequently, growing opposition attitudes exactly in the sphere of political power.

It is accepted that Soviet history in Stalin's years was connected with mobilization and, consequently, extreme concentration of national resources. The requirements of mobilization development created extremely concentrated power. Its space can be presented as a pyramid. In the centre there is the Supreme power-holder (The Ruler). He doesn't only control the currents of mobilization energy, but also produces them. This is an important feature of the ideocratic regime. The elite, during mobilization spurts, stays inert and serves as a docile instrument of Ruler. Ordinary people are out of the space of power in the pyramid. So, relations between the Ruler and the Elite remain unaffected by pressure from below.

As the mobilization temperature becomes lower, the Ruler's freedom of control reduces. The Elite, on the contrary, grows stronger and tends to become an independent subject, not an instrument in hands of the weakening Ruler. While pressure "from above" de-

creases, and pressure “from below” doesn’t exist, the Elite begins growing fast. It surrounds the Ruler and adopts his function of power-producing.

Thus, a period of stagnation becomes a time of the Elite’s revenge. During Elite-dominated, stagnating periods Russia has been involved in different modernizing experiments, trying on various Western patterns. But such modernization used to turn out a surface imitation of European practice. In the West, modernization was “heated” by the energy of popular initiative and based on a balance of interests. In Russia, the Elite saw in modernization the best way of their own accommodation.

Brezhnev’s regime was the apogee of the Elite domination. The Communist Party leader depended on the party nomenklatura but kept all formal attributes of supreme sovereignty. The Elite being a conglomerate of competitive groups, needed the General Secretary as an arbiter. But the Elite’s primary goal was to find out ways to the property from which they were still alienated. They had been long dissatisfied with the role of material resource managers.

The nomenklatura privileges provided by Stalin’s regime, to a certain degree, had met officials’ interests. After Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s deposition, the Elite got a real chance to approach to their main goal. The task of creating a “non-transparent,” or “shadow” economy was put on the agenda. But Kosygin’s reforms in the mid-60s split the Elite into two camps: ministerial and territorial. The first camp included upper managers of central ministries, the second one – large plant and farm directors together with regional party officials. The Central Party authorities tried to stay “above the fray”.

Territorial managers controlled production. They secured the effective functioning of the “shadow” part of their economic activity. The ministerial bosses hadn’t got such opportunities and they had to be content with bureaucratic racketeering. The central Party authorities found it more and more difficult to control illegal financial flows in the lower echelons. As a result, the Elite, torn apart by inner conflicts, was losing the opportunity to play a role of a governing subject. It required an external force capable of restoring order, and more important, launching market changes. Only they were allowed to legalize the “shadow” economy.



Yuri Andropov

Yuri Andropov got a kind of *carte-blanche* from the *nomenklatura*, that is, a certain freedom of action in exchange of securing order and entering the market. Andropov understood that he got a unique chance – to strengthen his power and, under favorable circumstances, to restore the Party *nomenklatura*'s monopoly it had possessed before Khrushchev.

Andropov acted swiftly, trying to prevent the *nomenklatura*'s consolidation against such measures. He put heavy, Stalin-like pressure on the *nomenklatura*. In short time, 18 Union ministers and 37 regional Party Secretaries were deposed. The General Secretary

obviously showed that he could, at any time, deprive any official of the opportunity to use state property in his interests. The *nomenklatura* had to retreat and admit, if only formally, the supremacy of the new leader.

Andropov knew that in Russia, traditionally, the Ruler's power becomes invulnerable when a mobilizing project takes place. And the Elite, on the contrary, becomes stronger during modernization. In order to withdraw the Soviet Union from stagnation, to strengthen his own power and to "press down" the *nomenklatura*, he began to prepare a mobilization spurt. This spurt was aimed at entering a postindustrial stage of development, by means of high technologies and science-based production. An idea of "acceleration," later adopted by Mikhail Gorbachev, emerged just then.

At the same time, Andropov didn't reject the idea of the limited use of market mechanisms in economic management – but only on the shop-floor level. In fact, he tried to repeat a success of the NEP

policy of the 1920s which had been achieved amidst a mobilization spurt of the early Soviet years.

For a few months, Andropov managed to restore the party leader's monopoly in the space of power and to "put the Elite in their place." He "attacked" the Elite during all his, not so long, ruling period. For this purpose, he used, directly or indirectly, the State Security Committee (the KGB) he had headed for one decade and a half.

Mikhail Gorbachev, from the first days of his presidency, was in a very different situation. He was much influenced by his "apparat" background. As a Party secretary, he supervised local agriculture and actively lobbied the interests of territorial nomenklatura which also controlled the "shadow market." Strong prejudice towards the opposing ministerial bureaucracy grew into a distinguishing feature of Gorbachev's presidency. He followed Andropov's "acceleration" line. But Gorbachev's "acceleration" had a clear antiministerial tendency.

This has the following explanation. Soviet industrialization in the 1930s was exercised by means of resource "pumping out" from the countryside. The 1980s "acceleration" was to be based on rationalization of production through improvement of managing mechanisms. A policy of permitted "glasnost" was aimed at criticizing of the bureaucracy which considered to have created the Brezhnev "stagnation."

This clarifies the reasons behind ministerial enlargement. Any shifts at the top level of bureaucracy inevitably weakened the established ministerial vertical of management. The territorial nomenklatura, free from the central authorities' control, gained the upper hand. That was also true for the idea of transferring principal managing functions from center to regions. The ghosts of Khrushchev sovnarkhozes began haunting the Soviet economy. The Agroprom (Agriculture-Industrial Complex) embodied those ideas. A system of RAPO (District Agricultural and Industrial Complexes) worked directly for the interests of local managers. Moreover, Gorbachev even intended to transfer a part of party district committee responsibilities to RAPO.

The General Secretary's initiatives significantly weakened the influence of Party officials, too. The Central Committee Plenary Session in the early 1987 was held in order to discuss Party personnel policy. The results of this discussion appeared no less than revolutionary. In





Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan

fact, there was no discussion of the Gorbachev team's actions but instead a problem of basic principles of the political system and ways of its functioning. The Plenary session also replaced a nomenklatura principle of appointment for party positions with direct and alternative election – from bottom to top, and set a course for “revival” of the vertical of Soviets. The party apparatus itself, after delegating of some of its functions to the Soviets, was to be reduced.

At the XIX Party Conference in 1988, the Andropov model of “acceleration” was given up. Gorbachev's intention to fully transform the regime became obvious. In the complex transformation of the Soviet system, political reform took a dominant place. The improvement of the economic mechanism now was considered as an integral part of a general democratic process. Moreover, the economic changes of the early “perestroika” were considered as democratization of the inner industrial management. Elective management was introduced into practice, the role of enterprises in decision-making expanded.

Thus, a centralized and balanced system of appointments and control was weakened and not replaced by market stabilizers. It made eco-

conomic and political processes uncontrollable. In these circumstances, an epoch of people's deputies congress began and Gorbachev became President. At the same time, the 6th Article of the Constitution was canceled and the Party became an outsider. Gorbachev consistently went on with lobbying the interests of local officials. The XIX Party Conference especially emphasized an opportunity "of transfer to self-financing for republics and regions". It was another "black mark" for Union ministries and their departments and, in perspective, for

all the Union's statehood. A law "On Cooperation" gave a start to the legalization of the "shadow" business of regional elites. Henry Kissinger later on noted: by 1990, the centralized



planning system of the Soviet Union had finally ossified. Numerous bureaucratic organizations established for control over all aspects of citizens' life, instead, began to conclude "non-aggression" pacts with

those whom they were supposed to control. The bureaucracy's primary task became self-preservation. Gorbachev's attempt to let loose the initiative undermined the system and "pulled down".

This process took place amid disintegrating actions of the republican congress of people's deputies and their established governing bodies. The sovereignty of the first Soviet President was evaporating almost visibly. Supported and promoted by Gorbachev, local "nomenklatura" launched a fly-wheel of the Union break-down. The Union became an obstacle to satisfying material needs of this "nomenklatura". Framed in the acting Union legal field, the situation turned out hopeless. This fact urged a part of the Union leadership to take ex-



Soviet perestroika stamps

traordinary measures. These measures resulted in August 1991 in an attempted coup d'état which signified the country's entering a new decade and a new epoch.

What was the predominant idea with which Russia was entering a new epoch? Without answering this question, it would be difficult to understand the nuances of modern Russian history.

In the late 1980's, the following model dominated: "Democrats of the Communist Party plus outside Democrats against the Communist Party Conservatives?" But since 1990, most of emerging political parties were based on anti-Communism, and their tactical model was: "Democrats outside the Communist Party against the Communist Party." The leaders of these new parties began to mock as nonsense Gorbachev's attempt to save Soviet socialism, or, at least, the country's loyalty to a "socialist choice." New parties were competing against each other under a slogan "More Liberalism!" Thus, the "Leftists"; most of whom had been Communists for years, now were turning into the "Rightists".

This quick and strange transformation seems to be a consequence, first, of the Communist Party's inability to exercise deep changes or to reform itself, and second, of swift and victorious anti-Communist revolutions in the East Europe. That is, not deep ideological upheavals, but political circumstances forced Radicals to break with a Socialist idea. It is essential that many ordinary people at this time turned against Socialist ideology wishing to live "like the West." But it was impossible at once to get rid of a mentality connected with ideas of justice more appropriate to Socialism, not Liberalism.

Radicals' prompt separation from the social, economic and cultural realities of Russia as well as their sharp turn to "pure Liberalism" appeared consequential, and the consequences are still seen. Then, in 1990, a cult of Liberalism and a denying of real Socialism reached its culmination.

According to VTsIOM polls, in 1990 32% of Russians considered exemplary the United States (in 1989 – 28%, while in 1991 – 25%, in 1992 – 13%); another 32% praised Japan (in 1991 – 28%, in 1992 – 12%); 17% – Germany, 11% – Sweden, and only 4% – China.

Thus, at a historical turning-point, both a new Russian political elite and its mass social base saw further progress of Russia in exercising modernization by a Western liberal model.

---

## *Theme 15*

### **The August Putsch of 1991 and the Termidor of Yeltsin**

Today information about these events is too fresh in our minds to be complete. It is still too early for sociological analysis, and we don't pretend to know the whole truth.

Therefore, we begin with a general analysis of the situation in August, 1991. Our initial thesis is that this was the most critical moment in the struggle for power between two forces. On the one hand, there were the diehards of the party and the state bureaucracies defending their positions, which were already undermined. On the other hand, there were numerous representatives of the new bourgeoisie. Everybody expected a clash. The people, divided by this struggle, saw a glimmer of hope when in June and July 1991 Gorbachev and Yeltsin took important steps toward an agreement. There seemed to be a way out of the dire straits. Ten Republics agreed to establish a new Union of Sovereign States. But these events served as a call to arms for extremists of both wings.

The party and the state bureaucracies, disagreeing with Gorbachev's perestroika, tried to use the difficult situation in the country and the resentment of the people. There was a sharp decline in Gorbachev's popularity. The party and the state bureaucracies wanted to remove Gorbachev from power and reinstate the former order. They were ready to do anything in order to achieve their goal, but were stopped by the resistance of all democrats in the country. Gorbachev, who had been taken prisoner, showed his determination and personal courage under the pressure of ultimatums. He rejected all demands of the conspirators. There is no doubt that the firm position of Yeltsin, the Russian Parliament, and the Government played the decisive role in defeating the plotters.

Now let us consider the nature of this coup. The events occurred within a short space of time, but for sociological analysis they raise rather complex problems.

The first concerns what happened. Was it a coup or only an attempt at a coup? The subject is still under discussion. What is the criterion by which we distinguish between a coup and an attempted coup? Power is the critical criterion. If real power changes hands as



Boris Yeltsin

the result of a struggle between different political and social forces, we have a real coup. In our case, it was not a simple change of leadership. It was not an attempted coup. It was an actual coup, when the party and state bureaucracies removed Gorbachev from power. They had a temporary victory. Their next adversary was the Russian President Yeltsin. They tried to crush the Russian Government, failed and were made to retreat. The coup thus failed, because the conspirators had not managed to get power away from the Russian Government.

The second problem is: how does the coup correlate with the USSR constitution? It was the key question both for our country and for foreign countries. Two approaches clashed. The first claimed that the events were an anti-constitutional *coup d'état* because the establishment of the State Emergency Committee was illegal. That

was Yeltsin's position. The second evaluation of events did not define the August events as a coup, but as an emergency. That was the position of the Emergency Committee itself, as it needed to prove that its creation and actions were constitutional.

But it is obvious that the August events were an anti-constitutional *coup d'état*. Why? Because the President of the USSR was illegally removed from power by force. Moreover, the highest authority in the country was usurped by the self-styled Emergency Committee. Another person could take the post of the President of the USSR only in three cases, besides a decision to that effect by a Meeting of People's Deputies. The three possibilities were – Gorbachev's death, a serious illness of the chairman or his voluntary resignation. Not a single one of these conditions was present. Gorbachev was alive, and healthy, and did not resign.

Let us make a few remarks on the coup's chronology. Everybody speaks of the "three days that shook the world" – August the 19<sup>th</sup>, the 20<sup>th</sup> and the 21<sup>st</sup>. But we must analyze this more closely. All the Emergency Committee documents on the transition of power are dated the 18<sup>th</sup> of August. It was only the 22<sup>nd</sup> of August that Soviet President informed the world that "the situation is completely under my control". Why do we speak of it?

The Soviet Union is a nuclear power, and at that time it was a "single button country". This means that in the USSR, as well as in the USA, the supreme authority in the land has not only the power over their people, but also the power over the destiny of the world. That is why the main and the real symbol of Power was the "box with a start button" in the hands of both Presidents.

And this means that the coup took place on the 18<sup>th</sup> of August, at 5 pm sharp. At this moment, the conspirators impudently burst into Gorbachev's Crimean villa, and demanded his resignation. Gorbachev refused. Then all his lines of communication were cut off – regular, governmental, military and satellite. We can hardly imagine the danger that ensued not only for the Soviet people, but for the whole world as well. The world's destiny was in the hands of the plotters.

On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of August Gorbachev said that he controlled the situation. Thus the West knew that it was not threatened anymore by the Soviet "box with the start button". It was the exact moment that the putsch failed completely.

Let us turn to the social base of the putsch. You should remember the people who constituted the Emergency Committee: the Vice-President, the Defense Minister, the Internal Affairs Minister, the KGB Chairman, etc. They were representatives of the state and military administrations. Not one of them was a “genuine” Party functionary, but this does not prove anything. The conspirators were only the



above-water part of the iceberg. The actual instigators and organizers of the coup had their seats in the upper levels of the Party’s Central Committee. They kept a surprising silence, both in regard to the disappearance of their own General Secretary, Gorbachev, and to their appraisal of the situation in the country. Silence means consent. The coup was the handiwork of party leaders as well. They carried it out without the knowledge of millions of rank-and-file communists, in defiance of democratic interests and aspirations.

Let us add a few more general remarks.

The coup shook the whole of Soviet society and riveted the attention of the whole world. It lifted the cover of a mystery, revealing the actual alignment of social forces and showed who is who. The reactionary forces lost out. This opened the way to an intensification of changes.

I deliberately narrow the range of problems resulting from the coup of August, 1991, because that coup was followed by the *coup d'état* of December, 1991. The latter abolished the old empire and gave birth to new independent states.

We repeat that the events of December, 1991 are a *coup d'état*. It's better to call things by their right names, so as not to create illusions. This *coup d'état* was carried out by the democratic authorities, or by authorities elected in a democratic way, of the former Soviet Republics, and of Russia first of all.

There is nothing wrong with the word *coup d'état*, at least if this coup does not substitute a totalitarian society for a democratic society.

But we must note that the previous legislation might define even a democratic *coup d'état* as a crime, especially if this legislation contained no norms of a democratic transition of power.

The countries with ancient democratic traditions insured against these dangers. They created and adjusted, with the help of numerous reforms, the proper political mechanisms for a radical change. We had no such mechanisms before perestroika, and we still don't have them. The struggle between the new and the old systems proceeded and reached its peak in the events of the August putsch and the December *coup d'état*. After latter the central authorities were destroyed. The head of the USSR, the President of the USSR, was removed from power without his consent. All these events are signs of a *coup d'état*.

But the December coup has a number of definite democratic characteristics.

1. It was bloodless and peaceful.
2. It only realized the tendencies that already existed in the country. One of them was the disintegration of the USSR.
3. The world community recognized it as a democratic transition of power, regardless of mistakes and of the problem of control of the nuclear weapons.
4. It created the Commonwealth of Independent States, that is, the possibility of averting a chaotic disintegration of the former USSR.

There were infringements of democratic principles as well, such as the cancellation of the Union Treaty by some of its subjects (Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia), such as the dissolution of the Union Parliament and the removal from power of the lawfully elected and officially recognized President.



Gorbachev submitted to reality. He made an unpleasant but correct decision. What was it? He gave up his powers, which were taken from him without “sharp opposition.” It is very important that the President of the USSR took his share of responsibility for this transition period. It made the *coup d'état* more constitutional than it actually was.

The collapse of the Soviet nation state was advantageous for the elite. It was the elite that had inspired the Soviet system's fall. The new Russian state system gave the elite an opportunity to convert power legitimately into their property. Yeltsin provided and guaranteed the “nomenclatura privatization.” However, his idea was inferior to the real elite sovereignty now. The first Russian President had every chance of becoming a puppet in the hands of his nomenclatura ex-subordinates who flourished in the field of privatization. Notwithstanding this fact Yeltsin managed to maintain his sovereignty and obtained the maximum possible centralization of authority. Whereas Gorbachev scattered his sovereignty, successively creating nomenclatura positions one by one, Yeltsin acted to the contrary – he became more powerful by weakening the elite that led him to the Kremlin.

In October 1991, after about two months of thought, Yeltsin told the V Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR that he would not follow the policy of stabilization based on non-economic means, but would carry out rapid market reforms. The explosive situation was neutralized by the high level of Yeltsin's popularity.

Yeltsin was wise and took advantage of the difficult and complicated situation that was caused by the country's impetuous entry into the market economy environment. Amid the accelerated and directive privatization implemented from the “top,” only yesterday's functionaries could get the right of property. Hitherto, the nomenclatura had been simultaneously an official and legitimate subject of ruling and a “shady” entrepreneur; now the situation was reversed. After passing into the legitimate owner the nomenclature reserved only “shady” potentials of affecting the political process. That's why the elite set a course for the forced building-up of civil society with its authority-control technologies through the system of democratic institutions.

Yeltsin understood the threat to his power that was hiding behind all the rhetoric of liberal-democratic reformers. He had the only one way: with all his strength he used reformist phraseology to impede the modernization of the political system modernization. The elite still



needed Yeltsin as the ensign of the reforms carried out by them. His national support ensured that they needed the President. Being popular among the “upper society” as well as among the “lower masses,” he was devious between the populism and the market.

However, by the middle of 1992, there were signs that the post-putsch disorganization was being overcome. The President had to fall back upon positional maneuvering, compromises and dodging to split the opposition. The inflation level after the liberalization of prices wasn’t so much an economic as an integral political index. It indicated the steadiness of the government group of reformers and the prospects of this type of market reform.

Inflationists defended a sort of mobilization variant of stabilizing and surmounting the crisis: financial infusions into the national economy for the purpose of supporting non-competitive factories (inflating with “cheap money”); strengthening control by restoring the power authority of the Center; and control of export-import activities. Anti-inflationists, adherents of the modernization course adopted at the end of 1991, insisted on liberalizing economic activity, financial and credit policy, and privatization. All these various strategic projects implied not only different economic systems, but also incompatible political regimes.

The constitutional-political crisis of 1993 was the culmination of tension between the inflationists and anti-inflationists. It was impossible to overcome legitimately the “diarchy” of the executive and legislative branches of power – within the framework of the working constitution, as well as through the supposed adoption of the new fundamental law. The Presidential draft constitution had every chance to be adopted only contrary to the Supreme Court and the Congress, and the parliamentary draft constitution – only contrary to the President.



A privatization cheque of 10.000 rubles

In the prevailing conditions the Order No. 1400 “On gradual constitutional reform in the Russian Federation” proposed the optimal choice for the country. In return Yeltsin’s rivals tightened the confrontation. The President’s concessions would have meant a catastrophic increase of instability. Most probably the “variegated” parliament would not have had enough determination and experience to save and stabilize the insignificant, but still clear successes in the relation to asserting the nationhood. Proposed by the so-called “third power” – the regional elite – the adoption of the “zero option” (the simultaneous annulment of Order No. 1400 and of associated resolutions by the Congress and the Supreme Soviet) threatened Russia’s territorial integrity. Regionalization, launched in 1991, had a well-defined separatist direction and was whipped up on the one hand by the economic

crises, and on the other hand by tough political competition, first in the USSR and later in the Russian Federation. The painful outcome happened on the 3rd–4th of October in 1993, a tragic solution to this intricate conflict.

The new Constitution, soon adopted by referendum, provided the presidential monopolism legalization through the division of powers among the branches as well as between the Center and the Federation subjects.

Yeltsin's preference for a non-party leadership style, formed during his opposition to Gorbachev, turned out to be well chosen. Before his resignation at the end of 1999, he ensured the free ranging movement exactly with non-party presidential power. Yeltsin's favorite methods were management for tendencies and building-up the system of personal and institutional checks and balances. However, Yeltsin did not manage to get on the top of the country's financial and economic life. Inflationists dominated in the State Duma, and oligarchs ran the real economy in alliance with the corrupt officials who had begotten them. The President could not overcome the contradiction between the single political supremacy and economic anarchy.

The oligarchic “peripheral” capitalism, that is, based on major property owners and representatives of Soviet economic executives authority of liberal and juridical powers, part of old nomenclatura and new bureaucracy, turned out to be the “recompense” for the next incorrect choice between the models of modernization and mobilization.

Yeltsin's victory in the presidential elections of 1996, won due to powerful support from business tycoons, proved to be Pyrrhic for him. The oligarchy limited Yeltsin's scope of maneuver to maintain its own sovereignty in full. He had to pay in full for the immunity of presidential power: by distributing privileges and resources, and turning a blind eye to the lawlessness of “regional barons”. Conflict among the power branches, the increase in foreign loans caused by the chronic budget deficit, the abundance of foreigners in the public stock market, the shortage of the currency reserve – all these factors generated the default of August of 1998. Nevertheless, Yeltsin managed to retain the immunity of his presidential sovereignty in full measure and to provide in these conditions the succession of authority.

---

## **FINAL PART**

### **CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA. WITH WHAT DOES RUSSIA ENTER THE NEW MILLENNIUM?**

#### *Theme 16*

#### **The Realm of Power Under Vladimir Putin**

The Putin era was a difficult period where modernizing and mobilizing trends were mixed together in the realm of power in quite a contradictory way. The President once confessed that “life as a whole consists of contradictions. When contradictions end, the abyss begins.” This abyss was in sight on the eve of Putin’s appointment as Prime Minister eight years ago. Even the most irreconcilable Kremlin critics describe the situation at the time in similar terms, the most common phrase being “the eight lost years.” The difference in evaluative measures when comparing the years 1999 and 2007 is obvious. It is definitively clear that Putin’s presidency was not a period of degradation, but the one of progress, in which Russia overcame the crisis of the 1990s. Instead of moving in a downward spiral, Russia gained a new level of historical development under Putin.

Initially, Putin’s agenda linking contrasting goals looked ambiguous. On the one hand, he intended to stop the country’s break-up and establish order in the state, which inevitably involved mobilizing actions. On the other hand, he was supposed to ensure a sustainable and predictable existence, albeit not the most elevated one, to guarantee to a people exhausted by the 1990s a life without disturbances. In light of such expectations, even the most well-balanced and measured

application of mobilizing techniques turned out to be extremely troublesome.

One may object that throughout Russian history there have never been suitable circumstances for mobilization. It has always been used as an extreme and desperate means to lead the country out of recurrent crises. People who survived the hardships of a mobilizing sprint were exhausted by the very crisis they were striving to overcome. And again in the late 1990s, people longed for stability, not for new pressures and the inevitable concentration of resources and efforts that those pressures entailed.

It is true that at first sight the situation at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century was not unusual for Russia – but only at first sight. Unlike all periods in the lead up to a major mobilization effort, Russian society entered the millennium not only tired of exhausting changes, but actually deprived of any motivating ideology for such an effort. The previous communist ideology was discredited during the “era of stagnation,” and was therefore rejected; however, no substitute was offered. The only motivation on offer was a cynical and immoral call, in a poor and struggling country, for personal enrichment, which was raised to the status of a new religion by a strong and aggressive mass media controlled by the existing elite.

Even during the hardest times of its past – during the Time of Troubles at the beginning of 17<sup>th</sup> century and in the period of the dissolution of the monarchy and the ensuing period of hardship – people at least had their faith. In the first case they had faith in a divinely blessed Holy Russia, and in the second they believed in the new religion of Bolshevism. During Boris Yeltsin’s presidency the public consciousness lost its motivation completely. The people did not have any image of the future. Strong apathy and indifference were gnawing at a society that seemed to be witnessing its possible disappearance as a historical subject. Russian society looked on with indifference at a new round of state disintegration in the North Caucasus in 1999.

It was clear that in such a moral and psychological climate, mobilization was impossible. Therefore, Putin had to elaborate a carefully calibrated and deliberate political program which would involve a minimal range of mobilization techniques. The social discomfort caused by these techniques would have to be offset by mechanisms to optimize the functioning of the system as a whole. Since the Russian

elites, including those closely bound to Yeltsin's Kremlin, preferred limited mobilization, the task became substantially simpler.

However, the real range of Putin's powers was quite limited. Yeltsin handed him a set of personnel consisting of people from "The Family," as members of the inner circle of the former president were known. "The Family" was to guarantee the continuation of the political course under the new Kremlin leader, i.e. to control Putin so that he did not disrupt the system of interests set up by his predecessor concerning the key political, oligarchic and lobbying groups. They were also supposed to restrict Putin's political activity to two issues: establishing order in Chechnya and the final elimination of the serious coalition, consisting of federal and regional elites, which formed the electoral bloc "Fatherland – All Russia" during the state Duma elections in 1999.

Putin was supposed to rule the country as a regime of controlled (by "The Family") Bonapartism. Meanwhile, the cumulative effect of a whole range of factors (such as the extreme popularity of the new president; the common negative attitude toward the state itself and its institutions; the continuing conflicts between elite and corporate groups in legal and illicit business; the slow federalization of the regions of the Russian Federation; and the generally unfavorable socio-economic situation for many people) allowed Putin to consolidate his power despite the narrow range of possibilities.

During the first months of Putin's presidency, the Chechen counterterrorist operation was the single and at the same time most efficient way to consolidate his influence as the new head of state.

In contrast to the first Chechen campaign in 1994–1996, which looked more like one of the Kremlin's political-technological operations (with its constant reconciliation with separatists, the preservation of their complex financial infrastructure and information network in the biggest cities of the country, and so on), the authorities not only did not interfere with the counterterrorist operation begun in August, 1999 – first in Dagestan and then in Chechnya – but also rendered genuine support. The groups lobbying for the separatists' interests were liquidated, meanwhile people were provided with appropriate information and propaganda. Such a unified position was definitely the result of the consensus between Putin and the main elite groupings. The consensus was unique in the power structure, and despite the fact that it concerned only one single issue, Putin took ad-

vantage of it. Enjoying success in the North Caucasus, he intended to launch long needed reforms in other critical fields of public life.

The President started with the mass media. Putin had been brought to power mainly thanks to the “Fourth Estate.” He knew that his limited opportunities could be cut off in no time by the media empires controlled by the oligarchs. Up to that point, those empires had been controlled by the Kremlin, but that situation could change. They could guarantee Putin’s defeat by creating an information vacuum or a climate of disrespect for the leadership as they did during the latter period of Yeltsin’s presidency. To avoid that, the President took preemptory measures.

First, having obtained *carte blanche* during the Chechen counter-terrorist operation to partially limit the independence and freedom of the leading media empires, Putin established flexible and clear rules, obligatory and indispensable for all members of the media cartels. Those actions immediately caused a huge outcry among the owners of the media. The media moguls tried to convince people that Putin was destroying one of the most important achievements of the Yeltsin era: freedom of speech. However, these notorious accusations against Putin did not have the desired effect. Putin had quite a solid reputation in public. As for the accusations themselves, they seemed exaggerated. Putin was not trying to curtail the independence of the media. All he did was to limit the ability of big business and criminal groups to operate with impunity with the help of the very mass media they controlled.

Second, the most odious media oligarchs – the ones that had in effect declared war against Putin and started a massive campaign to dis-



Vladimir Putin



credit the president in their media publications – were disarmed. The principle of “distancing” (that is, of separating the media cartels from the state – PTC) was applied to the other remaining oligarchs. At first they were “distanced” from state information politics, and then they were cut off from politics in general. This principle meant the rejection of the well-worn practice of the Yeltsin period of maintaining personal relationships between the head of state and big business. If the oligarchs agreed to renounce any claim to political influence, the Kremlin guaranteed the state’s non-interference in their entrepreneurial affairs.

Thus, during his first years in power, Putin launched a range of mobilizing actions to restore the territorial integrity of the country and bring order to the media sphere.

The social costs of this policy were minor, and meanwhile the popularity of the president kept increasing. Moreover, the president not only managed to break the shackles of controlled Bonapartism, but he also launched a project to selectively neutralize the elite, rejecting the pattern of “The Family” as seen under Yeltsin. He reached an understanding with his former opponents in the Duma elections of 1999, and started acting decisively against some of Yeltsin’s circle of representatives.

The reforms were seriously complicated by the fact that Putin did not have his own team. However, he managed at least to mark out the direction of the changes he intended to make. All the steps he made consisted of appointing his own people to positions still free from “The Family” or to newly created posts.

The Security Council, with its chairman Sergei Ivanov being close to Putin, constituted a certain counterweight to the old administration and government. Mikhail Fradkov, the future Prime Minister, also worked in the Russian Security Council, which was gradually converted into a center for developing and coordinating Putin’s policies. The creation of a system of federal districts run by presidential representatives chosen from Putin’s inner circle was designed to consolidate the territorial integrity of Russia.

The reformation of the Federation Council began. The second chamber was no longer a shelter for regional “Frondes” (rebellions against the absolutist French state in the 17<sup>th</sup> century – PTC) lobbying for their interests and claiming even more power by diminishing the

prerogatives of the center. In the end, the Federation Council was restructured so that its functions corresponded to its constitutional role, namely to ensure the regions' participation in the legislative process.

The situation in Russia was obviously changing for the better: the moral and psychological state of society improved, the threat of the break-up of the state was left behind, and most important of all was the wide-spread belief that Russia had pulled back from the abyss that the disastrous 1990s had threatened to cast Russia into.

Putin succeeded in solving these major tasks almost without any major mistakes. The only serious error he committed during this period concerned the image of his personal power, which he and his team were strongly implanting in the minds of the people. Due to its controversial nature, the problem requires a detailed explanation.

The Russian historical formula for constructing the power structures of the state indicates that the key to success for a president is his image, which has to be highly individual but with a corresponding mythology and paternalistic symbols. The image itself promotes the efficient functioning of the state. Yeltsin, with the tricks he used, was the latest vivid historical example. The powerful arsenal of the first Russian president, however, was limited by the very techniques he used.

It is obvious that the Yeltsin example itself was hardly worth copying. But the sacralization of the image of the head of state to a certain extent is essential in Russia. It is the “radar” that captures the significant and inspirational ideas that flow up from the people to those in power, and that reflects them back as formulae consonant with social expectations. “He ruled the flow of thoughts, and thanks to that he ruled the country,” as Boris Pasternak once expressed the technique used by Lenin to wield power in a previous era.

In the very first year of his presidency, Putin faced a serious test in proving himself during the “Kursk” submarine tragedy. From a formal point of view the president did nothing wrong. He did not want to interfere



The submarine *Kursk*

with the rescue operation being carried out by professionals, but his hands-off approach was seen by a paternalistic Russian society as callous. Unfortunately, the managers of the media empires opposed to Putin realized this much earlier than the president himself. At any rate, Putin had to resolve this situation by projecting the image everyone was longing for, mobilizing all his strength and stamina to meet the relatives of the dead mariners face-to-face.

After August 2000, the president went on to build a completely different, workman-like image. “I would like the Russian people to think of me as an employee, taken on for a certain period of time to do his functional and professional duties, as a contract employee.” That is how Putin presented himself. However, further events and the President’s reactions to them increasingly demonstrated that Putin perceived his mission as much more than simply fulfilling a contract.

Immediately after all the emergency measures necessary to establish elementary order in the country had been carried out, Putin had to define a more long-term policy. In the spring of 2001, he explained his strategy in his second State of the Nation Address. In practical terms, his plan was to re-establish the government – under the existing Constitution – through a whole series of institutional reforms that would redefine the elementary principles of state operations.

This reform program sounded reasonable and justified. For ten years Russia had been undergoing a variety of transformations. However, the basic principles were not yet arranged properly. The Yeltsin-era transformations were basically aimed at only one issue – the privatization of property. There was hardly any time or motivation for anything else. But Putin had long-term intentions to reconstruct Russia; thus, he had to start from the very base. The new stage was characterized by technocracy and professionalism, by the restriction of public policy and the gradual loss of media independence, which was limited to covering current events without commentary. These governmental shifts provided the foundation for a new stable power structure. This structure did not involve any intention to engage in mobilization.

In fact, Putin followed the steps of his idol Peter the Great as he set a goal to create in 21<sup>st</sup> century Russia a “normal” state. The reforms of Peter the First eventually led to the bureaucratic abduction of the monarchy and the neutralization of its ideological essence. Nevertheless, it created a favorable ground for the appearance of a liberal cul-

ture, though it was incompatible with the existing power structure. As a result, two centuries later, the monarchy was overthrown. And where have the attempts to repeat Peter's the Great experiment in the 21<sup>st</sup> century led us?

The precondition of any institutional reform is a special structure that would carry out this reform. By definition this structure should be public authorities at different levels. That is why the institutional reforms sought to establish a power hierarchy in the first place. Putin started tackling this problem right after his accession. In this way, the urgent measures taken by the President to strengthen the state system were not dictated only by the emergency, but constituted a natural part of the institutional reforms.

This large-scale plan to regulate power in itself was certainly right and necessary to finally overcome the after effects of the chaos of the 1990s. However, the main power structures – the Government and The Presidential Executive Office – were still under the control of “The Family,” so the future of this fundamental institutional reform was ambiguous.

The Presidential Administration was changing from a successful anti-crisis center (from the autumn of 1999 to the autumn of 2000) into an inefficient institution. It still ensured the personnel policy that on the whole served the president's interests, but on the other hand it completely lost the conceptual and ideological monopoly that it enjoyed during the transition of power in the first months of Putin's presidency.

The new political regime was more and more like “Yeltsinism,” though modernized and devoid of its most odious traits. But the first Russian president managed to keep his strong power monopoly (at least as the supreme arbiter of political disputes) up until his resignation due to his use of “political technology” in the sphere of public policy. The image of the early Putin was created to reflect the type of hierarchical communication that was created in the 1990s. But under the circumstances of technocracy and professionalism applied to the political process, a brand new image of the president and his team was needed. That image could no longer be based on imitating Yeltsin, but had to be based on a real, strategically-oriented approach toward a unified plan for the future.

But there was strong resistance from “The Family,” as it still controlled the main political offices. The presidential retinue gained

strength very slowly, and there was no opportunity for the Kremlin to start a decisive attack. Therefore, the political initiative was little by little taken by Putin's opponents, who represented a large coalition composed of "The Family," resurgent oligarchs, a number of regional authorities and, above all, by great masses of well-off citizens interest-



Gazprom office in Moscow

ed in preserving the existing situation.

In this context Putin could do nothing to change situation for the better except by depriving his opponents of the financial resources that they were attempting to convert into political power. The first step in that direction was the re-

placement of the leaders who controlled the backbone of the Russian economy: the natural monopolies. First of all this involved the Russian gas company "Gazprom," and secondarily the Ministry of Railways (later renamed the "RZhD": the public corporation "Russian Railways"). Thanks to complex law enforcement measures and particularly through commercial measures, the presidential team managed to launch a large-scale reprivatization project. That process did not mean an all-out revision of the results either of the property redistribution carried out in the 1990s or large-scale re-nationalization. It meant the beginning of a "juridical war" (unveiling the criminal history of corporations and the initiation of criminal cases) against those oligarchic groups who planned a "soft" coup d'état by means of buying elections in 2003–2004.

This "juridical war" reached its climax with the destruction of the Russian Oil Company Yukos and the arrest of its owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky. The oligarch used the Kremlin's plan to strengthen the party system in the country (designed as an alternative to clan-based confrontation) and the initiative by Putin to set up a new system of government based on the results of Duma elections. He began funding those parties that were certain to make it into the Duma, thus reckoning on their support in becoming Prime Minister as a first step in a further effort to gather power.

Khodorkovsky's arrest and the following "reprivatization" of Yukos became a breaking point in the "juridical war" between the Kremlin and the opposing oligarchic groups. Since the end of 2003 until the present day, there have been no cases of organized oligarchic opposition to Putin's power. Moreover, as a result of a series of acts which undid the previous privatizations, the president and his retinue obviously reinforced their power, making it possible to finally carry out the "personnel revolution." The replacement of the former Chief of the Presidential Administration and the Prime Minister by the loyal Dmitrii Medvedev and Mikhail Fradkov represented the victory over "The Family" and put Putin beyond the reach of the existing power structure. After the Duma elections, the lower house of the Russian legislature was dominated by a pro-Kremlin majority. In the course of the renewal of the members of the Federation Council, a similar majority was also formed in that body. The monitoring ability of the center, represented by the president and his team, which had once been weak, was now consolidated.

Due to the "personnel revolution" and the neutralization of the oligarchic opposition, a new architecture of power was established in the spring of 2004. The Presidential Administration turned into the main institution that controlled the balance of power inside the president's retinue – between "the security officials" and "the liberals" – by means of a flexible staff policy and a search for an optimal balance between domestic and foreign policy.

These new functions brought changes into the whole structure of the Administration. The function of the head of the Presidential Administration was reduced, but his deputies began to play a more important part as they were classified as Presidential Assistants that



Dmitry Medvedev

could address the head of state directly. The Presidential Administration was also responsible for the prosecution of “the juridical war,” or rather the continuation of the “re-privatization” process, which had to be transformed from a high-profile process into an ordinary process carried out by the Government.

The Security Council was no longer seen as a counterbalance to the Presidential Administration, and the whole Security Council structure lost its previous power.

The renewed cabinet remained the coordinating center of the institutional reforms, the bureaucratic interests and the lobbyists, but it did not interfere in other fields and did not make decisions on “re-privatization.” The transfer of decision-making power on the most important projects – including economic ones – to the Presidential Administration led to the depolitization of the Council and to its transformation into a body that simply monitored the country’s macroeconomic situation and traditional foreign policy.

It would seem that the unified power hierarchy was completely restored, and the process of the institutional re-establishment of the State was gaining momentum, while “technocracy” was becoming the official ideology. But it did not happen. It turned out that staff changes and the taking over by the presidential team of the main political offices and prime economic assets of the country constituted an end in itself, and it did not lose its overarching importance later – in the re-established structures of state power.

A new approach to the institutional reforms was on the agenda, but without any correction in their content or nuances, in spite of the fact that some profound transformations had occurred in the three years since their introduction. As a result, the authorities overlooked the possible social cost of the planned reforms and made serious mistakes, and this damaged the reputation of the president and his policies beginning in 2005.

The new elite’s political monopoly gave a false impression of the eventual elimination of any threat to the political system that could emerge from confrontations within the power structure or from aggressive separatism generated from the outside. In response to this complacency, there was a series of terrorist acts, and the end of summer of 2004 was marked by a seemingly forgotten feeling of social defenselessness. For a while a new state of undeclared war between

Russia and the terrorist underworld forced the authorities to overcome the excessive preoccupation with the re-privatization process and to focus on strengthening state capacity. It was then – for the first time in Putin’s public speeches – that the need for “national mobilization in the face of the common hazard” was declared and the power hierarchy was finally completed. Excessive electoral activity in the regions was reduced, the principles for the formation of the Duma were delineated, and the establishment of the Civic Forum of Russia as a special state institution regulating civil society began.

At this time, the transformations that had been carried out did not manage (except for the country’s doubled GDP and other consumption indicators) to present an image of the future that the authorities were going to offer Russia. Thus, the articulation of an ideological doctrine was temporarily set aside.

Finally, as the rigid control over the necessary and reasonable “re-privatization” process eased, some representatives of the new elite enjoyed the profits of their businesses. This situation put the president and his retinue at a disadvantage. And a sequence of “velvet revolutions” in the former Soviet republics made many Russian officials and businessmen think that something similar would happen in Russia as well. These groups ardently supported the idea of a “velvet revolution” in our country. They considered it as revenge for their non-participation in property redistribution. Russian oligarchs who had emigrated from the country encouraged those ideas anyway they could. They expected to recover their former positions in politics and business by resorting to “velvet” methods.

A monopoly of power was not a solid basis on which to consolidate the president’s position. Putin’s attempt to reestablish the ideology of the state on the basis of exceptional pragmatism and technocracy did not work. Instead, it confronted the Kremlin with new complications. The team’s lack of principles, the setting of stabilization as a main strategic priority in state policy, the constantly high world prices for energy products that preserved Russia’s energy-oriented export policy – all of this created favorable conditions among the new elite for rent-seeking behavior and shady business deals connected to the re-privatization process.

The Kremlin’s image was badly tarnished. Not only Putin’s declared opponents, but also a large number of those who were not sat-





Putin's speech in Munich

ified with his reforms, backed the idea of the “velvet revolution.” A moment came when the Kremlin could no longer wait to develop a serious ideological plan.

Such a project was declared in the spring of 2005 in the State of the Nation Address. It determined the main ideological features of

state policy. And though Putin did not give any precise definition, this new ideology was called “sovereign democracy.”

At first, the philosophy of sovereign democracy was considered by the Kremlin to be a competitive alternative to the defeatist and alternative ideology of the “velvet” revolution and its supporters. Later, a deeper meaning of this theory was revealed. “Democracy,” which had been seen in Russia as a means of development dictated from the outside, was rehabilitated around the core idea of sovereignty to be an original and convenient way of organizing the state. In the autumn of 2005, after the proclamation of priority national projects, the Kremlin made clear who the social target of the new ideology really was. The proponents of the “velvet revolution” no longer had a monopoly on the formation of social sensibilities.

The philosophy of sovereign democracy rejected the idea of “off-shore democracy” and the corrupt elite who supported it. The strong assertion of national interests in foreign policy constituted a firm guarantee of the preservation of Russia’s geopolitical position. The president’s speech in Munich gave clear evidence that the authorities had rejected the prioritization of international rules and practices over national interests put in place by Soviet leaders at the end of the 1980s. Sovereign democracy claimed the opposite. The complete and definitive restoration of the country’s superpower status was the main goal for the authorities who had launched the new mobilization process.

However, this notional transformation in itself does not guarantee the realization of the new mobilization project, and the whole situation in the realm of power remains ambiguous. Putin’s regime is just another example of the dominance of individual power in our history, which as before is destined to be transformed when the president steps down.

## *Theme 17*

### **Reforms and The Hierarchy of National Projects**

Vladimir Putin's presidency will be remembered for a number of stabilization measures that prevented the total atomization of national institutions, as well as for efforts to effectively reform political, economic and social aspects of life. The reforms were aimed at coordinating the market economy and government policy, neutralizing the negative consequences of privatization, promoting the social components of government policy, and closing the divides in our society and providing for its further consolidation. The reform processes, whether individual special-purpose projects or large-scale national projects, have embraced different sides of Russian life, bringing hundreds of modernization programs under one roof.

Originally, reforms were planned as a complex measures to influence the most difficult areas in crisis and to develop some legislative and organizational basics that had not been introduced to the fundamental principles of Russian state organization in the 1990s. The campaign required particular social and political conditions. It could not be engaged in the atmosphere of deep crisis that characterised the country during last months of Yeltsin's presidency. That's why Putin did not declare any reform projects during his first year as president and took only the most necessary steps to establish order at a basic level, to terminate the most immediate threats to national security and to provide for the territorial integrity of the country. As a result, in general the situation stabilized during the year 2000. The morale of society significantly improved. The need to undertake long-term state development projects was becoming more and more evident. In this atmosphere the government started implementing priority reforms. All the reforms of Putin's presidency can be divided into two groups: centralization reforms (all aimed at constructing a vertical power

structure, though they influenced different aspects of social life) and streamlining reforms (implemented to improve the State machinery, to simplify certain institutions and to make them more efficient at the same time).

On May 13, 2000 Putin proposed the creation of seven federal districts, appointing a president's plenipotentiary representative to each of them. This increased the president's influence over regional leaders. The Kremlin got an opportunity to react to the events in the regions of Russian Federation more rapidly. On May 17, 2000, Putin introduced a new procedure for organizing the Upper Chamber of the legislature. This initiative was soon called a reform of the Federation Council. The president was concerned about the evident abuse of fundamental legal principles: the Federation Council consisted of governors, who represented executive power in their regions while being members of a legislative structure on the federal level. The president could not help describing the situation as totally absurd. He proposed a new procedure: the governors were to send their representatives to the Federation Council.

At the same time the president announced that he would dismiss heads of regions and regional legislative assemblies that passed any legislation contradicting federal laws. He affirmed his right to dismiss the head of any region, but he guaranteed that these authorities had the same right towards authorities of lower levels.

The public announcement of certain measures concerning cooperation between the center and the regions became the first important step in the sequence of Kremlin reforms, aimed first of all at reducing the excessive power of regional leaders.

The idea of consolidating Russia's regions was another element of the campaign for national centralization and for minimizing the socio-economic gap in the development of Russian regions. This idea also emerged in the Kremlin in 2000, but only in 2003 was it backed up by some practical organizational measures: a referendum on consolidation of the Perm region with Komi-Permiatskii autonomous district was held (the consolidation itself was formally announced two years later). In October 2005, a referendum on the consolidation of Kamchatskaya region and Koryakskii autonomous district took place (on July 1, 2007, the united Kamchatskii krai appeared on the map of the Russian Federation).

In 2004, however, Putin made the most decisive step to limit the omnipotence of regional leaders: after the Beslan terrorist act in North Ossetia he introduced to the State Duma a draft law on the abolition of gubernatorial elections (September 27). The law swiftly passed all legislative levels and was ratified before the end of the year with almost no objections from governors. This measure promoted administrative, territorial and political centralization of the country. The abolition of gubernatorial elections was the final step in the transfer of power and complete responsibility to the president.

Meanwhile centralization of the political sphere went on; the party sector in particular underwent some changes. A number of amendments were introduced into the law “On political parties”: the minimum number of party members was set at fifty thousand; every party was to have offices in at least fifty regions of the country with the minimum of 500 people in each office. Later on a seven percent barrier for federal and regional legislative elections was introduced. The reform was opposed by the opposition as an abuse of democracy, though in fact it was a strategic centralization to minimize political risks. Besides their primary objectives, these steps were also taken to streamline the reforms in a context in which the country was virtually running on autopilot.

Tax reform was carried out between 2000 and 2002. In 2001, the tax rate for individuals was reduced to 13%; so-called “turnover taxes” were abrogated. A sliding social tax was introduced (basic rate at 35.6%). In 2002, the tax on organizations’ income was reduced to 24%. Tax reforms did not always result in the simplification of the tax system, though this was the aim stated at the beginning. However, certain groups of tax-payers, small businesses and agricultural producers in particular (special tax treatments were introduced for them), were pleased with the situation.

The state turned its attention not just to the reforms themselves, but also to the modernization of the legal code. On February 1, 2002, the new Labor Code of the Russian Federation replaced the Soviet Labor Code that had existed for almost thirty years.

Thorough reforms of the pension system began in January 2002. A distributive pension payment principle was replaced with an accumulative principle. Three principal federal laws on the national pension plan came into force in December 2003: “On the governmental



Medvedev and Putin

pension plan in the Russian Federation,” “On obligatory pension insurance in the Russian Federation,” and “On labor pensions in the Russian Federation.” Though the reform process was justly criticized in a number of respects, the reform itself proved the government’s intentions to streamline the system and to make it effective.

Significant changes in the education system were planned. The society’s attitude to the matter was ambivalent. On the one hand people regularly criticized any innovation and praised the Soviet system of education. On the other hand everyone agreed that the quality and accessibility of education needed improvement. The reforms, developed by the government for this area, included the introduction of a unified state exam, 12 year school education and other innovations; yet often even those who were to implement and promote these innovations did not understand their essence and benefits.

An effort was made to reform the military sphere – the most conservative part of the state. The necessity of modernization was voiced even in Yeltsin’s time. But nobody was too eager to actually pursue the aims declared. The government’s activity in this area faced serious obstacles. The effort to popularize contract military service made it clear that for the moment it was impossible to staff the army on a

contract basis only. The law on alternative service was a result of a compromise between the government, which tried to satisfy the society's demands, and the generals, who were worried about the problem of manning military units. Finally, the idea of alternative civilian service resulted in the adoption of a useless law, which in fact provided no real alternative. The step-by-step reduction of the term of army service should be viewed as a positive measure: the term of military service was reduced to one and a half years from January 1, 2007, and to one year from January 1, 2008. The financial well-being of the military was attended to closely: salaries were significantly increased, and a number of steps to solve housing problems were made.

Russia entered the new century with enormous problems in housing and communal services: 70% of the housing stock was worn-out. The government had to act urgently to save the cities and towns from further destruction. However, it didn't manage to invent anything new, merely raising prices and introducing "market economy rules in the sphere of housing and communal services." A special effort was made to dismantle the state housing monopoly and to attract private businesses: in particular, the so called associations of housing proprietors (AHP) were created. Government innovations were interpreted by the society in a very skeptical way – the government was seen as trying to transfer responsibility for housing and the communal sphere to private individuals.

Finally, the greatest (though not the most controversial) failure was the government's administrative reform. The president's decree "On the system and structure of federal executive bodies" was issued on March 9, 2004. It stipulated a three-level structure of government and divided powers among federal ministries, services and agencies. The administrative reform consisted of operational and institutional parts. The operational component implied a substantial reduction of excessive functions of the administrative apparatus, the streamlining of necessary government functions, structuring and systematizing executive bodies to make them correspond to their new functions so that any conflicts of interests between these bodies were eliminated. The institutional component of the reform provided for establishing schemes that would prevent the emergence of new excessive functions, for supporting procedures for carrying out necessary functions, for providing access to official information, and for promoting standards of quality

for state services. The reforms were mainly based on western administrative models, which accounted for the decision to cancel numerous posts of deputy head of government. After a time, however, Putin had to give up some principles of the reform and to appoint several assistants to the prime-minister. Even advocates of the reform, let alone its adversaries, were forced to admit that the streamlining processes were stagnating. Administrative schemes, effective and convenient in theory, got completely paralyzed in the bog of Russian red tape.

Most Russians feel that Putin's reforms were positive as a whole. For the first time in a decade, political leaders touched upon the development of Russia and measures to prevent its total destruction. It was proof that the problems of maintaining integrity and counteracting the negative tendencies of decentralization were left behind. At the same time, the reforms were a failure to a certain extent. On the whole the attempts to streamline the state were marked by numerous errors and defects. But that is not the main reason for their lack of effectiveness. If we speak about centralization reforms, Putin managed to force their implementation through his own authority and with the people's support; regional and federal bureaucracy had to yield because it had no choice in the matter of governing the country. On the other hand, the extremely extensive and clumsy, though very resilient, bureaucratic apparatus had far more freedom in the matter of introducing streamlining reforms. When it came to optimizing the efficiency of the state, it was Putin who had no choice: he could but seek the support of the old bureaucratic structures. The administrative reform turned out to be the most absurd one, for the president tried to reform the administrative apparatus with the help of the administration apparatus. We can suppose that so-called national projects were designed especially to avoid the traditional methods of reform, as well as the old and rigid bureaucratic structures.

The second term of Vladimir Putin was marked by a new term – “national projects” – that appeared in the Russian political vocabulary. The notion first emerged in the president's address to the Federal Assembly in 2004, but only a year and a half later would we see some practical administrative steps. Once urgent stabilization efforts had their positive effect, the necessity of the next stage of the country's development became evident. During this stage, new ideals, targets and strategic aims started to appear in the sphere of ideology. They were



The “Housing” National Project

indispensable in order to eliminate the ideological vacuum created by the absence of purpose and the senselessness that the collapse of the communist system caused. The country needed a common cause that could unite people, rationalize and inspire the society at the same time. Searching for pragmatic solutions, the government tried to do the impossible: to combine the ideal with the practical, tactics with strategy. The national projects were introduced as a result of this effort.

The synthetic nature of national projects is reflected in the name itself. They represent very concrete, quite realistic and clear-cut socio-economic anti-crisis policies. But the “national” part makes them historically and ideologically grounded rather than merely functional.

It is impossible to analyze key national projects separately from the political context of the time, when they were presented to Russian society. Very unpopular reforms introduced by the government in early 2005 (mostly the replacement of social benefits with cash compensation) provoked a serious negative reaction among people. From January 2005, the press was flooded with reports on regular protests of retired people, who were greatly dissatisfied by the new law. Up to 75% of population disapproved of the “replacement of social ben-



efits with money compensation” according to surveys; 38% of disappointed citizens thought that the law was an act of thievery. Elderly citizens were the most skeptical about the reform. Half of people over sixty who took part in the surveys considered that the law was aimed against the people. Despite urgent “therapeutic propaganda” efforts made by television channels, the wave of people’s protest was rising daily. Retired people in Saint-Petersburg and other cities and towns of Russia held meetings and blocked vital roads and highways. Experts nicknamed the phenomenon “the grey revolution,” though all these events did not have any traits of revolution at all. This term, however, was not mere wordplay. To see the grounds for this point of view it is necessary to analyze the political situation in the CIS countries.

In fact, during 2004 and the first half of 2005 Russian society, especially the elite, was expecting a so called “velvet revolution.” The news of events in post-Soviet states fuelled these expectations. In Georgia, a pro-government party “For the New Georgia” won parliamentary elections on November 2, 2003. Opposition forces, guided by Mikhail Saakashvili, refused to accept defeat; mass meetings of support went on for several days. The State Department of the USA officially supported the protesters on November 21. On the night of the of November 22/23, Eduard Shevardnadze resigned from the presidency. Thus the first “velvet revolution” of the 21<sup>st</sup> took place in the CIS.

The second one was soon to follow. A year later, on November 21, 2004, Viktor Yanukovitch won the second round of presidential elections in Ukraine. His rival Viktor Yushenko claimed mass falsifications during the elections; opposition forces placed their tents on Independence Square. On December 26, presidential elections were held for the second time. This time the opposition candidate Viktor Yushenko won the race. Despite numerous protests filed by Yanukovitch, Yushenko was inaugurated the President on January 23. “The Orange Revolution” (symbolized by oranges, orange ties and Yulia Timoshenko’s blond braid) boosted expectations of revolution in Russia.

The coup in Kyrgyzstan, marked by mass turmoil, robbery and bloodshed, was the final proof of this revolutionary tendency. Revolutions in the CIS and the atmosphere of protest in the country itself were sufficient to convince many people that the same events were inevitable (or at least possible) in Russia. Some analysts predicted it could happen in the summer of 2005. Evidently the government

decided to take a number of preventative steps in order to neutralize dangerous tensions and possible risks. National projects were the key part of this policy.

But the threat was clearly overestimated. The situation in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan was far worse than in Russia, moreover it was completely different. The poor state of the socio-economic sphere was only the tip of the iceberg: political disturbances in the CIS were provoked by the fact that people were dissatisfied with the government's policy and tired of lawlessness and instability. The countries' leaders lost the people's trust, who thought that they were guided by their own interests rather than by the interests of the nation. The events of 2003–2005 were a result of people's distrust of the government, and the consequence of their desire to replace it with a better one. All this was impossible in Russia in 2005 for one simple reason: 70% of the population trusted the president of the country. This was the advantage of the personalization of power that is so characteristic of our political culture. The constantly high rating of Putin saved the government from a vote of confidence, and also saved Russia from possible critical disturbances. If the country had not had such a popular leader, no social investments (like national projects or a simple increase of social spending) would have protected it from the development of a revolutionary atmosphere.

Finally, the launch of national projects also had an important internal policy dimension. Vladimir Putin made a definitive official statement in spring 2005: he was not going to run for the presidency for a third time, which would have necessitated changing the constitution. That moment can be considered the official start of the "race of successors." Though it was not before late 2005 that first discussions of successors could be heard, Vladimir Putin had to start dealing with this matter long before. By the autumn of 2005, initial preliminary schemes for a "soft" transfer of power had been worked out and were ready for use. National projects were designed as large scale programs with huge financial support and were broadly covered in the mass media. They targeted the most vital problems of society and made the person in charge of the process an important administrative figure highly popular with the people. Thus, besides everything else, national projects were one of possible solutions for the "2008 problem," which is another point in the list of the practical aims of the projects.

National projects were officially announced on September 5, 2005. The Council for the Implementation of Priority National Projects was organized under a presidential decree and headed personally by Vladimir Putin. The decree on the organization of the council contained a list of its functions: to provide cooperation among federal government bodies, regional government bodies, public, scientific and other types of organizations. The Council was a consultative body attached to the president and thus became another lever of power controlled directly by the president.

The number of projects was originally set at four, which is stated by the presidential decree of October 21, 2005: “Health,” “Education,” “Accessible and comfortable housing for Russian citizens,” and “The Development of the Agro-industrial complex.” But in the address to the Federal Assembly on May 10, 2006, Putin declared that there was a threat of a demographic catastrophe in Russia, and a fifth national project emerged in the summer 2006. Necessary amendments were made in corresponding documents and the Council for National Projects was renamed “The Presidential Council for the Implementation of National Projects and Demographic Policy.” Yet though the fifth national project was declared, it wasn’t structurally organized, because the morbidity level depends substantially on the quality of the health-care system. Likewise, the birth rate depends a great deal on the availability of housing and social grants that can provide accessible and free education for everyone.

The implementation of national projects began on January 1, 2006. The character of the process on the whole as well as particular problems of each of the projects aroused many questions. The fact that it was difficult to actually match national projects with corresponding budget expenditures was fairly criticized. It was not clear what made the national projects new or distinctly separate since they represented merely an additional part of budget expenditures. Besides, new bureaucratic structures were organized to supervise the expenditures, which further increased the already excessive numbers of Russian functionaries. It obviously contradicted the course set by Vladimir Putin for his reforms, the administrative reform in particular, the most grandiose and ultimately unsuccessful one. The vast network of additional administrative bodies that were charged with the implementation of the national projects was an abuse of the admin-

istrative reform principle, which implied a streamlining of the staff of state functionaries. Alongside functionaries supervising agriculture, housing construction, healthcare and education, new functionaries responsible for the same things were employed. The former acted under standard administrative procedures, while the latter acted under the new “project” schemes.

Few people saw the difference between the old and the new administration apparatus. Many people noted the fact that Dmitrii Medvedev’s apparatus simply started to work exclusively with national projects. Since he was first deputy prime-minister, it was inevitable that his team became a “quasi-government” within the federal government. The work of the latter could not remain intact, and it suffered a reduction in effectiveness and quality.

According to economists every national project required a corresponding organizational and legal form of financial management. The budget would disappear within different bureaucratic levels unless every penny was counted and direct personal responsibility for the loss of money was assigned. Such a situation would simply annihilate the national projects. Instead of the existing method of budget allocation, which nobody could call transparent, some analysts proposed the creation specialized joint-stock companies for each project. Legal entities engaged in a project would become officially and transparently incorporated in these companies.

National projects were criticized for the absence of strategic planning and conceptual coherence. They were supposed to be integrated into the country’s economic development for several decades ahead, if the authors wanted to achieve important social and economic progress and not just to produce a populist effect or to have their political status enhanced. But instead, the projects were mere adjustments to the state administrative system. No one can provide a reasonable explanation of the fact that there were four projects, not five or six: why not 200 different projects with clear and definite aims that would clarify the tiniest administrative details, adjust the budget to within a rouble, and designate those responsible for unfulfilled or excessive expenditures.

Lastly, the main drawback of the national projects consisted in their unprofitable character, because they duplicated existing budget expenditures. And it was necessary to attract big and middle-size en-

terprises to the process. No doubt, the state would have to give sound guarantees and stimulate investment. Nobody would get an instant profit, but when long-term projects are considered, there exist a great number of options and opportunities to earn profits. The market for new inventions is a perfect example. It requires large scale funding, but over time investors can acquire inexhaustible sources of income. By simply patenting an invention one can recoup part of the capital



expended. Following this scheme, American software development corporations have monopolized the market and now earn exorbitant amounts of money. But the state has taken up the great burden of social expenditures, which can be fairly well supported thanks to the constant income from the export of hydrocarbons. But it is impossible to constantly finance the unprofitable social sphere with the help of highly profitable economic sectors, as even these sectors are not an infinite source of money.

Supplying schools with computers and software involves using American software, and Dmitrii Medvedev backs this practice. In practice this means investing directly in particular American corporations, but an alternative to this would be a campaign to attract ma-

major Russian companies to invest in the development of national software. Russian programmers would get jobs, they would not have to go abroad to make a living. The software prices would also go down in the long term, because it's always cheaper to import technologies than to develop one's own products. Finally, it would reduce Russian dependence on foreign information technologies. Moreover, huge capital has accrued in the Stabilization Fund. Before these financial resources disappear (as is the tendency for all budget and other state funds), it is necessary to make some real use of them. Money must work in the economy. It is unacceptable to passively keep it as a national reserve or in foreign bank accounts: it simply does not work there.

The best thing to do would be to make national projects a distinct part of the government, to form a structured administrative body instead of having it under the exclusive control of a single person. This would greatly multiply the effectiveness of national projects, because they would be free from the patronage of the government and corresponding ministries.

All these drawbacks made experts doubtful about the successful future of national projects, at least if their conceptualization remained unchanged. There has been a lot of criticism of specific aspects of national projects concerning their regional and industrial components.

This was the state of the priority national project "Health" on October 21, 2005: the project consisted of two programs: "the development of primary medical care" and "High-tech medical treatment for people." The first program was aimed at increasing the qualification of district doctors, reducing the patient load of primary care doctors, reducing the time required for diagnostics results in health centers to one week, and renewing emergency vehicles. These programs were aimed at definite targets: to reduce the number of AIDS cases by at least one thousand people a year and to reduce the number of hepatitis B cases threefold. Maternal mortality rates were to be reduced to 29 per 100,000, and the infant mortality rate was to be reduced to 10.6 per thousand live births. Complications and aggravations of chronic conditions were to be reduced by 30%; temporary disability was to be reduced by 20%. Additional training for doctors, an increase in the wages of less senior doctors, and financial support for new mothers (7 thousand rubles) were the most important measures of this program.

The second program of the “Health” project called for building 15 new high-tech medical centers and a fourfold increase in high-tech medical treatment. These noble plans, however, were partially undermined by serious mistakes. For example, through increasing the wages of less experienced doctors, the authors of the project succeeded in attracting new specialists, especially in distant towns, where these professions used to be regarded as absolutely unprofitable and unattractive. But another obvious result was that the balance in the system of payment to doctors was upset. Highly qualified professionals, capable of performing the most complicated operations, received salaries equal to those of less qualified doctors. This did not promote stabilization of the healthcare system as a whole.

The priority national project “Education” included the following programs: “Support and development of the best models of national education,” “Introduction of modern educational technologies,” “The establishment of national universities and world-class business schools,” “Increasing education quality in schools,” and “The development of professional education in the armed forces.”

Massive financial incentives to higher education institutions, to teachers and students, were planned under the first program. It’s worth mentioning that the sum of approximately 10 billion rubles, allocated for national grants in 2006, was doubled in 2007. The second program included measures for computerizing schools and providing internet access. The third program was the most interesting one: in the framework of this program two university centers (30,000 students capacity) in the Southern and Siberian federal districts, and two business-schools (500 students capacity each) in the Moscow region and in Saint-Petersburg were to be founded. Three billion rubles were allocated for these projects in 2006 and 6 billion rubles in 2007. The government regarded these investments as the most important factor in the projects’ development: investments were not simply increased, but were immediately doubled .

Implementation of the priority national project “The development of the Agro-industrial complex” was carried out in three directions: “Increasing livestock breeding,” “Small scale farming promotion” and “Allocation of accessible housing for young specialists (or their families) in rural areas.” The most important measures in these programs were an increase in the number of low rate long-

term loans (up to 8 years) for construction and modernization of cattle-breeding complexes, making transparent the state customs and tariff policy for the importation of meat and technical equipment for cattle-breeding, and organizing the infrastructure of land and construction loans.

Dmitrii Medvedev regularly came to pig farms, cowsheds and poultry farms and was photographed with horses; this was evidently the most significant link in the implementation of this national project.



Problems in this sector were far more numerous than simple and effective solutions. The many intermediaries between farmers and consumers were the worst obstacle. In some regions they acted like the racketeers of the 1990s, making farmers sell their products for practically nothing. The situation in marketplaces was also very difficult, because they were controlled by semi-criminal groups. The government tried to solve this problem by elaborating a new labor migration policy that was fast-tracked on special instruction from the president. But these steps did not prove to be effective regarding the targets set. After all, it is impossible to revitalize a sector suffering from a labor shortage through investments or “restoring order.” Urbanization



is a natural process and farming is a priori a loss-making sector in all countries (even in those with the highest standard of living).

But the national project “Accessible and comfortable housing for Russian citizens” appeared to be the most difficult, complicated and controversial. Unlike other projects, this one was very transparent and perceptible, its results (or their absence) could be clearly seen: every citizen can easily assess the effectiveness of communal services, the accessibility of mortgages and his or her own capability to pay them. This national project consisted of four programs: “Promotion of affordable housing,” “Increase of mortgage loans,” “Expansion of housing construction and modernization of the communal housing infrastructure,” and “Fulfillment of state obligations for housing allocation to citizens as determined by federal law.” An important fact is that these aims were to be met during the first stage of the project’s implementation, which was to end in 2007 (there is no information on the second stage). Thus, by the parliamentary elections of 2007 and the presidential election of 2008, reforms and subsidies in this domain should be a demonstrative illustration of the effectiveness of the national projects. If these aims have not been achieved, national projects will have gained a bad reputation for being inconsistent.

New families in particular were to get subsidies for housing or were to have the first mortgage down-payment paid for by the state. The “Modernization of the communal housing infrastructure” program implied that some regions would get financial support from the state for communal infrastructure maintenance and modernization. Allocation of state funds for this sector was to total 10.1 billion dollars in 2006 and 2007.

But implementation of the project raised more questions than it provided solutions. Administrative barriers, hindering the increase in housing supply, were not eliminated. Monopolization of the real estate market in a number of territories, insufficient growth of construction industry and of other related production processes, affected the situation negatively as well. Administrative resources were not sufficient to solve these problems. It was necessary to develop financial legislation, apply tax, financial and loan facilities, and take a number of steps to effectively and profoundly develop the mortgage loan system. Regions and municipal authorities had their own tasks to meet: they should have adapted their legislation to meet new requirements

for land, housing and town planning; they should have substantially increased the number of building lease auctions and boosted town development planning. Land tenure was also a serious problem. According to Dmitrii Medvedev, tenure required intense control: “There is enough land for construction in regions, but it is still not sold openly and according to market principles.” The situation is the result of the activity of extremely corrupt local functionaries: the most expensive lands were sold only to “insiders,” and local elites did not want to lose such an oyster.



Some curious figures were voiced during the All-Russia conference of experts and specialists on national projects. According to “Rosstroii” six percent of Russian people could afford to buy a flat or a house. 22% could buy housing through a mortgage. And 70% of population had no means to improve their living conditions at all, because no bank was willing to give them a loan due to their low income. Moreover, the cost of a square meter was evidently overpriced in many Russian cities. According to experts the overcharge rate was 30–40% for Yekaterinburg in 2006 and much higher in Moscow with its unprecedented prices. Thus, two complementary processes emerged. On the one hand the amount of new housing construction fell from

13% in 2004 to 6% in 2005. On the other hand housing prices rose in Russia by as much as 47%. The combination of these factors made housing even less affordable.

The worst drawback of the “Accessible housing” project was the absence of a population who could afford to buy housing through the schemes developed by the government. It is impossible to completely justify the assertion that the current authorities rely on the middle class, which emerged during Putin’s tenure. It is true that the Russian economy has stabilized in the past seven years; pensions, salaries and social allowances have been increased. People’s living conditions have improved and, comparing their current financial situation to that of the 1990s, they were eager to declare themselves members of the middle class. But the truth is that the middle class in Russia is a fiction. Compared to the Western European middle class, Russian people live below the poverty line. The western middle class is a genuine support for the state: the standard of living meets people’s demands. One can afford to buy almost everything through a highly developed credit system (from a car to a flat). And what is more, one can feel assured that he or she will be able to pay back the loans. In Russia people who consider themselves members of the middle class can not afford a loan for either a car or a flat, thus it is somewhat too early to refer to them as group that solidly supports the government. This is the basic, fundamental problem faced in implementing the national projects. These projects could well become a total waste of financial and administrative resources, for the simple reason that the people will not be able to benefit from them.

The tasks set by the government, which the national projects are supposed to accomplish, are in fact unique projects of great magnitude; nothing of the kind has been seen in the past decades. The last projects of this scale took place during the zenith of the Soviet Union’s power, when Khrushchev, for example, started the reclamation of virgin lands and thousands of citizens of the USSR left cities and towns for abandoned rural territories. The Baikal Amur Mainline (BAM) was another project of similar dimensions. But these were concrete one-time mobilization projects, while the national projects are long-term investment programs that cover the most difficult sectors of the economy.

Russia has never been good at earning money and has always spent it unwisely. That is why these projects are also a pilot program that permits the government to learn how to spend properly gigantic amounts of money that have come unexpectedly to the budget. Dmitrii Medvedev confirmed it officially in these words: “If we want to discuss this subject seriously, on a national level, I can not say that



our state has ever been good at spending money.” He described the national projects as “a training ground where the state must learn to spend money effectively.” It is sad to realize that for the year and a half since the launch date of the national projects the government has been trying to optimize administrative resources and to find the best way to meet the targets. And it is highly probable that this learning period will continue for quite a long period of time.

It is also necessary to admit that the national projects, designed to solve current social problems, became part of the election campaign of the successor to President Vladimir Putin. Dmitrii Medvedev has traveled all over the country. He was accompanied by many reporters; he opened computer classes, held online meetings with regional authorities responsible for implementing some parts of the national

projects. This is the proof of the extreme pragmatism of the Kremlin: it accompanies every strategic action with tactical steps and links all necessary tactical measures with strategic tasks. We can judge the importance attached by Putin to the national projects by the fact that he trusted them to the hands of his closest assistant, who proved more than once his loyalty and professionalism in the post of head of the presidential administration.

The national projects have reflected the basic principle of Vladimir Putin's model of governing the country, which contradicts his rhetoric but that has nevertheless become evident in recent years. This principle was laconically formulated by historian Nikolay Karamsin in his *Notes on Ancient and New Russia*: "Not forms, but people are important." To speak more precisely, not a single large scale project in modern Russia has been launched without choosing a certain person to execute the project and, subsequently, every project was supported by a corresponding ideological argument. Naturally, creating a good "launching pad" for one of Putin's possible successors was not the least important aims of the national projects. But these projects provide an important analytical basis for examining the current state of society. It would not be wise to assess national projects only on the basis of the concrete results achieved during the first two years of their existence.

On the one hand, by working actively with all the information provided by the progress of the national projects, the government has managed to acquire a clear image of a sphere for which it did not usually have enough resources or attention. On the other hand, all of the initiatives indispensable for a substantial improvement of the living conditions of most Russian people were precisely and clearly outlined, and identified as the most urgent steps to take.

Finally, the national projects were a belated, but still necessary measure to complete the Kremlin's consolidation of power. Only essential social problems have the potential to so tightly unite different levels of the administrative apparatus, the representative structures of the federal government, local government, social organizations and corporate institutions. They were indispensable for optimizing communication within the power structure and supporting the further development of the state. Finally, all of this was done in order to increase the state's effectiveness, since at this point in history the state is the only actor that can serve as the guarantor of Russia's future.

## SPECIAL THEMES

### *Theme 18*

#### **Locating of the Revolutionary Period of 1917 in Russian Historical Memory**

Revolutions are fundamental objects of historical memory. Because memory is essentially a spatial phenomenon, a *special thinking* must be used to represent its workings. Thus we should approach the study of how society remembers and what it remembers using the following analogy: social memory snatches hidden objects from the darkness of the past; Power can, then, be envisioned as the ability select on which objects in time's depths light should be focused. This power, habitually, is wielded by the State, which enjoys a monopoly on the ability to diminish or amplify an illuminated zone, regulate the brightness of the "projector," as well as the light's direction and intensity. This method of illuminating the past can be termed *the memory project*; its purpose is to create and legitimate an authority structure in a particular period of time.

Authority, thus, has the power to shape not only the present or the future, but also the past. No direct access to The Past is possible; rather there are only desired perceptions, which can be actively manipulated. In practice, the collectively remembered past it actively and continuously re-sculpted to master and dominate the future. The memory project divides the past into two parts: actualized (that is, using our analogy, "illuminated") and forgotten, either because of purposeful ignorance or subconscious sublimation. As a consequence, the actualized aspects of the past are highly ambiguous. In order to untangle this ambiguity, two further concepts must be introduced: *the cultural hero of memory* and *the memory subject*.

*The cultural hero of memory* is an icon, which represents an individual or a personified collection of individuals who possess certain

common attributes. In the memory project, the cultural hero plays a central role in formulating an ideological context because the hero is presented as that creative force which brings the actualized past into being. But, even the most scrupulous, authoritarian memory project must occasionally focus on other forgotten or sublimated actors, thereby allowing these other memory subjects to get between the light and the dominant cultural hero. These marginalized subjects never fit into the dominant script of the memory project. Therefore, the state, exploiting its power to focus light, tries to minimize the role and importance of the sublimated subjects.

The result is an ineluctable confrontation between the cultural hero and memory subjects. In actual reality, this confrontation may have never even existed, but this, in the end; this has little relevance for the memory project. The cultural heroes must legitimate their exclusive status, while the memory subjects fight for their right to historical existence. The state ideology seeks to relegate unwanted historical subjects to an area of *anti-memory*, which receive as little “light” as possible. This area is a kind of mental prison, designed to deny undesirable historical subjects from invading dominant narratives and from impede the hegemonic perception of a cultural hero’s actions.

Thus, the analysis of interaction between authority structures and memory space furthers and expands the examination of the contemporary political process. The following sections of this essay consider some examples various aspects of the revolutions of 1917 have been forgotten, remembered and rewoven.

In general, central actors wrote little about the revolution while it was taking place; instead they fought for its realization. Only later does the revolution become a subject of discourse, endlessly contextualized and re-contextualized. Gradually these discursive texts turn into “memories” and dates become “anniversaries.”

Strangely, the passing of every tenth anniversary of the October Revolution was supposed to bring ever new insight into the “secret” of the Russian revolutions. The revolution’s “secret” power was connected to a passion for extremes during the overthrow or assumption of power; faith in the ability to overcome any, seemingly, insurmountable obstacle quickly by the force of will; belief in the efficacy of sudden transformations and breakthrough; and the idea that the

undesirable past could be rapidly swept away. Thus the first ten-year anniversary of the revolution in 1927 inaugurated the five-year plan. During the next anniversary, in 1937, the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) decided on to remove all obstacles to the development of communism by creating reliable and "new" people with the help of massive repressive operations. The 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 1947 was commemorated by the "Third Program" of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which stipulated building communism in the next 20–30 years. The 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary was directly associated with the country's "breakthrough" into outer space. For the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary the state attempted to reinvigorate communism with Kosygin's economic reforms. During the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary the party announced the completion of "developed socialism," the basis for a new "breakthrough." The 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary, the last one celebrated by the USSR, was attached to the slogan of "acceleration." Even in 1997, the authorities continued the memory project by promising ever new panaceas and national "rebirth."

These anniversaries were accompanied by reflections about possible reasons why there had been deviations from the cultural hero's initial concepts. But most importantly, it was a time when concrete people or groups were identified as "wreckers" of the revolution. In 1927, Lev Trotsky declared that it was Josef Stalin who was the "grave-digger of the party and revolution." After visiting Moscow in 1937, the legendary anti-fascist spy Leopold Trepper laid the blame upon those who, supporting Stalin's sinister machine, "extinguished October's bright glow in dusky prison cells." Later, the 60s generation blamed Stalinists. Finally the postmodernists have blames the 60s generation for resisting totalitarianism only from inside, instead of stepping outside of its standards and structures.

Now Great October is gone. Or is it? Perhaps, it has turned into a specter who, like the ghost of Hamlet's father, continues to haunt us, never about the reality of its death.

The first decade heavily reeducated the Russian people. Middle-age and older generations went through the brutal experience of the Civil War, War Communism, and the hunger of 1921–1922. But in the countryside, there were younger generations who knew little about social and national oppression; in schools they had learned only about "God, Tsar and the Motherland." Moreover, 77% of citizens in towns



and 3,3% of citizens in villages over 18 years old were deprived of the right to vote; these were the NEP-men, the kulaks, religious leaders, former landlords, former Tsarist bureaucrats, White army officers, Tsarist police and gendarmerie agents. Unemployed people amounted to one million and their numbers were steadily increasing. The countries misfortunes could no longer be blamed on “Tsarism and the Entente.” Differences among the former Empire’s regional cultures and religions now determined the paths to a collective memory about the revolution.

Comparisons between the new and old regime dominated the new memory project and the confrontation of cultural heroes and subjects in the memory space. The new regime fostered literacy among 10 million adults and constructed giant industrial complexes. But new problems and contradictions also had their roots in Soviet reality. The notorious “Astrakhan’s case” and “Smolensk’s abscess” provided evidence about real corruption in the state machine and the degeneration of the soviet bureaucracy. The constant indoctrination of workers concerning their role in the vanguard often led to “proletarian peacockery.”

The “proper” memory of the revolution soon caused a bitter struggle. The 12<sup>th</sup> of March was abolished as a holiday in honor of the February Revolution. Kadet, Menshevik and emigrant versions of the Great October Revolution were being excoriated from printed accounts. The OGPU (Unified State Political Department) helped enforce way the revolutions were remembered by fighting any nonconformists. The police members hunted down young activists from the workers’ ar-



“The will be socialist Russia out of NEP Russia!” (Lenin)



The famous poster "Socialist Construction"

eas who picketed in the evenings with self-made posters "Back to Lenin" and "Let's Fulfill Lenin's Will." For these workers Lenin was neither a mythic figure nor the name of the revolution city Leningrad, but the criterion of loyalty to the Great October principles.

Judging by the official images of the 30s, by the 20<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Great October Revolution, the Soviet people were at peace because class foes had been liquidated. Economically, the USSR held the second place for gross domestic product. In 1937, there was a

record harvest. Compulsory general elementary education had been introduced. The whole world was astounded by the flights of Valeriy Chkalov and Mikhail Gromov from Moscow to America. The first soviet research station was opened in the North Pole. The essence of these achievements was captured in Vera Mukhina's gigantic sculpture "Worker and Kolkhoz Woman" which topped the Soviet pavilion at the World Exhibition in Paris.

The memory project of the Great October was now being designed according to the dictates of Stalinism. The main topic of the film *Lenin in the October* by Alexey Kapler and Mikhail Romm was the close teamwork between Lenin to Stalin. Notably, according to this movie, after returning from his exile in Finland, Lenin implausibly rushes to first meet with comrade Stalin. Even, Nadezhda Krupskaya, his wife, must contents herself with only a letter from Lenin. Mikhail Koltsov captured the new mood, claiming that "Stalin can be seen even from Madrid. He is seen by the whole world, in every place where people want to live better." The essence of the Great Revolution holiday now became "we vote for Stalin and the world votes for us."

On the 7<sup>th</sup> of November, the cosmic Stalin reviewed the military parade and demonstration commemorating the Revolution. Despite bad weather, the memorial apotheosis was became a spectacular flight demonstration, performed by over three hundred airplanes. The words “Twenty years of the USSR” were drawn in the sky. At this demonstration a huge “human wheel” consisting of constantly somersaulting people symbolized socialism perfection. In a group photograph of the Political Bureau members staying at Lenin’s Mausoleum, features a smiling Nikolay Ezhov in the center and more to the right Stalin himself. For four years, mass repressions had been conducted under Ezhov’s supervisory control in order to finally do away with the problem of domestic enemies and improper memories.

The Grand Victory in the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) illuminated anew the revolution ideals and removed all class insults and all other prewar and war authority blunders and mistakes. Even Russian political emigrant acknowledged the Great October Socialist Revolution as an accomplished reality. However, two years after the Patriotic War, secret internal reports concerning about public sentiments reflected a growing public indifference towards politics. During the Jubilee year the situation was extremely dire. Forced bread collections, left villages without food, while the state’s unwillingness to open food reserves provoked famine (1946–1947). A total of 100 million people in the USSR went hungry and two million people died of starvation. These facts were hidden by the Soviet authorities. Damocles’ sword of a new mass terror was hanging over those who were looking for the truth and who were comparing the real life with the memory about the initial ideals of the Great October.



“The new Five-Year Plan (1946-50) is a plan of great construction!”

For example, a youth group from Voronezh “Revolution Line Union” questioned the state version of history. Terror alone was unlikely to unite the post-war society. A new formula of the Great Goal was needed. Stalin’s coworkers understood this; they found a new goal in the future communist society to be established in the next 20 years. But this project for a new party program was never realized and the XIX party Congress was delayed.

After Stalin’s death in 1953, the danger a party revolt and return to a Stalinism program darkened not only preparations for the 40<sup>th</sup> Great October Socialist Revolution Anniversary, but even the real successes of the XX party Congress. The commemorative program for celebrating the Revolution of 1917 included an increase in wages, a two-hour reduction in the work day on pre-holiday days, and long vacations for pregnant women. Kazakhstan produced a record billion poods (or 16 kg) of bread. The first atomic icebreaker “Lenin” and the first satellite “sputnik” seemed to offer new legitimacy to the Soviet regime.

However, the attempt of the Central Committee Presidium’s members to displace Nikita Khrushchev in June 1945 created new tumults; people no longer believed party slogans. At the Moscow Festival of Youth students showed an ever increasing interest towards western lifestyles. Many clandestine youth groups were inspired by the XX party Congress and the Hungarian uprising of 1956. For these youths, the 40<sup>th</sup> Great October Socialist Revolution Anniversary encouraged the slogan “Let’s defend the course of the XX party Congress.” In its resolutions, Soviet youth sought the return to the ideals of the Revolution.

Petr Vail and Alexander Genis saw in the Thaw such notions as “sincerity,” “personality” and “truth” which symbolized the late 60s. The words “Native land,” “nature” and “nation” (RODina, priRODa, and naROD) took on new, powerful meanings. In Russian all these words have the same root “rod” (having connotations of tribe, birth, and nation). This led to new conceptions about the memory of the NATION. The Soviet people, “a community twisted round the common idea and aim,” were divided into nationalities. On the eve of the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary many writers and literary critics, especially those connected to the journal *Molodaya Gvardiya* (“Young Guard”), suggested that the need of synthesizing czarist-era spiritual values with

the Great Socialist Revolution which was now being dubbed the Great “Russian” Revolution (the “great-Russians,” being an ethnic group separate from the Ukraine, Jews, Latvians and other minorities). The problem for these Russian nationalists was that the Revolution gave too much power to national minorities, annihilated too many “national” traditions, and curbed the activity of the monarchs, military leaders and the Russian Orthodox Church. According to “Rusists,” the authentic turning point occurred only after 1937.

This new ideology was supported by two other tendencies. Firstly, the “Great Patriotic War” received a cult-like status which propped up memories of Great October. Secondly, a year before the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Revolution, historians Evgeny Zhukov, Vladimir Trukhanovskiy and Victor Shunkov claimed in the newspaper *Pravda* that there had been no “period of the personality cult;” this understanding was un-Marxist, subjective and scientifically groundless.

It could be claimed that the only realistic memory of Great October were permitted to be revived only in one place – in the theatre *Sovremennik* (“The Contemporary”). It staged the play “Bolsheviks” by Mikhail Shatrov. The characters’ words were notable: “We don’t need professional punishers;” “Authentic socialism cannot be imposed with rifles and bayonets.”

The scale of the 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary celebrations surpassed all previous anniversaries of the revolution. Under the slogan “Great October’s Victory is the main event of the XX century” the USSR attained other victories, such as the “constructions of the century,” the Baikal-



“The people and the Party are united

Amur Mainline (BAM), the Atommash (nuclear industry equipment plant), KamAZ (car factory), and the creation of the supersonic passenger aircraft “TU-144.” However, the main theses of Leonid Brezhnev’s report “We were the first in the world to create developed socialist society, we are the first to build communism” were not widely accepted. Real income had dramatically fallen, the disproportion between the demand and supply grew. Profiteering was reaching an unprecedented scale. These catastrophic economic tendencies coincided with instability and tension on the international front and the growing possibility of a nuclear conflict. Soviet insiders expected a war with Communist China.

Unbelievably, after 20 years Shatrov again brought Efremov (at the Moscow Art Theater) the revolutionary play “Further... further... further!” Discussing the play Oleg Efremov claimed: “I understand clearly the main idea of the play. As long as we don’t say honestly in public what impeded our movement, as long as we don’t clarify the causes of our mistakes, misfortunes and tragedies, we can’t go ahead.” The space of memory about the Great October started being reorganized. Historians’ and writers’ discussions destroyed the visualization of the monolithic Bolsheviks’ unity in October 1917. Outdated approaches were criticized.

An absolutely new construction of the attitude towards the past emerged parallel with the new lightening of the revolution memory space. Timur Kibirov pointed out the potential dangers, which were rooted in “historical consciousness.” There was a danger that this consciousness could turn out to be nothing but an empty set of stereotypes open to mass manipulation. The “60s generation” now became the object of presumptuous criticism; it was maintained that Soviet intellectuals were dominated by infantilism, by careerist posturing, by the supposed right to a moral and cultural monopoly, but also by romantic “messianism.” However, the “Children of the XX party Congress” were eager to “correct and teach the authorities” and to “finish building socialism.” For the new General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev the anniversary was that “memory moment” and “reflection moment” that focused the past on the painful points of the present. After their elimination the Soviet Union could continue on the road towards “a new world – the world of communism” and will never “be detoured!”

Could we imagine that ten years later “communism” would become a swear-word, and the Revolution would gain a whimsical, but official name – the “Day of Reconciliation and Agreement?” The new state authority, which had survived the first revolutionary wave (1991–1993) and had won the presidential elections of 1996 with the help of the oligarchs’ money, was now vehemently destroying the space of the memory of the Revolution. Under Yeltsin, Victory Day remained the holiday of any spiritual significance for the majority of Russians. It was this holiday that represented the “self-generating” value for nationhood. Thus the 9<sup>th</sup> of May became the new 7<sup>th</sup> of November. Even then, surveys of public opinion demonstrated that in 1997, the 7<sup>th</sup> of November didn’t have relevance for 20% of those questioned; for 22% this holiday was only an extra day off, 47% still called this day the “Great Revolution Holiday,” and 8% considered it to be a commemoration of a tragedy.

It turned out that at the end of the XX century only communist parties needed the Great October Socialist Revolution. On the 7<sup>th</sup> of November, they managed to gather on the Palace square, “the cradle of the revolution.” There were over 35,000 people, consisting of representatives from more than 50 parties and movements from the Commonwealth of the Independent States, from Baltic countries and from western European countries. “Democratic” parties and movements of St. Petersburg (such as Yabloko) ignored this anniversary date. Near the Kazan Cathedral, only 40 people protested the anniversary, displaying such slogans as “Kill the Communist in Yourself” and “Communists, Repent!”

By the turn of the third millennium, one would imagine that disputes about the revolution would move into the sphere of academic studies that society would arrive at a well-balanced viewpoint on the significance of Great October based on consensus. However, the “Orange revolutions” of 2005 abruptly changed the situation. Profound historical context and rethinking of the Great October experience were needed in order to fully comprehend the nature of twenty-first century revolutions. Firstly, from the viewpoint of revolutionary legitimacy, it must be asked: What is necessary to take power, the will of rebels or legal decisions and elections? Secondly, under what conditions will a revolution fail? Is it that the “Masses” rebel or the leaders lack the will? Perhaps the political elite split has overestimated revo-

lutionary expectations? Thirdly, what are the roles of external factor, such as foreign governments and oligarchs?

Judging by a survey conducted by the center “Public opinion,” people are now confused about the meaning and memory of the revolutions. Russians often confuse the revolutions. The “Monarchy overthrow,” “Provisional government,” “Kerensky,” “Lenin came to power,” “Winter Palace seizure,” “the Soviets’ authority” seem to blend together. Is this a strange memory aberration or just a weakness in historical education in schools? The opinion poll demonstrated how hard it is for Russians to label the revolutions simply “good” or “bad.” For example, February and October Revolutions spurred the following responses: “lawlessness and chaos,” “hunger and ruin,” “nut-house,” “nightmare,” “revolution is chaos,” “I wish we hadn’t had it.” But, at the same time, the same people had other, positive connotations: “struggle for justice,” “the poor started living better after the revolution.” This means that the revolution is perceived by contemporary Russians as both a “social disease” and “the holiday of the oppressed people” with “the original sin” and “holy ideals.” That is how the revolution lives in the modern memory.

So the ghost of the revolution is still roaming Russia. Some thinkers wish for its materialization and even develop schemes to bring it about. These forces are opposed with familiar, but tedious and routine methods – a “smart” policy, involving coordinating and co-opting different segments of the political elite and civil society. It is claimed that one should not be obsessed with ideologies; instead reforms should be machine-like and technologic. Effectiveness should be only criterion of evaluation for the “reforming” process.

This technocratic line of thinking has clamed the Great October’s ghost by explaining that people, who experienced and survived the revolution, understand that they don’t want to live in the epoch of radical changes and pay an excessive price for them anymore, they don’t want to become victims of Utopian ideas. Current Russian political parties cynically use the revolution in their own struggles for power and property or in order to justify inexplicable leaps forward in their platforms, but these parties forget the true origins of the revolution: the abuse of authority and the promise of deliverance from oppression and tyranny.

This is how Great October was killed. And its ghost should be finally set to rest.



## *Theme 19*

### **The Great Victory of 1945 in Historical Memory**

The perception of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, as with the revolutions of 1917, has always depended on shifts in the dominant state of mind in the state and society and on the means to control such perception.

The Victory provided Russia with a powerful burst of energy. The thought that everything would improve was compensation for the grief and losses. The immense international authority achieved by the country in the war years also contributed to the process. The Victory objectively strengthened the potential for social consensus rather than conflict. But it was also possible that a different view of the situation might arise among those who fought in the foreign campaigns of 1944 and 1945, and who saw life in non-Soviet countries. This generation had to be shown its place. Any reflections on the causes and costs of the war were quickly encased in the plaster of Bolshevik dogma.

Official propaganda quickly erased the differences between the two periods of the war, and there were no hints of the numerous cases of treason, inexperience, and cowardice in 1941. Discussions of collaborationism and deportation were forbidden. The face of the Victory was Stalin's face. It was not by chance that every May 9, from 1946 to 1950, the newspaper "Pravda" printed Stalin's huge picture.

"Drunk with victory, presumptuous," the writer Fedor Abramov wrote, thinking about the reasons for the regime's authority after the war. "We have decided that our system is ideal...and were not only reluctant to improve it but, on the contrary, began to dogmatize it." Submission to military commanders was substituted with submission to those who before the Victory had been kept in the shadows on Stalin's order. The new ideological campaign acquired aggressive forms

disguised as the so called fight against cosmopolitanism and adulation of the West.

The authorities did not realize that people often recall hidden and shadowy memories. “The suffering of memory” emerged not because of the suffering itself, but because of the impossibility of explaining it. We should not forget Stalin’s appeal (at a meeting with the voters of the Stalin district of Moscow) to expose the victors to criticism and scrutiny, both for the sake of the business at hand and in order to prevent the victors from being presumptuous and to keep them humble. Involvement in the Victory did not give the right to extraordinary status. This statement was transmitted to all the “levels” of Soviet society. Moreover, the “victors” at the top were treated much more severely than those beneath them. Post-war repression, targeted at top military personnel, showed who the Master and Architect of the Victory *really* was.

Prior to 1953, perceptions of the Victory were paradoxical. Its official glorification existed side by side with its devaluation. The “realm of memory” appeared to be frozen, awaiting the arrival of a new political regime.

The 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the victory was not just the first jubilee, but also the first experience of a purposeful transformation of the realm of memory for new ideological needs. The most acute task was the large scale discrediting of Stalin and, consequently, of the mythology connected with his name. Deep differences between the prewar and postwar leader’s images practically made the year 1945 the framework that defined the Stalinist system. That is why Stalin’s de-sacralization must have inevitably signified the de-sacralization of the Victory.

On the May 9, 1953, two months after Stalin’s death, the words “Victory Day” and “Victory” could not be found in the newspaper headlines and were mentioned only in the Defense Minister’s traditional decree. And the anniversary in May, 1955, when there was less than a year left before the 20th Party Congress, became a dress rehearsal for the “coup” that had already by prepared by Khrushchev: the denunciation of Stalin, accompanied by the retention of the ideological foundations of his rule.

In this situation the memory of the Victory, which was strongly associated with the image of Stalin, was to a certain degree sanitized. The realm of memory was limited to those topics which were either



The War Memorial in Volgograd

only indirectly connected with Stalin, or were not connected with him at all.

From this point of view the scenario of the first Jubilee seemed to be the most appropriate. The main ritual was the solemn congress of

the party and the country's top leadership in the Bolshoi theatre on May 8. During this congress for the first time after Stalin's death new accents were set in the official interpretation of the Victory.

First of all, the main speaker was not someone from the top but merely one of the military functionaries – first deputy defense minister and the commander-in-chief of the Land troops Ivan Konev. He was quite popular and was not much involved in Stalin's mythology of victory as the then defense minister Georgii Zhukov. The report itself was untypical of the rhetoric of the Victory. Only military aspects of the Great Patriotic war and the Victory were mentioned. Thus, the realm of memory was limited to the military side during the celebration.


Secondly, the generalization of Stalin's role sounded very natural within the context of such limitations. The only one of Stalin's titles Konev mentioned was Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Commander-in-Chief. Downgrading the leader to a limited controlling and administrative post was in line with the focus on the purely military aspects of the Victory.

The authorities did their best to make the tenth anniversary of Stalin's victory invisible. The leader recently regarded as the one and only cultural hero now turned to be the person the authorities wished everyone to forget.

Since October 1964, a new era nominally started, but in fact, for several more years people were trying to interpret the inheritance of the "subjectivism and voluntarism" of the Khrushchev years. During numerous conferences held on the eve of the Victory's twentieth anniversary landmark declarations were made: "We've been too obsessed with Stalin cult. The decision of the XX Congress was the right one. But we can not blame everything on dead Stalin"; "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch" by Solzhenitsyn is pathological."

The twentieth anniversary of the Victory was a striking contrast to the first jubilee. In spite of the fact that only six months had passed since Khrushchev was dismissed, the official attitude to the Great Patriotic War received an entirely new interpretation. The holiday's status was totally changed. From now on, giving the official reports of the solemn conferences dedicated to the anniversary landmarks of the Victory became the exclusive prerogative of the leaders.

The realm of memory started to overcome the artificial focus on



Grave of the Unknown Soldier

particular, secondary events and developed rapidly until the memory of the war became part of life itself. In this sense the issuance and circulation of a new ruble coin with the image of the monument to the soldier-liberator in Berlin's Treptov Park, and the proclamation by Brezhnev in his solemn anniversary speech that March 8 would be a day-off seemed equally important events. At the first sight both facts are nothing special. But if we consider these events through the prism of the expansion of the realm of memory into real life, their exceptional significance becomes clear. A ruble was the daily budget of the greater part of the working population. The associative resemblance of the new jubilee ruble with a medal is evident. Such a "medal" becoming literally the coinage of daily life for Soviet citizens did not decrease its ritual status, but on the contrary heroized the daily routine; in a sense, it reinforced the feeling of the Victory on a daily basis.

The fact that March 8 (International Women's Day) became a holiday was interpreted the same way. This step might seem inadequate in spite of a strongly exaggerated statement about the labor exploits of Soviet women and their contribution to the victory in the rear as well as at the front. But in this case it was not the holiday itself that really mattered, but the fact that it became a day-off instead of a working day. March 8 was covered in the mantle of May 9; International Women's Day became part of the glory that was the Victory.

Another step in this process was the virtual sanctification of the people's living environment. It was on the twentieth anniversary of the Victory that the honorific title of hero-city was sanctioned, and Moscow, Leningrad, Volgograd, Kiev, Sevastopol, Odessa and the Brest tower officially became the first the hero-cities and hero-tower. The image of a hero ceased to be connected only with individuals.

The twentieth anniversary of the victory was marked with other innovations: the Minute of Silence and the Parade in Red Square. But if the tradition of a Minute of Silence became an integral part of every Victory Day, the situation with the parades was quite different. In the Soviet period they did not become a tradition on May 9<sup>th</sup>, but they remained a permanent attribute of November 7<sup>th</sup> celebrations. The reason was not that two annual parades were too much: the Soviet regime never considered the expenses if they were ideologically justified. It seems that the fact that the annual parades on May 9 were cancelled while those on November 7 remained demonstrated a strong level of tension between the two holidays that were foundational for the Soviet regime. If on November 7<sup>th</sup> we celebrated the creation of the new political system, May 9<sup>th</sup> became the event that confirmed the system's ongoing vitality.

The characteristic feature of Brezhnev's attempt to control memory was the absence of undesired subjects. It would be difficult to argue that this was a conscious part of Brezhnev's attempt to structure memory; it happened by default. Some unwanted topics from the past, such as the role of the allies, collaborationism or the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were totally irrelevant at that period. But injecting the aura of the Victory into soviet daily life allowed the regime to smooth over the society's rough edges and significantly improve the regime's rapidly decaying authority. This accounts for the intense exploitation of the images of 1945 that became such a characteristic feature of Soviet ideology in this period.

In spite of the fact that the next victory anniversary was celebrated under the same regime as the previous one, they had little in common. In place of the pomp and circumstance of 1965, the jubilee of 1975 was exercise in minimalism. May 9 celebrations were reduced to the laying of wreaths at the Lenin Mausoleum and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

New accents in the interpretation of the jubilee were as before

made in Brezhnev's speech under a very characteristic title: "The heroic feats of the Soviet people." Ahead of the adoption of the new Constitution, which was supposed to be free from the archaic class definitions of the existing constitution and to contain a wider and more neutral definition of the people, the General Secretary's jubilee report was something of an affirmation of this new perspective. To use the occasion to reflect on the Soviet people was both apt and risk-free. The Great Patriotic War indeed welded the socially and nationally diverse population of the Soviet Union into an integral community.

Another sign of the era, which found its reflection in Brezhnev's report, was a strong appeal to the youth as representing the most efficient and active part of the population. The movement of construction brigades and the exploration of the new mineral deposits – that is, events that were rapidly changing the country – were undertaken by the younger generation. "The whole country is in fact a huge building site," the General Secretary remarked in his jubilee speech. The realm of daily life, which the growing realm of memory had been trying to fill since the twentieth anniversary of the Victory, in the middle of the 70s resembled a construction site. Correspondingly, the symbols of the victory celebrations started resembling symbols of youth construction brigades. The demonstration of young Muscovites on May 9, 1975 in Red Square became the pinnacle of the All-Union initiative, launched not long before the anniversary, under the motto "Work for yourself – and for others."

With Gorbachev coming to power, the inevitability of changes could be felt everywhere. But the beginning of the "political spring" did not influence the fortieth anniversary celebrations. To be more precise, it did, but in a most inappropriate way. For the first time in many years, the new General Secretary mentioned Stalin in his jubilee report. It was a brief mention in one phrase, which was absolutely true: "the enormous work in the rear and at the front was directed by the Party, the Central Committee, and the State Defense Committee headed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Josef Stalin." It was symptomatic that even this totally impersonal, formal and politically neutral reference to Stalin led to heavy applause. People started talking about Gorbachev as a strong politician who was not afraid of mentioning Stalin after a long period of suppression.

The revival of the parade in Red Square became the ritual innovation of the fortieth anniversary. The articulation of the word “memory” was another peculiarity of the date. It was not in the official rhetoric of the celebrations that this word appeared. Memories and recollections suddenly became the main heroes of the day, independent and valuable points in the collection of creative reflections concerning the landmark that was 1945.

However, another transparent reason can be given for the unexpected appearance of this word. By the middle of the 1980s mass movement “Pamyat” (Memory) had been formed and practically legalized. It had been born in our country back in the Khrushchev period as a reaction to the official nihilism in regard to traditional national values, including Orthodox ones, which the authorities declared the heritage of Stalinism. Given the situation, it was completely natural for the “Memory” movement to adopt not only the style and rhetoric of the conservative Orthodox and monarchical organizations of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in Russia, but their focus on various clandestine topics as well.

In general, in 1985 the realm of memory still dominated in the daily life of the Soviet people. In this universe of values and motivations there was no place for the pragmatic, but the necessity of some changes not even articulated from above was strongly felt. The new breakthrough in our understanding of the war occurred 1990, when one of the principal newspapers, “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” published on May 5 an article entitled “The Stolen Victory” – an unconceivable title for that time. The article claimed that two interconnected but heterogeneous forces were at work during the war: the people and the system represented by Stalin’s regime. In the first period, the system turned out to be the main, though largely ineffective, force. It had no choice but to retreat for a while, adapt, and let the people manifest their power. This main active force gave birth to war-time leaders, showed mass heroism, and paid the price of millions of lost lives. Both forces contributed to the result: the people liberated the country, and the system followed immediately by claspings the liberated people tightly in its steel arms. In this way the Victory was snatched away at the final moment. The people were transformed from a central, inspired force into tools and instruments to be used by the regime. The tragic part was that this was practically inevitable: the people were



not connected socially, they did not have legal mechanisms which could remove the bankrupt government in 1941, and so they could not avoid giving away the Victory to the state in 1945. To stop the main driving force of the Victory, which Stalin had named “a screw,” the system sought a “nut” to bolt it down. The system was frantically battenning down the hatches that had been half opened during the war so as to stop the system exploding from the inside.

The acute debate concerning “The Stolen Victory” set the dividing lines between two groups of veterans: the bearers of the “ceremonial” and “true” memories about the war. The former addressed Gorbachev demanding that the authors be charged with slandering Soviet reality and deriding the memory of the war. The latter expressed gratitude for the restoration of the memory and honor of the dead, and for “giving back the Victory” to those who really earned it and suffered for it.

However the authorities demonstrated an open disregard for the realm of memory that they cherished, and they were unable or unwilling to master what was probably the most efficient means for managing our way of thinking: the ability to maintain and construct that realm in a stable way. It is symptomatic that the collapse of the regime occurred in the very year that Victory Day became a pawn in the conflict between the retrograde union center and the young “democratic” Russian authorities.

Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Victory Day remained probably the only holiday of the previous era which was still celebrated, even at the official level, even though immediately after the collapse of the USSR the view that the Victory was one of the main achievements of Soviet history was widely discredited. In 1992, the “non-fantastic novel” by Victor Suvorov “*Ledokol*” (The Icebreaker) was published. It said that Stalin had been preparing an aggressive war against Germany. It sowed discord not only among historians but also among large numbers of readers. The exploits of the 28<sup>th</sup> Panfilov guardsmen and Alexander Matrosov were demythologized. Publications appeared detailing the mass collaborationist movement that included millions of Russians, Ukrainians and people of other nationalities serving in the Wehrmacht and SS units, cooperating with police and occupation authorities.

While the tide of disclosures in the name of “historical truth” began to recede due to the growing patriotic mood and the attitude of

the Yeltsin regime, the significance of the May 9<sup>th</sup> celebrations began to rise. When the fiftieth victory anniversary came, Russian authorities decided to turn the holiday into a large-scale PR campaign in light of coming presidential election of 1996.

Victory Day had never before been celebrated so pompously. Not only did the authorities repeat the Soviet regime's use of the Victory Day celebration, they magnified it significantly. A parade was held in Red Square, ten years after the previous fortieth anniversary parade. The restoration of the Voskressensk Gates made it impossible for the military machinery to participate in the parade, and that is why it was decided to hold the spectacular event on Kutuzovskii Avenue near the newly completed building Victory Museum complex at the Poklonnaya Gora (which was itself another impressive project of the Yeltsin regime).

The elaborate jubilee celebrations, an attempt to distract people's attention from the disastrous situation in the country in general as well as from problems in the sphere of security should also be examined in the context of landmark events which followed the jubilee celebrations. On June 24, 1995, on the day of the fiftieth anniversary of the legendary Victory parade in 1945, when the flags and standards of Hitler's regime were cast at the bottom of the Lenin Mausoleum, Russia was shocked by the attack carried out by Chechen terrorists at Budenovsk.

The fiftieth anniversary of the great Victory was controversial. On one hand, daily life, which for many years had been enveloped by memories of the war, turned out to lack real substance – to be a “realm of emptiness”. On the other hand, the celebrations still took place. Moreover, this key landmark of Soviet history was not only fully rehabilitated but became an event of great significance in the formation of the Russian Federation. May 9<sup>th</sup> became our new November 7<sup>th</sup>, and the Victory Day parade since then has become an integral part of the holiday.

With Putin coming into office, the memory of the Victory suffered changes mostly identical to those suffered during the Yeltsin years. The first inauguration in 2000 took place in the atmosphere of the new president's clear identification with the spirit of the Victory. By this time, the tactical part of the counter-terrorist raid in Chechnya was practically over and this local but extremely signifi-



The Poklonnaya Gora War Memorial in Moscow

cant victory for the Russian Federation seemed to be the reflection of the main victory of 1945. Not long before the inauguration and May 9, Putin signed the State Military Doctrine – the first document of its kind in Russia’s more than 1000-year history. The content of the Doctrine as well as the date of its adoption completed the powerful image of Commander-in-Chief, which seemed very authentic on Victory Day.

After September 11, 2001, the Second World War (not the Great Patriotic war) almost came to symbolize the “final rehearsal” of the international fight against a common enemy. Who was that common enemy? In February 2003, during the celebrations of the sixtieth anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, Putin equated “terrorists” with the “Nazis of the 1930s-40s.” This explains the appeal to “forget all unimportant disagreements and stick together against the common enemy,” following the example of the alliance during the Second World War.

Due to this American tragedy, the international community temporarily stopped criticizing Russia for its actions in Chechnya, but at the same time September 11 made our country’s integration into the American-led international antiterrorist alliance inevitable. In this situation the Great Victory became but the “final rehearsal” of the

joint allied counter-terrorist campaign, which was taking place more than fifty years later. In this context a new interpretation was given to the thesis about “the Stolen Victory,” now as interpreted by Alexander Zinoviev: the winners of the “cold war” organized a complete falsification of history in order to deprive the victors in the Great Patriotic War of the greatest victory in the history of “hot wars”.

Can we create an ideal realm of memory at all? Probably not, just as we can not build an ideal power structure. However, power is the prerogative of the few – most people are only observers, while the realm of memory is open to everyone with no exceptions. That means everyone is responsible for it!

Memory is capable of being the arbiter who can save the country from falling into the abyss. Memory is a fair judge. And it has serious charges to make against both sides – the authorities and society.

Right after the Victory (the ethical value of which gives it significant weight) a number of scenarios emerged which by the end of the century had played themselves out: the purposeful break up of the USSR; abortive attempts at nation and state building in a multi-national and multicultural state; alternative models of socialism; the determinative role of religious confessions. The first signs appeared in the immediate post-war years, but they remained totally misunderstood by the authorities carried away by the Victory. It is possible, perhaps, that quite different memories of Stalin and his regime might have remained if he had not missed those signs and cues. These signs came from the most diverse quarters: from ordinary citizens who loved their motherland, and believed in the credibility of the top officials after the terrifying social experiments of the 1930s; from the marshals who trusted Stalin; from the People’s Commissars who had experienced the responsibility and independence of controlling innumerable tanks; and from the diplomats who sent impressive signals of trust in the country that had secured the Victory.

But society is also responsible. It has no claim of innocence or purity in contrast to the overwhelming guilt of the regime. It is simply not credible to lay all the blame on “the top.” The only solution is to work and cooperate intensively with the current authorities’ initiatives, which are objectively creative, to develop carefully and encourage the sense of national unity and accord which still surround Victory Day and the realm of memory created by that date.

## Theme 20

### **Twentieth-century Russian Utopias: Archaeology of the Future as Imagined by the State and Desired by the Intelligentsia**

The Twentieth century provided opportunities to fundamentally reengineer social consciousness; it was a period when intellectuals sought to recover the lost promise of the French Revolution. Characteristically one of the first actions of the Bolsheviks, who clung to power for three quarters of a century, was to reorder Time itself. They altered the calendar to make 1917 the dawn of a new era; Soviet time was to be measured by decades passed since revolution, by ruling periods of Soviet leaders, by Five-year plans (*piatiletki*), and by the so-called “objective stages” of socialist construction. Although the importance of time in structuring consciousness has been noted since Kant only in the twentieth century was it used to systematically incubate a new, Modernistic social order. As historian Elias Canetti suggested, the shared, social understanding of time can unite geographically scattered peoples – who can’t possibly know each other personally – into a virtual Collective, thus overcome the classic contradiction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. When networks of small hordes and tribes grow more complex, common measuring of time becomes necessary. Time is the road to the future.

But what sort of future? What structure does it have? Mass consciousness ignores distinctions between Present and Future while, as Karl Mannheim demonstrated, utopias always imply a program of moving towards as yet unrealized ideal. Therefore the ideology that underpins mass culture can never be truly utopian. Instead, utopias have been produced by specific sub-cultures, notably public intellectuals and the so-called intelligentsia. Real contradictions in utopia-making ineluctably arose when members of the intelligentsia attempt-



"We'll fulfil the Five-Year Plan in four years!"

ed to implement utopian ideals at the government level because the State has its categories of organizing reality and its own world-view. The twentieth-century has thus witnessed an implacable struggle between the intelligentsia and the State for establishing an ideology of development. Both sides have well understood Arnold Toynbee's dictum: "It is a paradoxical but profoundly true and important principle of life that the most likely way to reach a goal is to be aiming not at that goal itself but at some more ambitious goal beyond it"

The State and the intelligentsia, nonetheless, promoted their utopias in different ways. The State continually had to convince the populace of the exclusive and righteous nature of its vision. Therefore it was forced to promise ever grander utopias; the State discussed less and less actual circumstances and, instead focused on a Promised Land of future abundance. The intelligentsia, on the other hand, was guided by two main sets of ideas, by the utopian culture in the 1920s and the futurism in the 1960s. In general the intelligentsia had fewer problems in promoting its utopias than the State, because the arts and science are necessarily oriented to the future, while they are less bound by concrete dogmas. As James Billington argued, utopianism was especially important in Russian-style of patterns of thought. If

it is true that Russian intellectuals are motivated principally by noble causes and high purposes, then Russian Communism was the grand, quixotic quest of the twentieth century.

At the beginning of twentieth century Russia was geographically the largest empire in the world. Historian Kliuchevsky indicated that Russia was similar to continental Europe in terms of population density, but its geography resembled Asia. The urban population was overwhelmed in number by the rural population. Moreover, the tranquil pace of peasant life, measured by seasonal cycles, did not appear to be threatened by any sort of future cataclysm. Economic conditions were, however, forcing millions of peasants to leave the countryside for the city; migration and shifting social dynamics were altering society. An additional factor of instability was that Russia was the in a sense the youngest country in the world (nearly half of the population was under 20 years old) and had one of the highest fertility rates. These factors inevitably fed millenarian expectations and sweeping aspirations.

The State, however, stuck to the outdated doctrine "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality"; developed by Uvarov under Nicholas I as an official ideology. Though the age was calling for constitutionalism, the state still clung to the ways of the ancien regime.

In 1902 leading members of the intelligentsia published *Problems of Idealism* which reconsidered the philosophy of idealism and offered a new ideological synthesis. According to this manifest, the leading ideas of the age as formulated by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud were all leading to anarchistic subjectivism, to the notion that everything is permitted. The end result would be an anthropological catastrophe. Russian thinkers such as Sergey Bulgakov and Nikolai Berdyaev argued that the only antidote was to return to Kant and to declare ethics to be ontologically valuable in itself. Ethics must rest



Vassily Kliuchevsky

above politics. In particular, the Russian authors proposed to reintegrate “truth-value” with “truth-justice.” This “metaphysical synthesis” was man’s true destiny. But the main themes of *Problems of Idealism* remained vague and ambiguous. In particular, there was little mention about how any of its declared goals could be achieved.

The failures and frustrations surrounding the Revolution 1905 dealt a substantial blow to the Empire’s political environment and to ideology principles that had once been considered unshakable. The publication of *Vekhi* (“Signposts”) was a result of the soul-searching provoked by the events of the years 1905–1907. Unlike *Problems of Idealism*, which had proposed a new ideological model, the tone of *Vekhi* was negative. It contained a devastating critique of the Russian intelligentsia. Yet this acerbic manner did not necessarily exclude the articulation of a real program for action, although one that was destructive and not constructive. (This approach indeed typifies many radical programs which follow Napoleon’s principle “on s’engage et puis on voit.”) *Vekhi* offered a sweeping criticism of Russian traditions in the spirit of Chadaev. Its authors focused on the failed nature of Russian political culture, which from the time of Peter the Great was based on an overly mechanistic approach towards society and state. These rancid traditions, therefore, debased the fundamental value of *lichnost’* (personality). The authors of *Vekhi*, especially Sergei Bulgakov, were true products of the intelligentsia they sought not merely fresh ideas but keys to the City of God.

The February and October revolutions of 1917 not only intensified Russia’s ambition to economically “overtake” Europe, but also fostered an eagerness to offer Europe Russia’s own brand of utopia. The slogan “To overtake and surpass Europe” was an essential part of all the programs of the February-era political parties; only the means to that end differed.

This utopianism can be seen by surveying the platforms of the leading parties. For example, the party of the Kadets (Constitutional Democrats) considered legal transformations the main priority. They proposed an overly-egalitarian elections laws that surpassed those of France and the United States of America. The Kadets not only proposed that women be given the right to vote, a right enjoyed at that time only by women in Norway and Denmark. They also wanted to establish voting rights for soldiers, abolish all property, residency, and



literacy qualifications, and allow citizens to vote at age 20. These were unheard of at the time. The Bolsheviks offered even more amazing and unprecedented social-reform projects, which included giving all land to the peasants, all factories to the workers, and “expropriating the expropriators.” It seemed that the State itself was to be abolished. Lenin, at the head of the Soviet of People’s Commissaries, at times seems to have been convinced of the practicability of a huge commune-state; this was to be a state without police, without bureaucracy, without a regular army, and without any privileged people, who would be separated from or superior to the masses. In this City of the Sun everyone would become a bureaucrat and therefore nobody could really become a true bureaucrat. The government saw reality through the prism of world revolution and communistic ideas that seemed to be just at hand. As Nikolai Berdyaev ironically claimed, communism was a new “scientific” religion which would “the discipline and organize the chaotic forces of the masses. No half-measures or gradual steps were acceptable in the movement towards grand ideals.

Everything that didn’t fit into this scheme had to be crushed mercilessly, for it was believed that “there is nothing impossible – if we want something, we can do it immediately.”

Starting in December of 1920 the government initiated a fantastically ambitious plan entitled GOELRO (The State Commission for Electrification of Russia). The



“Communism is the Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country” (Lenin)

plan, prepared by 200 scientists and engineers, argued for the construction of 30 large power stations in Russia's most populated regions. This was the first long-term plan for economy development not only for Russia, but for the world. (In fact, it was accomplished only in the 30s). Even left-leaning English science-fiction writer H.G. Wells doubted the possibility of realizing the plan and dubbed Lenin "the Kremlin dreamer."

The Russian intelligentsia was overly dominated by the idea of a global acceleration of time. Economist Alexandr Chayanov proposed a peasant version of Robespierre's utopia of a republic of "equal proprietors" in his 1920 novel *My Brother Aleksey's Journey in the Land of Peasant Utopia*. The artist Kazimir Malevich made a prophecy of his own: "Day by day nature is leaving the old green world, the world of flesh and bone, so that finally that green world will fade away, as the landscape of the first epochs did." Another artist Vladimir Tatlin suggested building a monument to the Third International and a flying machine powered by human muscle force – the "Letatlin." (This is a pun on the Russian verb "to fly"). The project of the monument is impressive: it was to be a 400 meter high spiral tower which would host the leaders of the Third International. It was designed to include a wire service that would diffuse communistic ideas all over the world. It was here that the proletarian masses would have ceremonial meetings with their leaders – meetings in honor of Labor, Joy and Knowledge, the World Revolution, and The Future.

And yet the optimistic concepts of the future were not shared by everyone. In the *Forthcoming Prospects* (1919) Moscow writer Mikhail Bulgakov described the future in an absolutely different way: "Our unfortunate country has reached the apex of disgrace and disaster, and it has been driven there by the so-called Great Social Revolution." Bulgakov show hope in recent developments in western-European countries: "The Great War of the Great Peoples has ended; they are licking their wound. Now their minds are at rest. Anyone, who is not poisoned by our feverish nonsense that our disease will infect the West, can clearly see the powerful wave, produced by titanic, but peace loving forces, that will raise western countries to unheard of world heights." Bulgakov was skeptical about the future of a sinister Soviet Russia: "We will be late. <...> We will be so late, that none of our prophets will be able to say, when we will overtake them and if we

will even overtake them at all. We are truly being punished.” Bulgakov associated the future with an almost Biblical time of reckoning which was just beginning to take shape: “We would have to redeem the past with unbearable labor, with intolerable penury; we would have to pay for the madness of the October days, for the independent traitors, for the ideological depravation of workers, for Brest. Only after this can the process of creation even begin. But our contemporaries will not witness any bright days in the future. Only our children or our grandchildren will enjoy those sunny days. History is a phenomenon of long-duration.”



Mikhail Bulgakov

The inertia of New Economic Program (NEP) did not abolish utopian aspirations. The State fully controlled the construction of the nation’s future, as it controlled the means to accelerate its fulfillment. The nation itself became part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; historic Russia no longer existed. The USSR adopted a program of industrial modernization that shocked the entire world. But the Bolsheviks had even grander ideas. In 1925 that Leo Trotsky describes the Soviet motto clearly and succinctly: “To master feelings, to understand instincts, to make them transparent, to connect the wires of will with the hidden, the latent, and thus to raise humans to a new level of biologic evolution, to create a higher socio-political type, a Superman – if you prefer.”

But the retreat of NEP was seen in a different way by the intelligentsia. New ideological movements – “smenovekhovstvo” (changing signposts) and “evraziystvo” (Eurasianism) – proposed their own alternative ideas of the future. Influential idea journals of the 1920s – such as *Smena Vekh* (Change of Signposts), *O Smene Vekh* (On the Change of Signposts), *Iskhod k Vostoku* (Exodus to the East), and *Na Putiakh* (On The Rails) – did not regard communism as a final goal for the development of Russia, rather communism was viewed

as an instrument, as a condition, and an opportunity for ideological transformation.

While the supporters of “smenovekhovtsi” mainly analyzed the significance of new social tendencies, advocates of “evraziistvo” went further. They illuminated the future prospects of Russian-style Communism by unlocking the genetic code of Russian history, a history which they understood in their own peculiar way. They believed that the collapse of “Petersburg Russia” wiped away the national lethargy and degeneration, engendered by the Romanovs, which had corrupted Russia for 200 years. The Revolution had freed the country not only from an Autocracy but from decayed “European” traditions which had blinded Russia from its true calling. According to them, a new and truly native “Russian” ideology would eventually supplant Marxism.

Though “smenovekhovtsi” and “evraziitsy” aroused interest among some Bolshevik intellectuals, these movements were repudiated and labeled as ideologies of the new bourgeoisie. “It is not forbidden to dream in this country” – Stalin noted ironically. But all intellectuals must know (and this was already a threat) that “while dreaming about a new transformation”, they have to “carry water to our bolshevist mill at the same time.” If not, “they will suffer the consequences.”

Some perspicacious artists had some dim presentiments of the coming of new regime. Mikhail Bulgakov’s novel *Fatal Eggs* (1925) was inspired by the plot of H.G. Well’s novel *The Food of the Gods and How It Came to Earth* (1904). Both authors describe a miraculous food that accelerates the growth of living organisms and stimulates the intellectual development of gigantic people. But in Bulgakov’s novel, it is not the highly intelligent human beings that become giants, but extremely aggressive reptiles. A professor invents a way to rapidly incubate eggs through irradiating them with the red rays of sun. A Soviet worker then steals the secret and orders boxes of chicken eggs. When the chicken and reptile eggs are accidentally mixed up, immense hordes of reptiles are created. These monsters slither to Moscow, surround it and devour everything. The novel ominously ends with a scene of a depopulated Moscow and a huge serpent entwining the Chapel of Ivan the Great.

Later, the end of the novel was altered to be more optimistic: hard frosts now come, and all the reptiles perish. By a lucky coincidence

the government censor regarded the plot as a parody on the armed intervention by the 14 states against Soviet Russia during the Civil War (in the novel the reptiles were born from the eggs brought from abroad). Moreover the scene where Moscow is invaded by hordes of reptiles was interpreted as a risky allusion to a possible defeat of the USSR in a future war with “imperialist powers.” But, in reality, the story was based on quite different ideas. For Bulgakov the “red ray” that helps to incubate the monstrous reptiles, stands for the Russian revolution that was inspired by the idea of a better future, but in fact would lead to terror and dictatorship.

When Bulgakov wrote his *Fatal Eggs*, he couldn’t imagine the great wave of terror in the name of a Better Tomorrow. At the turn of the 1930s the government crushed the kulaks and forced poor peasants to enter the kolkhozes, the “socialistic bases” of the countryside. The Soviet Russia had to pay an enormous price for the ability to launch 600 new enterprises a year. But “to slow the pace means to lag behind. And those who lag behind get the worse of it.” Stalin spoke these words in 1931. A year later the slogan “Time, Forward!” (the title of Valentin Katayev’s book) would become a key slogan of the government.

The project of the Northern Sea Route, a route from the White Sea to the Bering Strait is an example of Stalin’s utopianism. It entered the Soviet consciousness as the token of the “new world.”

Other grand utopian projects followed. An entire imperial stronghold was to arise in the Far North, including sea, river and aviation ports, and new towns. The route would be serviced by stream lines, hydrographic enterprises, and industrial and transport enterprises. A special ice breaking fleet would guarantee an absolute monopoly for the USSR in the Arctic. A heroic breakthrough to the North seemed only natural for a new government that planned the entire global transformation of humanity and of Universe. Polar stations, ice breakers, arctic air travel – all of this was perceived as something created from scratch, as one of the barriers that separated the “damned past” from the “better present” and a still better tomorrow.

The reclamation of the Arctic took place at the same time as the “assault of the skies.” Flights to the stratosphere, long-distance air travel continually amazed humanity. The world was startled by flights of the crews of Valery Chkalov’s and Mikhail Gromov’s airplanes



Stalin greets Chkalov

from Moscow to North America across the North Pole in June-July 1937. Moscow metro was a vivid incarnation of the coming future and the symbol of a new country: the entrails of the primitive nature pierced by a system of connected shining underground palaces. The 128 kilometer Moscow-Volga Canal was regarded as a demonstration of the country's power, of its liberation and of correctly directed elements. "Terrestrial" Moscow became a port for three seas: The Baltic, The White and The Caspian.

Indeed the government seemed to have no obstacles "either at sea or on land." And when the social structure was reconstructed, a new type of man would appear. Distinctive features of this new type of man can be found in the typical literature characters of the 1930s – textile men, mechanics, kolkhoz farmers, students, football-players, and airplane constructors.

At first the government supported the dissimulation of personality into collective life and subordination of the private sphere to the labor sphere. When their entire private life revolved around individualistic concerns, workers would never adopt collectivist values. In this context, there emerged ever more grandiose projects for reorganizing existing towns and cities in accordance with the dogma that all private

life must be transformed into communal life. Nourishment, lodging, and education were to be collectivized; children were to be separated from their parents. In the end, even Stalin had to realize the futility of transforming social life in a “single leap” – these harmful, utopian efforts led to a gigantic waste of resources and discredited the very idea of a communistic life-style.

A leftist German journalist, who came to the USSR in 1932, commented on the Soviet, utopian state: “A new myth has appeared in Russia, a myth that the man created the world. In the beginning there was chaos, capitalism. Then Marx, Lenin and the Red October came. The chaos was defeated after a violent struggle. Now, Stalin is establishing order, harmony and justice for everyone through five year plans.” Thousands of Soviet artists and intellectuals sensed this rapture inspired by a myth about human happiness. It penetrated people’s minds; it inspired joy, hope for a better tomorrow, it justified losses and sacrifices. Writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn admitted bluntly: “Our generation was completely beguiled with communism before the war. We sincerely believed in these false ideas.”

The Palace of Soviets – planned by Boris Jofan and approved in 1932 – was the culmination of this beguilement. It was a grand project of the revolutionary vanguard, similar to Tatlin’s tower of the Third International. According to the 1935 General Plan for the Reconstruction of Moscow the city was to become a Third Rome for the world Proletariat. It’s Via Appia was designed to awe: beginning at the Red Square, where Shhyusev’s Mausoleum pulsed with the power of “god Lenin,”



Palace of Soviets



Worker and Kolkhoz Woman

the traversed a labyrinth of massive, gothic buildings such as the hotel Moskva. Two other roads – one along the reconstructed Mokhovaya street with its classis facades, and the other one along the embankment of Moscow river with its majestic bridges – represented the sacred path leading to the Palace of Soviets, built on the site of the demolished Cathedral of Christ the Savior, the symbol of ancient religion.

This incredible monument was never built, but even without it the new era was represented in the USSR by the pavilions for the 1937 World Fair in Paris (especially, the majestic sculpture by Vera Mukhina

“Worker and Kolkhoz Woman”), at the 1939 World Fair in New York, and in the Canal Moscow-Volga with its huge statues of both *vozhds* (leaders). The parade of the “grand style” continued at the All-Union Agriculture Exhibition, which became one of the miracles of world transformation; this included the never-to-be-completed Palace of Soviets, Moscow Metro, and the Canal Moscow-Volga. The new world order was objectified in the composition of the exhibition.

Another “glorious” manifestation of the Soviet future was represented by the *Summary of the history of AUCP(B)*. The text of this “book of books” is permeated by the idea of a new epoch outside the boundaries of historical time. The greatest, fairest regime in the world was oriented to “the future” that was being built “from scratch.” There were “demons” of course, trying to hamper the process, but they could not lead the masses astray from the “bright path.” Still, references to





1935: the opening of Moscow Metro

the notions of “Motherland” and “Homeland,” so characteristic of the late 1930s, produced a certain amount of confusion in the minds of those, who observed the situation: Stalin was becoming an anti-utopist. Yet historian Mikhail Gefer was right to notice that Stalin was only dissimulating his

true ambitions, utopia simply became Stalin’s.

In the late 30s, Mikhail Bulgakov also pondered over the conundrums of utopia. In his play “Bliss” (it wasn’t published or staged until 1960s) he depicts a communistic-technocratic utopia state, which is called “Bliss.” The People’s Commissary of Inventions is the leader of the country (an allusion to Stalin), and ideological monopoly is in the hands of the Institute of Harmony (an allusion to the nineteenth-century thinker Robert Owen and his “New Harmony” utopian colony). The institute entirely regulates the life of the citizens of Bliss. The state is cosmopolite and has no nationality aspects. One of the main characters keeps to the established communistic harmony. He is against any manifestations of real life that can disturb this order. Life is organized according to an ideal plan, and therefore life in Bliss becomes utterly boring.

Paradoxically, the World War II (or the Great Patriotic War) revived the people’s belief in a positive future. A peculiar social atmosphere had appeared in the country by the end of the war, a rare ideological accord of the government and the intelligentsia. A lot of talks and rumors were connected with after-war expectations, which concerned division of kolkhozes, private trade, and legalization of different political parties. People started to look into the future more freely and with more confidence. Film director Alexander Dovzhenko wrote about a conversation with his driver, a soldier from Siberia, which struck him: “We live poorly. <...> And, you know, we all are expecting some changes and reconsiderations in our life. We all are waiting for it, everybody. It’s just that nobody talks about it.” Dovzhenko com-

mented on this: “The people have some enormous mass urge for some other, some new ways of life on Earth. I can hear it everywhere. I only haven’t heard it from government representatives.”

Philosopher of the natural sciences Vladimir Vernadsky wrote in his diary: “You can’t help thinking about the near future. Some shift is taking place... many people think that it will be of immense importance. For instance, the alliance with the Anglo-Saxon democracies, where life has been deeply penetrated by ideas of freedom of thought, freedom of religion, and also by forms of great economic changes. Soon we will experience a lot of unexpected, as well as drastic changes in our life very soon.”

Even the Soviet elite realized that change was coming. There need to be better mutual understanding between the state and the intelligentsia. But change should be gradual, rather than a radical “to be or not to be” situation. Stalin ideologist Andrey Zhdanov believed that this union brought an opportunity to complete three tasks: to establish soviet humanism, “that has defeated the ideology of animal anti-humanism” (i.e. the Nazis), to strengthen friendship of the peoples, and to raise the culture and technical level of peasants and workers to the level of the “scientific-technical intelligentsia.”

But this ideological balance was upset in 1947. The Cold War fueled a new and far more dangerous wave of nationalism that was transforming into chauvinism and anti-Semitism. This could hardly contribute to the post-war solidarity of the society. A new “grand” idea was necessary, an idea that would be equal the true potential of the October revolution. The Government found a new utopian idea in the attempt to build a truly communistic society in the coming 20-30 years. A special taskforce was created to find the ways to achieve this ambitious goal. This was regarded as the main part of the new (third) Program of AUCP(B). Some of its projects included bold suggestions for that time, for example limiting the period when a person could hold a position in the party, and encouraging quasi-elections where several candidates competed in soviet deputy elections. Unfortunately, these suggestions were never included in the final version of the new program. However, the project was itself deposited in the archives, after it had been printed typographically.

A draft of the General agricultural plan was presented to the government and to the Central Committee of AUCP (B) in autumn 1947.

The plan covered the period up to 1965 – this date was supposed to be marked by the country’s transfer to communism. By this time, i.e. after 20 years, the USSR was to outrun the main capitalist countries in the index numbers of industrial production per capita, and what is more, to distribute one third of people’s income according to people’s needs (at the beginning it would be bread, potatoes, and later “almost all kinds” of food products). The calculations were based on the “theory of the possibility of establishing Communism in one concrete country, developed by comrade Stalin.”

Of course, the idea of a new “leap” and aspirations to create a communistic society in the shortest time possible did not take into consideration the post-war conditions or whether people had any intention to engage in new ecstatic efforts, imposed by the administration, which would mean working under immense strain and stress. Finally due to common sense, this project was also shelved.

Post-war ideological campaigns seemed to have silenced the intelligentsia. But in the late 40s artist Pavel Korin unexpectedly turned back to his sketches of the “March to the Future” for the Palace of Soviets. The symbolism of social realism was driven to a paradoxical culmination in his cartoons representing an immense frieze. The theme of a “bright path,” the idea of a triumphal procession seemed definite enough, but an utterly hypertrophied form completely overcame the content. The humanistic motives and utopian ideas, which had been sincere at the at one time, literally grew into monsters: naked giants with their hands thrown up ecstatically resembled a horrifying rite of pagan initiation. It is as if Korin wanted to show his viewers the edge of a dangerous boundary-line. Evidently it was behind that line that the crash of the soviet myth would begin.

Stalin’s death and the Scientific and Technological Revolution once again saved Soviet society from falling over this precipice. The whole world was impressed by Soviet outer space exploration, nuclear energy exploitation, creation of synthetic materials, and mass use of computers. Each of these achievements was so important, that some people suggested considering the twentieth century as the “Age of Nuclear Power, while others proposed that it was “the Space Age,” still others saw it as “the Era of Cybernetics.” Later an all-embracing definition appeared the Scientific and Technical Revolution. The communist government fervently believed in the STR

and that only socialism could implement this revolution, this leap to the future.

In early 1960s Nikita Khrushchev and his adherents propounded that two decades was enough for laying the material and technical foundation for communism. The calculations were based on a simple extrapolation of average annual economic growth indices, achieved through the years 1957–1961. In a wave of enthusiasm, it was believed that the social development of the USSR was now smooth, that the country had overcome some difficulties and was on a new and vast plateau; all the difficulties had been left behind and the short and easy way to success lay ahead. These beliefs were formed in the pre-war period, during the war and the post-war years, when a certain psychological complex of ideas emerged in the society, making people feel that the world was easy to shape they way one liked.

Given these conditions, the government didn't bother with transformation of Marxist theory, but the idea of the development of a new level of ideology was never forgotten. Alongside with a lot of underground and semi-underground Neo-Marxist circles and seminars (which appeared mainly after the XX Congress) an absolutely legal Moscow intellectual circle elaborated a new utopian ideal. This circle (that later became the Moscow methodological circle) included Alexander Zinoviev, Georgiy Schedrovitsky, Boris Grushin and Merab Mamardashvili. But the methodological research was in fact pursued out of sheer enthusiasm, and it turned into "the very quintessence of opposition" to the soviet regime, as Alexander Zinoviev said.

Ideological decomposition of the Soviet empire was pursued in several directions. Two well-known political reviews were: *Iz-pod Glyb* ("From Under the Rubble"), published in Europe, and *Metropol* that was issued in the USSR illegally. Another influential journal for collective declarations was published in 1988 *Inogo ne dano* ("There is No Other Way"). These, often illegal, publications paved the ground work for another utopia, Pertroika. Perestroika implied building a law-governed state, establishing democracy and transparency, and abolishing the theocracy of the Party. The Sixties ("children" of the XX Party Congress) wanted very much to "correct and educate the government"; aspired to "finish building socialism." Mikhail Gorbachev believed that if the USSR could amend its "hot buttons" by recovering the essential parts the true revolutionary experience, it could

again find the road “to the new world, the world of communism” and “would never again leave” this road. “Foremen of new mentality” rejected the idea of Russia’s originality for the first time in the history of intellectual manifests of the intelligentsia. In fact the authors spoke mainly about the imperative of modernization.

It is symbolic that at the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century, an enormous exhibition of Russian and Soviet Revolutionary art toured various countries, from New-York to Moscow. The art exhibition asked visitors to recall the slogans “Time, Forward” and “overdrive this crock of history.” This, in a sense, was humanity’s farewell to the great soviet myth. Thus contrary to Nikolai Berdyaev’s conviction, the twentieth century never produced a “utopia that can be brought to life.”

Disregarding Chilean or Chinese paths, Russia in the 1990s wanted to import Liberalism and Democracy in its ideal form; western civilization was regarded as the ultimate benchmark. Francis Fukuyama’s utopia, presented in *End of History*, was adopted by the Russian intelligentsia. They argued that the future has become impossible to predict; new epistemological constructions were fruitless because nothing new could happen at the ontological level.

The authors of the four-volume *A Different Path* disagreed with this notion. The very title of this edition, published in the post-soviet Russian Federation, indicated its presentation of an alternative to the perestroika, a new *Sonderweg*. Indeed the project’s leader Sergey Chernyshev raised some interesting issues. Should we speak about the absence of the future itself or about the fact that images of the future have exhausted themselves? Chernyshev himself managed to avoid constructing a definite image of the future; instead he wanted to revisit the philosophical notions of History and Russia. Interestingly the authors reviewed a variety of spheres essential to national life, so that today we have an excellent opportunity to evaluate its, now thirteen-year old, predictions.

One of the project’s authors, Simon Kordonsky examined economic prospects for the Russian Federation. He contended that Russia would soon become a peculiar amalgamation of regional economies. It would enjoy a relatively highly developed resource and mining sector; its new, aggressive financial institutions would strive to gain a substantial share of the global financial market. On the other hand, the

agricultural sector would remain in a rudimentary state and the manufacturing sector would be developed only to a limited extent. Most of the gigantic agricultural plants and factories, which were created under the slogan “to overtake and surpass,” would disappear from the national economic map. The main asset of the country would be raw materials and education.

Vadim Radaev, who analyzed the future of Russian ideologies, asserted that massive changes in the political sphere would take place. The Russian president could never be a real liberal or democrat; the soviet apparatus had become far too engrained. Because of this, the liberal-democratic intelligentsia “will have to turn back” to its historically defined role of opposition in order to preserve its “half discredited” scenarios of future development. But, in the end, only the semblance of a struggle for freedom and democracy will continue. In reality, the main ideological contest will take place on another level, between closed, secretive groups. The dominant ideology will be a new brand of socialistic, national “patriotism.” All other ideological movements will be forced to establish contacts with and subordinate themselves to these conservative forces. All criticism of socialism will remain superficial so that the new conservatism will preserve the main traits of the Soviet system for generations to come.

Vladimir Makhnach presented three paths of future development: isolationism, which will foster “a highly disagreeable state, that will reject everyone and everything,” a return to imperialistic self-identity, and a culturological “orientation toward a holistic Orthodox culture.”

Alexander Panarin claimed that development of a Eurasian project is the only promising and reasonable option for such a large state as Russia: assimilation of a specific model of civilization, different from both the old “Atlantic” and the post-war “Pacific” models. The society will have to sustain a technological and “spiritual transformation of a scale equal to the phenomena of the Reformation or Enlightenment in Europe.” If Russia manages to restore its status of the Third Rome, the postindustrial society will have more of a chance to become an alternative to the world industrial ghetto. The mission of Russia is to promote polycentrism (pluralism of civilizations) through becoming a counterbalance to the hegemonic model imposed by the USA.

Thanks to a wide diversity of opinions, the authors continued the discussion concerning the fate of Russia, producing a myriad of theories and predictions. The *Russkiy zhurnal* ("Russian Journal") became a popular forum for such discussion; in 1997 its intellectual community migrated to the Internet. This marked the emergence of a new phenomenon: Russian virtual intellectual sites.

The dialogue and discussion between *Krasnye kholmy* ("Red Hills", 1999) and the *Novy rezhim* ("New Regime", 2001) typifies the intellectual atmosphere under Putin, which focused on debates concerning the Russia of the past and the Russia of the present. This discussion, however, never produced anything more than paper projects, because the intellectual class who presented the so-called the new course uncovered its real role neither under either the old, nor the new regime. Intellectuals under Putin remained in the periphery of political activity. Some of these thinkers were indeed ready to accept the "new bureaucracy" as a kind of social-democratic ideology; they viewed the enlightened elite as part of a new "Russian system" and tried to present an alternative to the bureaucratic "discourse" as a determinative social and mental vector of the coming epoch. But these intellectuals could elaborate this alternative "discourse," only by resorting to a confused amalgam of leftist post-modernist, right-conservative and even nationalist ideologies. This was an ambitious effort which was doomed to failure.


In conclusion, the twentieth century witnessed the appearance and complex co-existence of political and intellectual absolutist models of the future. Sergey Chernyshev characterized this frantic movement towards the future with the following images: standbys during railway hauls, standbys "so hopeless that iron wheels cling to the rusting rails"; wild sprints, "which make steam boilers explode"; back-breaking climbs, "when passengers run ahead of the locomotive and lay rails"; mad leaps across gapes, "when you are hanging in the air and have no time to look back and see the cars falling down, then you must quickly transform the locomotive into a plane."

This is why Russians have chosen to "live in present," to forget about utopian projects and deal only in the real world. But can the future be whitewashed and give a new ideological sense? Is there a realizable utopia of the twenty-first century? Will Russia adoption of a new form of development? Only the future can provide the answer.


## **APPENDIX**

### **I. MAPS**
















*The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after 1945*






*Commonwealth of Independent States in 1997*







*the Russian Federation 1997*

## II. MAIN EVENTS, DATES AND GLOSSARY

### Russia at the Beginning of Twentieth Century (1900–1916)

#### *Main Events and Dates*

|           |   |
|-----------|---|
| 1903      | The division of delegates of the Second Congress of the Russian social-democratic labor party into Bolsheviks led by Lenin and Mensheviks led by Martov |
| 1904–1905 | Defense and Fall of Port Arthur   |
| 1905      | Russian War with Japan  |
| 1905      | Foundation of the first Trade Unions in Russia  |
| 1905      | First Soviet of the working deputies in Ivanovo-Voznesensk  |
| 1905      | Founding congress of the party of constitutional democrats (Kadets) in Moscow   |
| 1906      | Opening and dissolution of the First State Duma (Kadets in majority). P.A.Stolypin is appointed Head of the government                                  |
| 1905–1907 | The first Revolution in Russia  |
| 1907      | The Second State Duma. The 3rd June coup d'état. Duma dissolution. Adoption of the new election law.  |
| 1907–1912 | The Third State Duma  |

1912–1917

The Fourth State Duma

*Glossary*

|  |   |
|--|---|
| The Stolypin agrarian reform                     | Envisaged: abolishing the obschina system, consolidating isolated farmsteads and developing large-scale individual farming (khutors), peasants' resettlement to the south-eastern and eastern regions of the country.             |
| The Entente                                      | Military alliance of states organized at the beginning of the Twentieth century (1904) and originally consisting of two states: the UK and France. In 1907 Russia joined the alliance, and in 1917 – the United States and Japan. |
| The State Duma                                   | Legislative body convoked according to Manifesto issued by Nicholas II on October 17, 1905. It was elected for 5 years. Before the February Revolution there had been four State Dumas.   |
| The Constitutional Democratic Party (the Kadets) | “Party of National Freedom”. Existence from October 1905 until November 1917. Represented the left wing of the Russian liberalism. Were members of all four Provisional Governments. Comprised about 100 thousand people.         |
| The October Manifesto (1905)                     | Proclaimed civil liberties, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association. Also mentioned convocation of the Duma.   |

|                                       |  |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Soviets of workers' deputies          | Form of power of the working class, which appeared in the course of the First Russian Revolution, in summer 1905 in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. During the October political strike the Soviets appeared in different cities and towns.  |
| “The Union of October 17”             | Bourgeoisie party, comprised about 60 to 70 thousand members. Its ideal – strong monarchical power. Supported united and indivisible Russia and expansion of labor legislation.  |
| “The Union of the Russian people”     | Monarchist party (about 4100 thousand people) defended autocracy, police power and manor's land ownership.   |
| The June 3 Coup (the 3 June Monarchy) | Dissolution of the Second State Duma. The June 3 Monarchy called for the preservation of absolute monarchy, which more often resorted to strong-arm tactics in politics and had two-chamber parliament. It relied on upper bourgeoisie encouraging capitalist production but didn't allow bourgeoisie come to power. |
| The Labor group                       | Faction of deputies-peasants and popular intelligentsia in I–IV sessions of the Duma (107 people in the First Duma). Played an important role in the political life of the country. The Labor group program was welcomed by millions of peasants.  |

## 1917

### *Main Events and Dates*

|                         |  |
|-------------------------|--|
| February 23, 1917       | The first signs of unrest in Petrograd   |
| March 2, 1917           | Abdication of Nicolas II                 |
| April, June, July, 1917 | Crises of the Provisional government     |
| October 25–26, 1917     | Victory of the armed revolt in Petrograd |
| March 3, 1918           | Concluding of the Brest peace treaty     |

### *Glossary*

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Brest treaty   | Peace treaty between Soviet Russia on the one side and the coalition of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey on the other. |
| Provisional Government   | Supreme legislative and executive authority in Russia from March 2 to October 25, 1917                                    |
| All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies | Authority that exercised general control over Soviets in-between congresses of the Soviets.                               |
| VChK / All-Russian Extraordinary Commission  | Established in December, 1917 for combating counter-revolution and sabotage.  |

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Diarchy                                | Specific political situation that existed in Russia after the February revolution from March 2 to July 4, 1917. The first power (bourgeois dictatorship) was represented by the Provisional government that sought for parliamentary monarchy. The second, by the Soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies that aspired creation of the republic. The absolute rule of the provisional government was established after the shooting of demonstrators in Petrograd on June 4, 1917. |
| Decree                                 | One of the denominations of the document issued by the supreme public authority. In the first soviet years, laws and resolutions of SNK (Council of People's Commissars), the Congress of Soviets and its executive bodies were called decrees. Thus, the Decree on Peace and the Decree on Land were passed by the Second Congress of Soviets on the night of October 27, 1917.  |
| Commune                                | A form of agricultural cooperative with socialization of means of production and equalizing distribution per head. Communes first appeared at the end of 1917 on the lands of former landowners.  |
| People's Commissariats (the Narkomats) | Central public authorities in different sectors, created after the October revolution. They were established by the decree of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on October 26, 1917.   |
| Nationalization                        | Transition of private businesses, land, transport, telecommunications, banks to state ownership by measures of compulsion as well as on basis of full or partial redemption.  |

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Prodotryads (Food detachments)                  | Part of food-confiscation forces in the course of food dictatorship; consisted of armed worker, poorer peasants usually aligned with the interior guard forces and committees of the poor. |
| Sovnarkom—<br>Council of People's<br>Commissars | Supreme executive and administrative government body, the government of the Soviet State. In 1946, it was turned into the USSR Council of Minister.  |
| Congresses of<br>Soviets                        | Supreme and local public authorities that existed in the Soviet State from 1917 until the USSR Constitution was adopted in 1936 and Constitutions of ethnic republics, in 1936–1937.       |

## Russia in 1918–1920

### *Main Events and Dates*

|                                |   |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Spring-summer,<br>1918         | Beginning of the civil war and foreign intervention.                                  |
| May 29, 1918                   | VTsIK (All-Russian General Executive Committee) decree on the compulsory recruitment. |
| January 11, 1919               | SNK Decree on the Prodravverstka.   |
| April, 1919 – January, 1920    | Defeat of the Kolchak's white-guard troops by the Red Army.                           |
| October, 1919 –<br>March, 1920 | Defeat of Denikin's troops.   |



## *Glossary*

|   |  |
|---|--|
| The White guard                               | Military formations that opposed the Bolsheviks' rule. The white color symbolized the "legitimate law and order". It consisted mainly of the Russian army officers.  |
| The Military Communism                        | Soviet State socio-economic policy in the wake of the civil war and foreign intervention (1918–1920). It reflected the idea of quick socialism building by forcible exclusion of capitalist elements.                  |
| The Civil war                                 | Intervention of one state into the internal policy of another that can be of military, economic, ideological or other type.  |
| The Red Army                                  | Main constituent part of the soviet armed forces. The Red Guard was the principal military organization that supported the Soviet rule during the first months after its establishment.                                |
| The Food dictatorship                         | Extraordinary measures system in 1918–1921, developed and applied by the Soviet government in conditions of food crisis so as to supply the Red Army with bread.   |
| Prodrazverstka (surplus-appropriation system) | System of agricultural products procurement in the "military communism" period (1919–1921). Compulsory bread and other products surplus delivery to the state by peasants. In 1921, it was replaced with the food tax. |

## The Soviet State of the 1920-s

### *Main Events and Dates*

---

|                                 |   |
|---------------------------------|---|
| February 20 –<br>March 18, 1920 | The Kronshtadt revolt.                                    |
| March, 1921                     | GOELRO plan adoption.                                     |
| 1921–1928                       | Issue of silver and gold coins.                           |
| December 30, 1922               | Formation of the USSR.                                    |
| 1928/29– 1932/33.               | The first five-year development plan of national economy. |

---

### *Glossary*

---

|   |   |
|---|---|
| GOELRO<br>(The State electrification of Russia) | The first general plan for restoration and development of the Soviet State economy on the basis of electrification of the Republic, expected to be completed in 10–15 years. Generally finished by 1931.  |
| Collectivization                                | Reorganization of private peasants' households into major socialistic farm units (1929–1933).   |
| Kolkhoz<br>(collective farm)                    | Joining of peasants for collective agricultural production on the basis of socialized means in the country from 1917.   |
| Industrialization                               | Industry transfer to industrial machinery, creation of large-scale machine production. In the USSR, industrialization was called the policy from 1920-s to 1940-s aimed at formation of machine production in the country so as to catch up with the West and to set material and technical base for socialism. |

---

|                     |   |
|---------------------|---|
| Personality cult    | Worship of someone, reverence, glorification of something or someone. In the USSR from 1929 to 1955, defined as J.Stalin's personality cult.  |
| Cultural revolution | A number of measures, applied in the USSR in 1920-s that were aimed at changing the social structure of the post revolutionary intellectuals. It envisaged communist ideologizing of all spheres of culture. One of the primary goals was creation of the so called "proletarian culture". Among the measures were literacy campaign, foundation of the soviet school system, education of the "people's intelligentsia". |
| Five-year plan      | Plans for national economy development of the USSR from the 1st to 8th five-year period (1929–1970). Beginning from the 9th, the plans were called the "Five-year plans for the economic and social development of the USSR" (1971). The plans stipulated solutions of economic and political problems.   |

## **The Soviet Union from the end of 1920-s to 1930-s**

### *Main Events and Dates*

|                 |   |
|-----------------|---|
| 1927–1929       | Grain procurements crisis   |
| 1932–1933       | Hunger in the USSR  |
| September, 1934 | USSR's accession to the League of Nations                           |
| 1934            | XVII congress of VKP(b) (All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)) |

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| December 5, 1936  | Adoption of the Constitution of the “Winning Socialism”                                 |
| March, 1939       | Publication of the “Brief course on the history of VKP(b)”                              |
| 1937–1938         | Mass repressions  |
| 1939              | Introduction of the general military duty.  |
| August 23, 1939   | Concluding of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany                      |
| March, 1939       | XVIII congress of VKP(b)  |
| March, 1939, 1940 | War between the USSR and Finland  |
| 1940              | Karelia-Finnish, Moldavian, Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian republics joined the USSR. |

### *Glossary*

|                     |   |
|---------------------|---|
| Anti-Comintern pact | Pact, concluded between Germany and Japan for 5 years (November, 1936). The main goal of the agreement was the joint fight against the Communist International. In 1937, Italy joined the pact; later some other countries did the same. In 1939–1941, the pact turned into the Alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan. |
| GULAG               | Central Labor Camps Administration, later – Central Corrective Labor Camps and Penal Colonies Administration. In 1930, OGPU (Labor Camps Administration) was founded that later turned into Central Administration (GULAG) in 1931; dismissed in 1956.  |

|                            |  |
|----------------------------|--|
| Deportation (expatriation) | Expatriation as a measure of criminal or administrative sanction. During the years of mass repressions (from 1920-s to 1940-s), representatives of many USSR ethnic groups as Balkars, Ingush, Kalmyks, Karachai, Crimean Tatars, Germans, Meskhetin Turks, Chechens were expelled from the country. In 1989, deportation of these groups was found illegal and denounced as the gravest crime of the Soviet regime. |
| The International          | Name of the large associations of working people (international). The first International was founded in 1864 and existed until 1876. The second International was established in 1919 and was dismissed in 1943.  |
| The League of Nations      | International organization of states that worked in-between the two World wars (1919–1939).  |
| Literacy campaign          | A part of the “Cultural revolution”. As the result of the mass education of adults, the level of literacy in the country reached the 90% mark by the end of 1930-s.  |

## **The USSR in the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945)**

### *Main Events and Dates*

|                                    |  |
|------------------------------------|--|
| June 22, 1941                      | Attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR.    |
| June 30, 1941                      | Set-up of the State Defense Committee. |
| September 30 –<br>December 5, 1941 | The Battle of Moscow.                  |
| June 17, 1942                      | The Stalingrad battle.                 |

|  |   |
|--|---|
| February 3, 1943   | The Battle of Kursk.                      |
| July 5 – August 23,<br>November 28 –<br>December 1, 1943 | Meeting of the “Big Three” in Tehran.     |
| June 6, 1944   | Opening of the Second Front.              |
| May 9, 1945  | Capitulation of the fascist Germany.      |
| July–August, 1945  | Potsdam conference.                       |
| November 20, 1945  | The Nuremberg Trial of fascist offenders. |

### *Glossary*

|                        |   |
|------------------------|---|
| Anti-Nazi<br>Coalition | Military union of the states fighting against the Alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan in the World War II. The beginning of the Coalition formation dates back to 1941.  |
| The Great Powers       | International law term first used during the Vienna Congress (1814–1815), refers to states that play a significant role in the world politics. After the World War II, according to the UN Charter the Great Power status belonged to the USSR, the USA, the Great Britain, France and China. With the disintegration of the USSR, the Russian Federation became its legal successor in the international relations sector. |
| The Wehrmacht          | Armed forces of Nazi Germany. The Wehrmacht was eliminated by the resolution of the Potsdam conference.   |

|                                      |   |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| The Lend-lease                       | System organized by the US by which equipment, ammunition, strategic materials, provision etc. were lent or leased to Anti-Nazi Coalition members during the World War II.  |
| Patriotic war                        | Just nationwide liberation fight against foreign aggressors.  |
| Reparation                           | (International law term) full or partial compensation of pecuniary loss caused by the war; paid to the winning state by the defeated party.   |
| Tehran conference                    | Conference of the three allied powers (USSR, USA, GB – J. Stalin, F. Roosevelt, W. Churchill) that took place in Tehran. At the conference was signed the Declaration on joint actions in the war against Nazi Germany, besides there was made the decision to open the Second Front in France in May, 1944. The Soviet Union stated its readiness to join the war against Germany's allies (Japan) after the end of hostilities in Europe. |
| Fascism (bundle, bunch, association) | Political course, first appeared in several countries after the World War I. As the result of the world economic crisis (1929–1933), the fascists (Nazi) came to power, establishing anti-democratic regimes in Germany and Italy. The foreign policy of fascism came to nothing more than aggression and enslavement of nations. It played the decisive role in the outbreak of the World War II; was defeated.                            |

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| Capitulation | End of military actions and surrender on conditions of the winning party. The Second World war (1939–1945) ended with the unconditional capitulation of Nazi Germany and Japan. |
|--------------|---|

## The USSR in the postwar years (1945–1953)

### *Main Events and Dates*

|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| 1946–1950      | Fourth five-year plan for agricultural development.                |
| December, 1947 | Cancellation of the rationing system and monetary reform.          |
| January, 1949  | Set-up of the Economic Mutual Aid Council of pro-socialist states. |
| May, 1948      | Foundation of FRG (Federal Republic of Germany).                   |
| October, 1949  | GDR (German Democratic Republic) creation.                         |
| April, 1949    | formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).        |
| October, 1949  | Foundation of the People's Republic of China                       |
| 1949           | Large-scale campaign of “cosmopolitanism” disclosure.              |
| March 5, 1953  | Day of Stalin's death.   |



*Glossary*

---

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Warsaw treaty                                 | Included Bulgaria, Albania (until 1962), Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR, Czechoslovakia. Concluded in 1955, it was caused by NATO actions and pursued security of the states members and peace in Europe.   |
| The United Nations                            | International organization, created to maintain and consolidate peace, security and development of the cooperation between the nations.  |
| NATO  | Military and political alliance, established on the US initiative and according to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on April 4, 1949. From the moment of its creation and during the Cold war, NATO had a clear anti-soviet orientation and opposed the organization of the Warsaw Treaty, besides it applied its efforts to fight the national liberation movement. In recent years NATO has changed its course from military to political way of international problem solving. |
| SEV<br>(Council<br>of Economic<br>Mutual Aid) | International organization, founded in 1949. Its members were pro-socialist countries of the Eastern Europe: Albania (until 1961), Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Rumania, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, as well as Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia.   |
| “Cold War”                                    | State of opposition between the USSR and its allies on the one side and the USA with its political partners on the other, that lasted from 1946 until the end of 1980-s. During the “Cold war” economic and political methods were applied.  |

---

## The USSR in 1953–1964

### *Main Events and Dates*

|                  |   |
|------------------|---|
| February, 1956   | XX congress of the CPSU.  |
| February, 1954   | Transfer of Crimea to the Ukraine.  |
| June, 1956       | Decree of the CPSU Central Committee on “Overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences” |
| March, 1954      | Beginning of Kazakhstan virgin lands development.   |
| February 5, 1960 | Foundation of the Peoples’ Friendship University.   |
| October, 1961    | CPSU program passed at the XXI CPSU congress.   |
| April, 1961.     | Yuri Gagarin’s Space flight.  |
| October, 1962    | Caribbean crisis.   |
| August, 1963     | Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests was signed by the USSR, the USA, and the Great Britain.       |
| October, 1964    | N.Khrushchev’s ouster from party and government posts.  |

### *Glossary*

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Voluntarism | Policy, carried out regardless objective laws of historic process, relying on subjective desire and unconditioned decisions, was typical of N.Khrushchev’s rule. |
| Berlin wall | Construction of a wall round West Berlin. The wall was erected by 400 thousand GDR soldiers supported by the soviet government on the night of August 13, 1961.  |

|                             |  |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Y. Gagarin                  | A soviet cosmonaut. On April 12, 1961, was the first human to fly in Space on “Vostok” space shuttle, made a complete circle around the Earth.   |
| Caribbean crisis (1962)     | Grave international crisis, directly connected with Cuba, that threatened the mankind with the World War III. On the initiative of the soviet government and by approbation of F.Castro, soviet missiles were secretly placed in Cuba. The US intelligence service managed to disclose the plot; American fleet imposed a sea blockade against Cuba that led to a sensational scandal. The USSR and USA leaders made mutual concessions; the US removed its missiles from Turkey and the Soviet Union withdrew its ammunition from Cuba. |
| S. Korolev                  | Designer of the first rocket and space systems, founder of the practical cosmonautics. Besides he created ballistic and geophysical missiles, first artificial satellites, “Vostok” spacecrafts that made possible the first manned space flight and space walk.   |
| Ottepel’ (Thaw) (1954–1964) | Ten-year long rule of N.Khrushchev characterized by changes in social and political spheres of the USSR and democratization of the soviet society.   |
| Political Subjectivism      | Is characterized by political decisions taken on the basis of unconditioned guidelines. Political subjectivism is the cause of slighting attitude toward social appropriateness, belief in omnipotence of administrative decisions. N. Khrushchev’s rule had clear signs of political subjectivism.  |

---

## The USSR from the mid – 1960-s to 1980-s

### *Main Events and Dates*

|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| Mid – 1960-s   | Start of Kosygin's reform (economic)                                     |
| 1966           | L. Brezhnev elected the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. |
| October, 1977  | Adoption of the Constitution (the Main Law) of the USSR                  |
| December, 1979 | Soviet troops enter Afghanistan  |
| December, 1982 | 60th Anniversary of the USSR Formation                                   |
| 1968           | “The Prague Spring” and its consequences                                 |

### *Glossary*

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Brezhnev's Doctrine  | Policy of “limited sovereignty”, strong trusteeship toward socialist states, that in the West received the name of Brezhnev's doctrine.  |
| Zastoy   | Process of economic decline.   |
| Final Act of the Conference of 33 European states, the USA and Canada. | Document containing the most significant principles of borders inviolability in Europe, respect for sovereign's independence, territorial integrity of states, refusal of use or threat of force.              |
| The Prague Spring  | Began in the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic as an attempt of democratic renovation of socialism, giving it the “human face”. The driving force of the reformative moods in the CSSR was the party apparat. |

|                                |  |
|--------------------------------|--|
| USSR Economic reform in 1960-s | System of economical and organizational measures to intensify production. Its goal was improvement of all spheres of the economical activity: management, planning, material stimulation so as to accelerate the development of national economy, increase labor productivity. The economic reform was called forth by increased productive forces, complication of production, the apparat and economical ties in the USSR economy. |
| Stagnation                     | In economy, industry standstill. Sometimes is used in a broader meaning as stagnation in general or in a particular sphere of social life.   |

---

## **Perestroika in the USSR**

### *Main Events and Dates*

|                |   |
|----------------|---|
| March, 1985    | M. Gorbachev elected the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. |
| February, 1989 | Russian troops withdrawal from Afghanistan                                |
| March, 1989    | USSR-PRC relations normalization  |
| May 25, 1989   | The first Congress of the USSR People's deputies                          |
| March, 1990    | M. Gorbachev elected the President of the USSR                            |
| June 12, 1990  | Establishment of the sovereignty of Russia                                |

---

---

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Beginning of 1990 | “Sovereignities parade” (start of the USSR breakup) |
|-------------------|---|

---

### *Glossary*

---

|                         |   |
|-------------------------|---|
| Glasnost'               | Person's right to express his/her opinion regarding governmental actions and state institutions, freedom of speech, abolition of censorship; essential element of democracy.  |
| Democratization         | Process of establishment of the democratic political regime, state structure, based on people's recognition as the source of majority rule, election of power-holding structures, supremacy of laws, guarantee of citizens' rights and freedoms, division of power branches and insurance of the rule of law.   |
| State's National policy | Public authorities' policy, aimed at consideration of ethnic groups' interests of the state in question and other countries. Among its primary goals, there can be political, socio-economic and spiritual development of the citizens, creation of harmonious interethnic relations or, on the contrary, affirmation of supremacy of the titular ethnic group. |

---

## **1991–2000**

### *Main Events and Dates*

---

|                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| March 17, 1991     | Referendum on preserving of the USSR                                 |
| August 19–21, 1991 | Coup in the country; set up of the State Emergency Committee (GKChP) |

---

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| December 8, 1991  | Foundation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (the Belovezhsk Agreement)   |
| 1992              | Year of economic reforms, transition to the market by means of the “shock therapy”  |
| March 31, 1992    | The Federal Treaty signed by the majority of the federal regions. According to the treaty, republics received more rights than the regions of federation. |
| 1992–1993         | Conflict between the executive (the President of Russia) and representative (the Congress of People’s Deputies – the Supreme Soviet) powers.              |
| October 3–4, 1993 | Tragic events in Moscow. Shoot-out of the Supreme Soviet. Establishment of the new rule in Russia.  |
| 1993, 1995        | Parliamentary election in Russia.   |
| End of 1994.      | Russian troops enter Chechnya.  |
| 1996              | Withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany.  |
| September, 1998.  | E. Primakov appointed Prime-minister.   |
| 1996              | Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe.  |
| March, 2000.      | V. Putin elected the President of the Russian Federation.   |

## *Glossary*

|                                 |   |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Belovezhsk Agreement            | Statement of the leaders of three Slav republics – Belorussia, Russia and Ukraine on the break-up of the USSR and foundation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Later other former Union republics except the Baltics joined the CIS. The Belovezhsk Agreement lacked legitimate basis. The CIS countries had territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, Allied command of the armed forces and unified control of nuclear weapons. |
| Conflict (interethnic)          | Clash of opposing interests, views and positions. Acute debate, strong disagreement. The number of interethnic conflicts increased since the end of the 80s in certain republics and regions: Karabakh, South Ossetian, Transdnistr, Ossetia-Ingush.  |
| Novo-Ogarevo Agreement          | (Spring – summer 1991) – the “9+1” agreement, i.e. nine Union republics and the Center represented by the President of the USSR agreed upon the basis of cooperation. The republics obtained considerable rights with the Centre preserving important levers of power: the armed forces, financial system, transport, energy sector etc. This Agreement was to serve as a basis of a new Union Agreement.   |
| Parliamentary elections of 1999 | For the first time in the history of modern Russia the Rights and the Centrists gained the majority in the Duma. It gave legislative basis for further complex socio-economic reforms in the country.   |



---

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Putsch (coup)  | Power take-over by a group of plotters.<br>Such an attempt was made August 21, 1991.  |
| Article 6 of the<br>Constitution of the<br>USSR (1977) | Officially stipulated the governing role of<br>the USSR. In March 1990, III Congress of<br>People's deputies of the USSR abolished<br>this Article.                                       |
| “Shock therapy”  | The first steps of E. Gaidar's government on<br>the way to market economy in 1992: abol-<br>ishing fixed prices, free trade, privatization<br>(selling of state property to individuals). |

---

### III. SELECTED BIOGRAPHIES



**ANDROPOV Yuri Vladimirovich** (1914–1984) – Soviet politician. Since 1941, First Secretary of the Central Committee of Komsomol of Karelia. During the Great Patriotic War – one of the heads of partisan movement. In 1951–1952, joined the party secretariat. In 1953–1957, Soviet Ambassador to Hungary. Played a role in the Soviet military intervention in Hungary in 1956. since 1957, head of department of the Central Committee, in 1962–1967 and since 1982 – Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Member of the Politburo since 1973. In 1967–1982 – Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, in 1982–1984 – General secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, since 1983 – Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.



**BERIA Lavrentiy Pavlovich** (1899–1953) – Soviet politician and party member. At the end of 1922 Beria was appointed deputy head of the Georgian Emergency Committee. In 1924, suppressed the Georgian nationalist uprising. During 1931–1938, Beria was appointed first secretary of the Communist party Central committee in Georgia, and secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee. In 1938, purged NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs).

During World War II became a member of the State Defense Committee (GKO). In 1945, got the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Chairman of the Commission of Atomic Energy, was in charge of the project of the nuclear bomb. After Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev conspired against Beria. He was arrested and immediately shot.

---



**BREZHNEV Leonid Ilyich** (1906–1982) – Soviet statesman. In 1921, finished six grades of secondary school. In 1931, became candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, started working at the factory and entered evening department of the Metallurgical Institute, which he graduated in 1935. In 1939 became secretary of the regional party committee on propaganda. During the Great Patriotic war served as a political commissar in different military units. Ended the war in Prague in 1945 as Major General. During 1946–1950 was first Secretary of Zaporozhsky and Dnepropetrovsk regional CP committees. In 1950, Brezhnev was sent to Moldavia as first secretary of the Communist Party Central committee. In 1954, being second secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central committee, was sent to cultivate Virgin lands. In 1960, became chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In 1964, Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev and became General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1970, propaganda campaign announced Brezhnev a new “Supreme Ruler”. Brezhnev's reign caused economic stagnation and gave birth to a phenomenon of the epoch – dissidence.



**BUKHARIN Nikolai Ivanovich** (1888–1938) – eminent Soviet party member and politician, one of the leaders of Comintern (the Communist International). Party member since 1906, member of the Central Committee in 1917–1934, candidate member of the Central Committee in 1934–1937, member of the Politburo in 1924–1929, candidate member of the Politburo in 1919–1924. In 1917–1929 – editor-in-chief of “Pravda.” At the same time worked in Comintern Executive committee, in the Industrial Supreme Council. In 1929–1934 – held different posts in the country’s economy, in 1934–1937 – editor of “Izvestia of the USSR Central Executive Committee.” Member of the All-Union Central Executive Committee and the USSR Central Executive Committee. In 1937, Bukharin was unjustly arrested and shot in 1938.



**GORBACHEV Mikhail Sergeyevich** (born in 1931) – Soviet state official and politician. In 1955, graduated faculty of Law of Moscow University. In 1952, became member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 1956, returned home and made a brilliant party career. In 1970, he was appointed First Secretary of the Stavropol regional committee of the CPSU. In 1990, was awarded the Nobel Prize. Gorbachev’s domestic policy was notable for its inefficiency: the proclamation of “the rapid social and economic development” in practice turned into priority development of machinery construction. “Democratization” and “Glasnost” were supposed to symbolize the policy of external liberalization but with a binding

slogan: “More Socialism!” Ideological and political pluralism led to radical changes in public conscience.” – “Socialist choice” and “the leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union” were rejected. These processes were accompanied by economic chaos. In March 1990, was elected President of the Soviet Union.

---



**DZERZHINSKY Felix Edmundovich** (1877–1926) – Soviet governmental official and party worker. Party member since 1895, member of the Central Committee since 1906, during 1907–1912 and since 1917 candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee since 1924. In 1917, joined the Secretariat of the Central Committee. During the post-October period in 1917–1922, was chairman of the Extraordinary Commission (Cheka), at the same time during 1919–1923 – People’s Commissar of the Interior of RSFSR ( Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic). During 1922–1926 – chairman of the State political department of NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affaires) of RSFSR, United State political department of Sovnarkom. At the same time during 1921–1924 – People’s Commissar of the communication lines, since 1924 – chairman of the Supreme Soviet of National economy of the USSR. Member of VTsIK and TsIK of the USSR.



**EZHOV Nikolay Ivanovich** (1895–1940) – politician, general Commissar of state security (1937), People's Commissar of the Interior of the USSR. Candidate member of Politburo in 1937–1939. One of the main organizers of mass repressions. Arrested in 1939, shot in 1940.

---



**YELTSIN Boris Nikolayevich** (1931–2007) – Soviet and Russian politician and public figure, first President of Russia. In 1955, graduated from the Construction Department at the Ural Polytechnic Institute. Worked as builder, mastered twelve various construction jobs in one year. Worked as a section foreman, chief engineer and head of department. In 1961, joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in 1968, devoted himself to party work, heading the Construction Department of the Party Regional Committee. In 1975, became Secretary and then First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional party committee. In April 1985, appointed head of department of the CPSU Central Committee. After two months, became Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and First Secretary of Moscow Municipal Committee of the CPSU. In 1986, Yeltsin and Gorbachev disagreed on key issues of new political and economical reform. Laid off his post and appointed minister- deputy chairman of the State committee on construction. Headed the democratic opposition. In 1990, at the last, XXVIII Congress of the CPSU demonstratively left the party. The confrontation between Gorbachev, who tried to keep balance between democrats and

conservatives, and Yeltsin, who called for decisive reforms had become so deep that it paralyzed any constructive activity in the country. On June 12, 1991 elected President of Russia. The coup of August 19–21, 1991 led to banning CPSU and break-up of the Soviet Union. In December 1991, Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia proclaimed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In 1996, re-elected for the second term. On December 31, 1999, resigns before term and appoints Vladimir Putin acting President of Russia.

---



**ZHUKOV Georgy Konstantinovich** (1896–1974) – Soviet military commander. Born in a poverty-stricken peasant family. During 1903–1906, studied in parish school, which he finished with the certificate of progress and good conduct. In 1915, joined the army and twice was awarded the Cross of St. George. In 1918, voluntarily joined the Red Army. In 1933–1938, was commander of brigade, division and corps. In 1939, for the successful operation near the Khalkhin Gol river on defeating the Japanese troops Zhukov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1940, got the title of the General of the Army and in January became chief of the Red Army General Staff. In the battle near Moscow, Zhukov organized the troops of the Western Front to launch a counteroffensive, coordinated actions of the fronts in the Battle of Stalingrad. In 1943, as Marshal of Soviet Union he coordinated the fronts' actions and gained victory in the Battle of Kursk, forcing Dnieper, liberation of Kiev. In 1944, defeated the enemy in Korsun – Cherkassky

and Proskurovsko-Chernovtsy battles. In 1944–1945, Zhukov was a commander of two regiments: First Byelorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts in Vistula-Oder Offensive and Berlin operation. In 1955, became Defense Minister. Zhukov's political influence scared Khrushchev and in 1957 Zhukov was accused of imposing his “personality cult”, “tendency to adventurism”, attempt to withdraw Armed Forces out of control of the Party, and was relieved of his ministry.

---



**ZINOVIEV (Radomyslsky) Grigory Yevseevich** (1883–1936) – eminent Soviet Communist politician. Party member in 1901–1927, 1928–1932 and 1933–1934. Member of the Central Committee in 1912–1927, candidate member of the Central Committee since 1907. Politburo member in 1917 and 1921–1926. After the October Revolution and till 1926 Zinoviev was chairman of Petrograd (Leningrad) Soviet, at the same time in 1919–1926 – Chairman of Comintern. As one of the leaders of the Opposition he was expelled from the Communist Party more than once, groundlessly sentenced to exile and sent to prison. In 1936, was illegally shot.





**KALININ Mikhail Ivanovich** (1875–1946) – Soviet politician. Party member since 1898, member of the Central Committee since 1919, candidate member of the Central Committee in 1912–1917. Candidate member of the Politburo from 1919 till 1926 when he became full member of Politburo. In 1919–1938 – Chairman of the All-Union Executive Committee (VtsIK), in 1922–1938 – Chairman of TsIK. In 1938–1946 – Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

---



**KAMENEV (Rosenfeld) Leo Borisovich** (1883–1936) – Soviet politician. Party member in 1901–1927, 1928–1932 and 1933–1934. Member of the Central Committee in 1917–1918 and 1919–1927. Member of Politburo in 1926. After the October Revolution Kameney was elected First Chairman of VTsIK. In 1918–1926 became chairman of the Moscow Soviet, since 1922 – deputy Chairman of Sovnarkom of the USSR (RSFSR). At the same time worked as a director of Lenin Institute. At the end of the 20s – beginning of the 30s devoted himself to economic, research and publishing activity. As one of the leaders of the opposition Kameney was more than once expelled from the Communist Party, and was groundlessly sentenced to exile and prison. In 1936, illegally subjected to repression and afterwards shot.



**KERENSKY Alexander Fyodorovich** (1881–1970) – politician, lawyer. Since March 1917 – served in the Provisional Government, Minister of Justice, Minister of War, since June 1917 – Minister-Chairman. After the October Revolution made an attempt to fight for the government against the Bolsheviks. Left for France in 1918, moved to the USA in 1940. One of the organizers of the “League for the liberation of people”

---




**KOLCHAK Alexander Vasilievich** (1874–1920) – naval commander, polar explorer during 1900–1902. For his explorations Kolchak was awarded the Order of St. Konstantin, the highest award of Russian Geographical Society and elected full member of the Society. During the Russo-Japanese War commanded a naval gun battery. In 1906, was appointed Chief of the Naval General Staff. In 1909–1910, took part in the expedition to the Bering Strait. In 1912, Kolchak joined the Baltic Fleet. In 1916, became commander of the Black Sea Fleet and was promoted to Vice-Admiral. In 1918, Kolchak started forming troops to struggle against Germans and Bolsheviks. In November 1918, returned to Omsk where he was appointed Minister of War in the White Directory. In November 1918, after a coup, named himself “Supreme Ruler of Russia” (Verkhovnyi Pravitel) and proclaimed the only political objective to defeat Bolshevism and to establish law and order. By summer 1919, Kolchak’s basic military alignment was destroyed. On January 15, 1920, was arrested by the Czechoslovaks and handed over to the leftist authorities “Political Centre”

The Bolshevik revolutionary committee in Irkutsk sentenced Kolchak to death.

---




**KOSYGIN Aleksey Nikolayevich** (1904–1980) – Soviet politician. In 1919, voluntarily joined the Red Army and served till 1921. In 1927, joined the Communist Party. In 1937, became director of a factory. In 1938–1939, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Lenin-grad Soviet. In 1939–1940, People’s Commissar for the textile industry, in 1943–1946 combining this job with the post of Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR. Since 1960, Kosygin became a full member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Realizing all the disadvantages of the administration he attempted to improve it and proposed to implement economic reforms, which are called Kosygin’s reforms. During 1961–1961 serious experiments started, and in 1965 when Kosygin was already Chairman of the Council of Ministers, a decision to implement an economic reform was taken. The inability of the party to understand the necessity of changes led to the refusal from scientific and technological revolution as well as from the implementation of financial and economic reforms.



**LENIN (Ulyanov) Vladimir Ilyich** (1870–1924) – prominent politician and state figure of the Communist party and Soviet state. One of the eminent theorists of scientific socialism. One of the leaders of the Russian Social-Democratic labor party, creator and the main organizer of the Communist Party and the Communist International, founder of the Soviet state. Not only a talented revolutionist, but also a brilliant scholar and philosopher, Lenin is considered one of the most famous figures of the world history of the last century.

Party member since 1893, member of the Central committee in 1905–1906 and 1912–1924. Member of Politburo Central Committee in October 1917 and in 1919–1924. After October Revolution – Chairman of Sovnarkom of the RSFSR. Buried in the Mausoleum in Red Square in Moscow.

---



**MOLOTOV (Skryabin) Vyacheslav Mikhailovich** (1890–1986) –Soviet politician. Party member in 1906–1963 and since 1984, member of the Central Committee in 1921–1957, candidate member of the Central Committee since 1920. Member of the Politburo (Presidium) in 1926–1957, candidate member of Politburo in 1921–1926. In 1920–1921, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), in 1921 – 1930 – Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and First Secretary of the Moscow Municipal Committee. In 1930–1941 – Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (till 1937), at the same time in 1939–1949 and 1953–1956 – Molotov remained People's Commissar (Minister) for Foreign Af-

fares. In 1941–1942 and 1946–1953 – Deputy Chairman of People's Commissars Council (Council of Ministers). In 1956–1957, Minister of State Inspection Agency of the USSR. In 1957–1960, ambassador of the USSR to Mongolia. Retired in 1956.

---




**TSAR NIKOLAI II (NICHOLAS II)** (1868–1918) – the last Emperor of Russia (1894–1917), elder son of Emperor Alexander III. His reign coincided with fast industrial development of the country. The defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War was one of the causes of the First Russian revolution. From 1915 – Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army during World War I. Abdicated during 1917 February Revolution. Executed with all his family in Ekaterinburg.

---




**PUTIN Vladimir Vladimirovich** (born 1952) – Russian politician. Graduated Leningrad State University (Department of Law) in 1975 and recruited to the KGB. Till 1990, served in the KGB First Chief Directorate, worked in Germany. In 1990, became advisor of Chairman of the Leningrad City Council Anatoly Sobchak, since 1998 – First Deputy Chief of Presidential Staff, later – Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Since August 1999 – Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. December 31, 1999, President Boris Yeltsin resigned and appointed Vladimir Putin acting President. March 26, 2000. Putin was elected President of the Russian Federation.



**RYKOV Aleksey Ivanovich** (1881–1938) – Soviet politician. Member of the party since 1898, member of the Central Committee in 1905–1907, 1917–1918 and 1920–1934. Candidate member of the Central Committee in 1907–1912 and 1934–1937. Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee in 1922–1930. After the October Revolution – People’s Commissar of the Interior of the RSFSR, in 1918–1921 and 1923–1924 – Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the RSFSR and USSR. Since 1921, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, in 1923–1924 – Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, in 1924–1930 Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and RSFSR (till 1929). In 1926–1931 – People’s Commissar of Post and Telegraph. In 1937 Rykov was groundlessly arrested, and in 1938, shot.

---



**SAKHAROV Andrey Dmitrievich** (1921–1989) – eminent public figure, nuclear physicist, academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences. One of the creators of the nuclear bomb. Since late 60s – one of the leaders of the human rights movement, protested against bringing Russian troops to Afghanistan. In 1980, was deprived of all awards, titles and sent to exile to the city of Gorky. Came back from exile in 1986, in 1989 elected People’s Deputy of the USSR. Proposed a new draft Constitution. Nobel Peace Prize winner (1975).



**SVERDLOV Yakov Mikhaylovich** (1885–1919) – Bolshevik party member since 1901. In 1905–1907 one of the leaders of Yekaterinburg and Uralian Regional Committees of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. Since 1912, member of the Russian buro of the Central Committee. In 1917, headed the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (the Bolshevik faction). In November 1917, elected chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK). De facto creator of the organizational and staff system of the Soviet state and Communist party. One of the ideologists and initiators of the Red Terror and punitive operations against the Cossacks.

---



**STALIN (Dzhugashvili) Josef Vissarionovich** (1879–1953) – eminent Soviet politician. Party member since 1898. Member of the Central Committee since 1912, member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee since 1917 and in 1919–1953. General Secretary of the Central Committee in 1922–1934. In 1934–1953 Secretary of the Central Committee. After the October Revolution – People's Commissar of Nationalities Affairs of the RSFSR (1917–1923), People's Commissar of State Control of the RSFSR, in 1920–1922 – People's Commissar of the Workers and Peasants Inspection of the RSFSR. Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic and of a number of fronts. Since 1941–1945, Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In 1941–1947, People's Defense Commissar of the USSR, also Min-

ister of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Since 1945 Generalissimo of the Soviet Union.

---



**TROTSKY (Bronstein) Leo Davidovich** (1879–1940) – Soviet politician. Member of the Communist party from 1917 till 1927. Participant of the social-democratic movement since 1897. Member of the Central Committee in 1917–1927. Member of the Politburo in 1917 and 1919–1926. After the October Revolution, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in 1918–1925 – People's Commissar for Army and Navy Affairs, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and TsIK of the USSR. In 1929, deported abroad, in 1932 deprived of Soviet citizenship, in 1940 assassinated in Mexico by an NKVD agent.

---



**CHERNENKO Konstantin Ustinovich** (1911–1985) – Soviet politician. In 1960–1965 – Head of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, later, till 1982 – head of Department, since 1975 – Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Since 1984 – General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.



**Viktor Barabash, Gennady Bordyugov,  
Sergey Devyatov, Elena Kotelenets**

## History issues of Russian 20th century

A Study guide for students of the Faculty of Philology in the major of «Journalism», «Television Broadcasting» and «Advertising and Public Relations» at the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia

Компьютерная верстка и техническое редактирование – С.П. Щербина



ЦНИ «Актуальная история»

E-mail: [andmak@airo-xxi.ru](mailto:andmak@airo-xxi.ru)  
[www.airo-xxi.ru](http://www.airo-xxi.ru)

Подписано в печать с оригинал-макета 08.06.2021  
Формат 60×80 (1)16. 18,0 усл. изд. л.  
Тираж 500 экз. Зак.